Semble, if his property may be preserved for him before birth, his life should be entitled to no less protection. Our furtherance of the reasoning of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is precedented by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in State, Use of Odham v. Sherman (1964), 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71. After searchingly examining the question, the Court directed recovery for the death of a stillborn child caused by a tortious pre-birth injury. A like conclusion was reached in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 61 (D.C.N.D.Iowa 1960), Judge Graven writing trenchantly under the law of Iowa. Additional word from the Supreme Court of South Carolina would have been a welcome guide, but we believe we are pursuing its policy. As that court and the Maryland court have noted, opinion on the subject is divided.

With the decisions in the Tursi and Prates cases, Connecticut joined the growing number of jurisdictions recognizing liability for prenatal injuries to a viable fetus. As Judge Graven noted in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Sup. 56, 62 (N.D. Iowa), "[s]eldom in the law has there been such an overwhelming trend in such a relatively short period of time as there has been in the trend toward allowing recovery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant." The cases are noted and well considered in the Tursi and Prates opinions, supra.

Id.; Ross v. Philip Morris Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485, 497 (8th Cir. 1963); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D.Iowa 1960). Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law — An Argument for Expanded Scope of Inquiry, 53 Minn.L.Rev. 806 (1976).

Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960). The weight of authority evidenced by the foregoing is that an action may be maintained under wrongful death statutes for pre-natal injuries sustained by a viable fetus which is stillborn and we think that Sinkler has indicated that Pennsylvania would align itself with the preponderant view.

Id., 191 N.W.2d at 709. The McKillip court acknowledged that the federal court in Iowa had ruled otherwise in Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960), but the Iowa court declined to follow that authority. McKillip, 191 N.W.2d at 709.

In the absence of direct local authority as to state law, it is proper for a federal court to look to other sources from other jurisdictions, treatises and restatements. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.Iowa 1960). Iowa law does provide broad principles for interpretation of insurance contracts.

While these decisions are not binding precedent on this court, I am free to evaluate the reasoning and weigh the conclusions reached by other courts faced with the same issue while deciding this case. Glassman Construction Co. v. Fidelity Casualty Co. of N.Y., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 356 F.2d 340, 342 n. 7, cert. den. 384 U.S. 987, 86 S.Ct. 1890, 16 L.Ed.2d 1005 (1966); Summers v. Wallace Hospital, 276 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1960); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.Iowa 1960). See Wright, Federal Courts § 58 at 240 (1970).

As a consequence of this ruling, defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action must be denied. Among the decisions allowing recovery of damages for wrongful death in the case of a stillborn child are the following: Gullborg v. Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1964); but see, Marko v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A.2d 502 (1966); Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co., 341 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1964); Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.Iowa, 1960); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R.2d 634 (1949); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 34 Wis.2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967); Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Sup. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Kentucky, 1955); Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); Worgan v. Greggo Ferrara Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Delaware, 1956); Use of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Poliquin v. Macdonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955).

However, in recent years there has been a considerable trend in judicial decisions allowing such action in some states, under similar wrongful death statutes, (although others hold to the contrary) in the following situations: (1) Where the child was viable at the time of the act complained of but was delivered dead. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838, 10 A.L.R.2d 634; Wendt v. Lillo (Iowa 1960), 182 F. Supp. 56; Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1. (2) Where the child was viable, was delivered alive and died as a result of the injuries.

Having found no direct Iowa authority it is the duty of this court to predict the manner in which the Iowa Supreme Court would resolve this question had it been presented to that court. See Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960), wherein Graven, J., looked at the Restatement of the Law, law review articles, A.L.R., and text books, as well as the cases from other jurisdictions. The Restatement, Conflict of Laws, Section 377 (1934) is as follows: "The place of wrong is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.