Id.; Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485, 497 (8th Cir. 1963); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D.Iowa 1960). Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law — An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 Minn.L.Rev. 806 (1976).

It is the reasoning employed by those jurisdictions — rather than their status as a "minority view" — which I find unacceptable. Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Sup. 256; Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, 50 Del. 258; Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga.); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (applying Iowa law); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143; Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.); Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La.); State Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179; Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365; Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269; Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104; Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431; Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608; Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis.2d 14. In summary, I am of the opinion that it is both illogical and unreasonable to distinguish between injuries wrongfully inflicted upon a viable foetus which result in death just prior to the infant's separation from the mother and those which cause either permanent injuries or death itself, but at some short interval after birth has occurred. I, therefore, dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the dismissal of the wrongful death actions by the personal representatives of these stillborn foetus.

In 1949 we extended the application of the statute to apply to death of a viable fetus resulting from prenatal injury. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R. 2d 634. See, also, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412; Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790; Wendt v. Lillo (N.D. Iowa) 182 F. Supp. 56; Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106; Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc. 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912. 2.

See Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.) (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So.2d 434 (Miss.) (1954); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.) (1955); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d 249 (N.H.) (1957); Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106 (Co. Ct. App., Ohio) (1959); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (D.C.N.D. Iowa) (1960); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan.) (1962); Gorke v. LeClerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct., Conn.) (1962). See also Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (Orleans Ct. App., La.) (1951), and Morgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Super. Ct., Del.) (1956).

See Kader, The Law of Tortious Pre-Natal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo.L.Rev. 639, 663 (1980). E.g., Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 62 (N.D. Iowa 1960) ("Seldom in the law has there been such an overwhelming trend in such a relatively short period of time as there has been in the trend toward allowing recovery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant.") Wendt, a diversity case, involved a claim for prenatal death of a viable fetus under Iowa law, an issue which had not yet been decided by our court. Judge Graven, in concluding Iowa would allow such recovery, relied to a large extent on this trend. See also W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 55, at 336 (1971) (beginning in 1946, "a rapid series of cases" allowing recovery for prenatal injuries or death where the child is born alive, "brought about what was up till that time the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts").

Courts in other jurisdictions have held that there is no cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus. Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal.App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954); Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1968); McKipplip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971), disapproving a prior interpretation of Iowa law in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Leccese v. McDonough, 279 N.E.2d 339 (Mass. 1972), approving Henry v. Jones, 306 F. Supp. 726 (D.Mass. 1969); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969); Gay v. Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966); Oklahoma: Padillow v. Elrod, 424 P.2d 16 (Okla. 1967); Caroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964), disapproving a prior interpretation of Pennsylvania law in Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1964); Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371 S.W.2d 433 (1963), aff'g the courts' continuing approval of Hagen v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969). There was no right of action at the common law for the death of the child.

Porter v. Lassiter (1955), 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100; Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412.Gullborg v. Rizzo (3d Cir. 1964), 331 F.2d 557 (Pa. law); Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co. (4th Cir. 1964), 341 F.2d 75 (S.C. law); Mace v. Jung (D.C. Alaska 1962), 210 F. Supp. 706; Wendt v. Lillo (D.C. Iowa 1960), 182 F. Supp. 56. The importance of these cases is emphasized by the fact that the question was undecided under the state law and a federal court was required to make its own determination of what a state court would probably rule in a similar case. The Gullborg Case provides an excellent summary of the existing state of the law in American jurisdictions, although Pennsylvania later ruled to the contrary in Carroll v. Skloff (1964), 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9.

sidered, have held that under wrongful death statutes, an action may be maintained to recover damages for the wrongful death of a viable unborn child. Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Sup. 358, 224 A.2d 406; Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Sup. 256, 181 A.2d 448; Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557; Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100; Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1; Rice v. Rizk, (Ky.) 453 S.W.2d 732; Mitchell v. Couch, (Ky.) 285 S.W.2d 901; State, Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71; Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434; White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617; Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249; Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 11 Ohio Op.2d 383, 167 N.E.2d 106; Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42; Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107; Gullborg v. Rizzo, (3 Cir.) 331 F.2d 557; Todd v. Sandidge Construction Company, (4 Cir.) 341 F.2d 75; Wendt v. Lillo, (D.C.Iowa) 182 F. Supp. 56; Panagopoulous v. Martin, (S.D.W. Va.) 295 F. Supp. 220. See 15 A.L.R.3d, Annotation, Section 2, page 995.

A number of courts subsequently passing on the question have held that an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child is maintainable where the fetus was viable at the time of the injury. At present they are: Connecticut: Gorke v. Le Clerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn.App. 1962); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del.App. 1956); Georgia: Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga.App. 1955); lowa: Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Maryland: State, Use of Odham v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964); Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, supra; Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, supra; New Hampshire: Poliquin v. Macdonald, supra; Ohio: Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio App. 1959); South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964), and Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); West Virginia: Panagopolous v. Martin, supra; Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967). It has been stated in the following cases that an action will not lie for the wrongful death of a stillborn child: California: Norman v. Murphy, 268 P.2d 178 (Cal.App. 1954); Massachusetts: Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., supra; Michigan: Estate of Powers v. City of Troy, supra (Footnote 5); Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 50 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 1951); New Jersey: Graf v. Taggert, 20

CONNECTICUT: Prates v. Sears, Roebuck and Company (1955), 19 Conn. Sup. 487 ( 118 A.2d 633); MINNESOTA: Verkennes v. Corniea (1949), 229 Minn. 365 ( 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 ALR2d 634); NEVADA: White v. Yup (1969), 85 Nev. 527 ( 458 P.2d 617).IOWA: Wendt v. Lillo (ND Iowa, 1960), 182 F. Supp. 56; WEST VIRGINIA: Panagopoulous v. Martin (SD W Va, 1969), 295 F. Supp. 220.NORTH CAROLINA: Stetson v. Easterling (1968), 274 N.C. 152 ( 161 S.E.2d 531); the North Carolina Supreme Court opined that the prenatally injured child "if he had lived, could have maintained an action to recover damages on account of injuries negligently inflicted upon him when en ventra sa mere," but held no cause of action since the North Carolina death act required proof of "pecuniary injury" and there was no sufficient allegation thereof.