[Citations.]" ( Wemyss v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [ 241 P.2d 525].) (1b) Construing these three sections together, we hold the Legislature intended to create the following scheme: (1) section 228, paragraph one, is to be applied first, distributing each one-half of the community property to the named classes of relatives; (2) section 230 is to be applied second, [if either spouse leaves no such relatives] passing affected property to the next of kin of the decedent; and (3) [if there are no next of kin of the decedent to take the section 230 property, the second paragraphs of sections 228 and 296.4 are to be applied], passing affected property to the blood relatives of the predeceased spouse.
This language is not applicable to the problem here involved. We are directed both by statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858) and by case law ( Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616 [ 241 P.2d 525]) that when confronted with two statutes dealing with the same subject matter, they should, if possible, be harmonized and effect given to both. Here it is possible to harmonize the statutes and to give effect to both.
[7] More appropriately, "all parts of a statute should be read together and construed to achieve harmony between seemingly conflicting provisions rather than holding that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency." ( Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [ 241 P.2d 525].) [8] Since Mr. Quick was already 43 1/2 per cent disabled when he suffered his 1959 heart attack, section 4750, which directs that the employer shall be liable only for such disability due to the later injury as though no prior disability had existed, required a determination by the commission of the percentage of permanent disability caused solely by the 1959 heart attack.
[3] The proper construction to be given to this statute is to be found by construing it as a whole and harmonizing its various parts. ( Wemyss v. SuperiorCourt, 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [ 241 P.2d 525]; People v. Moroney, 24 Cal.2d 638, 642 [ 150 P.2d 888].) [4] Applying these rules to the construction of this section, it is reasonable to conclude that the reference to "every Jewish law and custom," etc. must be construed to include only such Jewish laws and customs as are generally recognized as among "the orthodox Hebrew religious requirements" which must be followed in preparation of kosher meat and meat products.
The Pearsons urge that if the word utilized is interpreted to include the requirement of a sale of their real property assessed at less than $5,000 this creates a conflict between the two sentences in section 2164, and the rule should be applied that "Where possible, all parts of a statute should be read together and considered to achieve harmony between seemingly conflicting provisions, rather than holding that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency." ( Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [ 241 P.2d 525].) It is their contention that under the first sentence of section 2164 the Legislature has unequivocally declared that the recipients may continue to own real property assessed up to the amount there stated and that the recipients may not, by reason of such ownership, be denied assistance payments.
While mandamus will lie to attack the order ( Austin v. Turrentine, 30 Cal.App.2d 750 [ 87 P.2d 72, 88 P.2d 178]) such order may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment because it "substantially affects the right of a party." (Code Civ. Proc., § 956) The granting or denial of a motion to quash a subpoena is not appealable and may be attacked by mandamus ( Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616 [ 241 P.2d 525]), and is reviewable on appeal from the judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 956; Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal.2d 559, 562 [ 212 P.2d 878]; see McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.2d 386 [ 159 P.2d 944].)
We are thus enjoined, wherever possible, to reconcile seemingly conflicting or inconsistent provisions by reading all parts of a statute together and construing them to achieve harmony rather than holding that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency. ( Wemyss v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [ 241 P.2d 525].) Keeping in mind these precepts of construction, we turn to the disputed enactment.
We are thus enjoined, wherever possible, to reconcile seemingly conflicting or inconsistent provisions by reading all parts of a statute together and construing them to achieve harmony rather than holding that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency. ( Wemyss v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [ 241 P.2d 525].) Our duty to harmonize statutes if reasonably possible applies even though the apparent inconsistencies appear in different codes.
[Citations.]'" ( Estate of McDill, 14 Cal.3d 831, 837 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874], quoting Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616, 621 [ 241 P.2d 525].) Defendant's reliance upon Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners, 41 Cal.App.3d 924 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 479], is misplaced.
(1b) The aggregate legislation comprising the Judges' Retirement Law must be viewed as an integrated whole with a single objective and all parts must be construed to harmonize the legislative scheme and to attain the legislative objective. ( Wemyss v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 616 [ 241 P.2d 525]; Ivens v. Simon, 212 Cal.App.2d 177 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 801].) That law contains numerous and varied provisions, construction of which requires reference to other provisions for definition of terms.