Id., 191 N.W.2d at 709. The McKillip court acknowledged that the federal court in Iowa had ruled otherwise in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960), but the Iowa court declined to follow that authority. McKillip, 191 N.W.2d at 709.

As a consequence of this ruling, defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action must be denied. Among the decisions allowing recovery of damages for wrongful death in the case of a stillborn child are the following: Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1964); but see, Marko v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.Iowa, 1960); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R.2d 634 (1949); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Sup. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Kentucky, 1955); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Delaware, 1956); Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Poliquin v. Macdonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).

See Kader, The Law of Tortious Pre-Natal Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo.L.Rev. 639, 663 (1980). E.g., Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 62 (N.D. Iowa 1960) ("Seldom in the law has there been such an overwhelming trend in such a relatively short period of time as there has been in the trend toward allowing recovery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant.") Wendt, a diversity case, involved a claim for prenatal death of a viable fetus under Iowa law, an issue which had not yet been decided by our court. Judge Graven, in concluding Iowa would allow such recovery, relied to a large extent on this trend. See also W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 55, at 336 (1971) (beginning in 1946, "a rapid series of cases" allowing recovery for prenatal injuries or death where the child is born alive, "brought about what was up till that time the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts").

A number of courts subsequently passing on the question have held that an action for the wrongful death of an unborn child is maintainable where the fetus was viable at the time of the injury. At present they are: Connecticut: Gorke v. Le Clerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn.App. 1962); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del.App. 1956); Georgia: Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga.App. 1955); lowa: Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d 1 (Kan. 1962); Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Maryland: State, Use of Odham v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964); Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, supra; Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, supra; New Hampshire: Poliquin v. Macdonald, supra; Ohio: Stidam v. Ashmore, 167 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio App. 1959); South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964), and Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); West Virginia: Panagopolous v. Martin, supra; Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967). It has been stated in the following cases that an action will not lie for the wrongful death of a stillborn child: California: Norman v. Murphy, 268 P.2d 178 (Cal.App. 1954); Massachusetts: Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., supra; Michigan: Estate of Powers v. City of Troy, supra (Footnote 5); Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 50 N.W.2d 229 (Neb. 1951); New Jersey: Graf v. Taggert, 20

It is the reasoning employed by those jurisdictions — rather than their status as a "minority view" — which I find unacceptable. Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23 Conn. Sup. 256; Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, 50 Del. 258; Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100 (Ga.); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (applying Iowa law); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143; Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky.); Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La.); State Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179; Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365; Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269; Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104; Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431; Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608; Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis.2d 14. In summary, I am of the opinion that it is both illogical and unreasonable to distinguish between injuries wrongfully inflicted upon a viable foetus which result in death just prior to the infant's separation from the mother and those which cause either permanent injuries or death itself, but at some short interval after birth has occurred. I, therefore, dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the dismissal of the wrongful death actions by the personal representatives of these stillborn foetus.

Not only do the statutes differ from state to state but the facts, particularly the period of gestation, differ from case to case. The reported cases (by jurisdiction) which have allowed the action are: CONNECTICUT: Hatala v. Markiewicz (1966), 26 Conn. Sup. 358, 224 A.2d 406; DELAWARE: Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara, Inc. (1956), 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: Simmons v. Howard University (D.D.C. 1971), 323 F. Supp. 529; GEORGIA: Porter v. Lassiter (1955), 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100; IOWA: Wendt v. Lillo (1960, D.C. Iowa), 182 F. Supp. 56 (applying Iowa law); KANSAS: Hale v. Manion (1962), 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1; KENTUCKY: Mitchell v. Couch (1955, Ky.), 285 S.W.2d 901; LOUISIANA: Valence v. Louisiana Power Light Co. (1951, La. App.), 50 So.2d 847; MARYLAND: State use of Odham v. Sherman (1964), 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71; MICHIGAN: O'Neill v. Morse (Mich. 1971), 188 N.W.2d 785; MINNESOTA: Verkennes v. Corniea (1949), 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 ALR 2d 634; MISSISSIPPI: Rainey v. Horn (1954), 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434; NEVADA: White v. Yup (Nev. 1969), 458 P.2d 617; NEW HAMPSHIRE: Poliquin v. MacDonald (1957), 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249; OHIO: Stidam v. Ashmore (1959), 109 Ohio App. 431, 11 Ohio Ops.2d 383, 167 N.E.2d 106; SOUTH CAROLINA: Fowler v. Woodward (1964), 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42; WEST VIRGINIA: Panagopoulous v. Martin (D.C., W. Va. 1969), 295 F. Supp. 220; WISCONSIN: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. (1967), 34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107. Those cases which have denied it are: CALIFORNIA: