In 1949 we extended the application of the statute to apply to death of a viable fetus resulting from prenatal injury. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R. 2d 634. See, also, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412; Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790; Wendt v. Lillo (N.D. Iowa) 182 F. Supp. 56; Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106; Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc. 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912. 2.

Without making an exact numerical count of the cases for and against recognition of such a claim, we are satisfied that the position we take here is in accord with the clear trend of recent decisions. Keyes v. Construction Ser., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ia. 1960). Furthermore, we are convinced that our holding does not collide with any unyielding theoretical barrier.

With the decisions in the Tursi and Prates cases, Connecticut joined the growing number of jurisdictions recognizing liability for prenatal injuries to a viable fetus. As Judge Graven noted in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Sup. 56, 62 (N.D. Iowa), "[s]eldom in the law has there been such an overwhelming trend in such a relatively short period of time as there has been in the trend toward allowing recovery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant." The cases are noted and well considered in the Tursi and Prates opinions, supra.

Having found no direct Iowa authority it is the duty of this court to predict the manner in which the Iowa Supreme Court would resolve this question had it been presented to that court. See Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960), wherein Graven, J., looked at the Restatement of the Law, law review articles, A.L.R., and text books, as well as the cases from other jurisdictions. The Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Section 377 (1934) is as follows: "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.

However, in recent years there has been a considerable trend in judicial decisions allowing such action in some states, under similar wrongful death statutes, (although others hold to the contrary) in the following situations: (1) Where the child was viable at the time of the act complained of but was delivered dead. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R.2d 634; Wendt v. Lillo (Iowa 1960), 182 F. Supp. 56; Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1. (2) Where the child was viable, was delivered alive and died as a result of the injuries.

See Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.) (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So.2d 434 (Miss.) (1954); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.) (1955); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H.) (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106 (Co. Ct. App., Ohio) (1959); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (D.C.N.D. Iowa) (1960); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan.) (1962); Gorke v. LeClerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct., Conn.) (1962). See also Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (Orleans Ct. App., La.) (1951), and Morgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Super. Ct., Del.) (1956).

Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960). The weight of authority evidenced by the foregoing is that an action may be maintained under wrongful death statutes for pre-natal injuries sustained by a viable fetus which is stillborn and we think that Sinkler has indicated that Pennsylvania would align itself with the preponderant view.

Semble, if his property may be preserved for him before birth, his life should be entitled to no less protection. Our furtherance of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is precedented by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in State, Use of Odham v. Sherman (1964), 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71. After searchingly examining the question, the Court directed recovery for the death of a stillborn child caused by a tortious pre-birth injury. A like conclusion was reached in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 61 (D.C.N.D.Iowa 1960), Judge Graven writing trenchantly under the law of Iowa. Additional word from the Supreme Court of South Carolina would have been a welcome guide, but we believe we are pursuing its policy. As that court and the Maryland court have noted, opinion on the subject is divided.

Porter v. Lassiter (1955), 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100; Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412.Gullborg v. Rizzo (3d Cir. 1964), 331 F.2d 557 (Pa. law); Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co. (4th Cir. 1964), 341 F.2d 75 (S.C. law); Mace v. Jung (D.C. Alaska 1962), 210 F. Supp. 706; Wendt v. Lillo (D.C. Iowa 1960), 182 F. Supp. 56. The importance of these cases is emphasized by the fact that the question was undecided under the state law and a federal court was required to make its own determination of what a state court would probably rule in a similar case. The Gullborg Case provides an excellent summary of the existing state of the law in American jurisdictions, although Pennsylvania later ruled to the contrary in Carroll v. Skloff (1964), 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9.

Banker v. McLaughlin, Tex.Civ.App., 200 S.W.2d 699, aff., 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843, 8 A.L.R.2d 1231; Jasper County Lumber Co. v. McMillan, Tex.Civ.App., 188 S.W.2d 731, writ ref'd. Prates v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Sup. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Inc., 11 Terry 258, 128 A.2d 557 (Del. 1956); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (D.C. Iowa 1956); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La.App. 1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R.2d 634 (1949); Woods V. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1950); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P.2d 225 (1955); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Service, Inc., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962). Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1959); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla.