Wendt v. Lillo

3 Citing cases

  1. Smith v. New York Life Insurance Company

    208 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Iowa 1962)   Cited 6 times
    Predicting Iowa law

    Having found no direct Iowa authority it is the duty of this court to predict the manner in which the Iowa Supreme Court would resolve this question had it been presented to that court. See Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960), wherein Graven, J., looked at the Restatement of the Law, law review articles, A.L.R., and text books, as well as the cases from other jurisdictions. The Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Section 377 (1934) is as follows: "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.

  2. Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

    213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968)   Cited 42 times
    Construing predecessor statute to be derivative in nature because the representative recovers only such damages as were recoverable by his decedent

    Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, Ch. 5 (1966). Illustrative of those which treat the viable fetus as a person are: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.Ia. 1960); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Sup. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); State, Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964), with a strong dissenting view; Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Todd v. Sandidge Constru. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964), with a significant dissent; and Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins., 34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967). On the other hand, a number of equally strong and persuasive decisions have held that a stillborn, viable fetus is not a person under similar death statutes.

  3. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.

    34 Wis. 2d 14 (Wis. 1967)   Cited 53 times
    Concluding that the word "person" includes a viable fetus for purposes of wrongful death statute

    Porter v. Lassiter (1955), 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100; Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412.Gullborg v. Rizzo (3d Cir. 1964), 331 F.2d 557 (Pa. law); Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co. (4th Cir. 1964), 341 F.2d 75 (S.C. law); Mace v. Jung (D.C. Alaska 1962), 210 F. Supp. 706; Wendt v. Lillo (D.C. Iowa 1960), 182 F. Supp. 56. The importance of these cases is emphasized by the fact that the question was undecided under the state law and a federal court was required to make its own determination of what a state court would probably rule in a similar case. The Gullborg Case provides an excellent summary of the existing state of the law in American jurisdictions, although Pennsylvania later ruled to the contrary in Carroll v. Skloff (1964), 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9.