We recognize that the federal courts have divided on the question whether Rule 407 proscribes proof of after-the-fact corrective measures where the claim is one of strict liability. Holding that such corrective measures cannot be shown to support strict liability are Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 2036, 72 L.Ed.2d 484 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 862, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981); and Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980). Decisions to the contrary are Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1977); and Abel v. J.C. Penney Co., 488 F. Supp. 891 (D.Minn. 1980), affirmed, 660 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1981).

See also Carmel v. Clapp & Eisenberg, P.C., 960 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Socony–Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 238–39, 60 S.Ct. 811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940)). However, five years earlier, the Fourth Circuit decided Werner v. The Upjohn Company, Inc., 628 F.2d 848 (1980). In Werner, the plaintiff's closing argument offended Federal Rule of Evidence 407 by using a post-injury change in a drug company's warning label as evidence of antecedent negligence.

Understandably, Troja urges that we adopt the Ault rationale and hold that the trial court's decision forbidding him to introduce evidence of subsequent warnings was erroneous. We, however, opt to follow the Fourth Circuit's decision in Werner v. Upjohn, 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), because we think its reasoning sounder than that of Ault. We rely particularly on the language used by the Werner court in rejecting Ault and its progeny:

The express extension of the rule to strict liability was added by amendment effective in December of 1997, prior to which time a substantial majority of federal courts already had adopted this approach. See Wood v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 1995); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1276 (3d Cir. 1992); Raymond, 938 F.2d at 1522-23; Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636-37, amended, 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-72 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960, 102 S.Ct. 2036 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 862 (1981). See generallyHyjek, 944 P.2d at 1039 nn. 6-7 (citing cases).

See In re Joint E. Dist. S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1993); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522-24 (1st Cir. 1991); Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 17, 21-22 (4th Cir. 1988); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637-38 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1984); Grenada Steel Indus. Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1983); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (6th Cir, 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1981); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 852-58 (4th Cir. 1980); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir. 1980); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Dollar v. Long Mfg., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977) (admitting evidence of postaccident warning about backhoe for limited purpose of impeachment). While the District of Columbia has never ruled on the issues, in an unofficial reported district court case the court indicated that it would exclude such evidence in a strict product liability case.

Federal Rule of Evidence 407 enacted the common law rule excluding subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence, with certain exceptions. Werner v. UpJohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 862, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981). Rule 407 follows:

But that issue does not implicate the concept of "feasibility" within the meaning of Rule 407. Accord, Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir. 1980); Schneider v. Eli Lilly and Co., 556 F. Supp. 809 at 811 (E.D.La. 1983); Keil v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 75-7099, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Mich. July 3, 1980); Needham v. White Laboratories, No. 76 C 1101, slip op. at 4 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 13, 1979). Contra, McAdams v. Eli Lilly and Co., No. 77 C 4174, slip op. at 5-6 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 6, 1981) (1954 A-form admissible in rebuttal or cross examination on issue of Lilly's knowledge during 1953 because "[f]easibility also embraces the factual basis upon which the [warning] change could have been made").

See Fish v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 779 F.2d 836, 839-40 (2d Cir. 1985) (strict liability); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The failure of Rule 407 to refer explicitly to actions in strict liability does not prevent its application to such actions."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960, 102 S.Ct. 2036, 72 L.Ed.2d 484 (1982); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (negligence). Accord Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-58 (4th Cir. 1980) (subsequent revised warnings of drug's side effects were not admissible under either negligence or strict products liability principles), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 862, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981). In denying Crane's post-trial motion, the district court concluded that "plaintiff's use of the label evidence focused on the statement that no warning labels were placed on the products at the time of McPadden's exposure, not that the labels were placed on the products later because Crane recognized the danger."

In DeLuryea v. Winthrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 227-29 (8th Cir. 1983), a case involving a drug manufacturer's duty to warn users of its products and the admissibility of a subsequent change in the warning statement the manufacturer packaged with the drug, we observed that some duty-to-warn cases raise issues of reasonableness and foreseeability closely akin to those present in negligence cases. Following the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 862, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981), we noted that whereas in negligence cases the inquiry focuses on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, in typical products liability cases the inquiry focuses not on the defendant's conduct but on the safety of the product. But where the product is inherently unavoidably unsafe, liability hinges on the adequacy of the warning to users, an issue which, like negligence in non-products cases, turns on the reasonableness of the defendant's responses to foreseeable dangers.

Other circuits have taken a different path and held that Rule 407 applies with equal force in strict liability cases. Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960, 102 S.Ct. 2036, 72 L.Ed.2d 484 (1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 862, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981). In Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980), and Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1978), the courts applied Rule 407 in product liability cases without discussing the issue.