Opinion
CASE NO. 1:06 CV 601.
August 22, 2007
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants on June 18, 2007 (Docket #60). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, filed on January 17, 2007 (Docket #17), sets forth three causes of action. Plaintiff's First Cause of Action alleges that he was retaliated against for previously asserting claims for benefits under an ERISA plan. Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action alleges retaliation in violation of Ohio public policy, citing (1) Ohio public policy prohibiting retaliation against employees who assert claims for benefits under an ERISA plan; (2) Ohio public policy prohibiting retaliation against employees who "sue" their employers; and, (3) Ohio public policy prohibiting retaliation against employees who retain counsel to advise them of their legal rights. Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action alleges age discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4412, et seq. Defendants seeks summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff's claim.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court is satisfied "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The burden of showing the absence of any such "genuine issue" rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). A fact is "material" only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is "genuine" requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. The court will view the summary judgment motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In sum, proper summary judgment analysis entails "the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
CONCLUSION
Based upon a thorough review of the briefs submitted by the Parties, as well as the materials submitted in support thereof, genuine issues of material fact exist which make summary judgment inappropriate in this case.
With regard to Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Court recognizes, and Plaintiff concedes, that Plaintiff's Ohio public policy claim is preempted insofar as it alleges retaliation for asserting a claim for benefits under ERISA. However, Count II also relies upon public policies prohibiting retaliation against employees who file lawsuits against their employer or retain counsel. In determining whether ERISA preempts state common law causes of action for wrongful termination, courts focus on the employer's alleged motivation in terminating the employee, concluding that a claim is preempted when the complaint alleges that "the employer had a pension-defeating motive in terminating the employment." Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 298 U.S. 133, 139 (1990).
This Court has carefully reviewed the facts presented by the Parties. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants had a "benefit-defeating motive" for their alleged actions. Rather, Plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against for pursing his claims for short and long term disability benefits in the earlier lawsuit. Although refuted by Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that he was referred to, by at least one company executive, as "the guy who sued us" without reference to Plaintiff's ERISA rights or payments to be made under ERISA. Further, in Plaintiff's earlier lawsuit, while his long-term disability claim was governed by ERISA, the Parties stipulated that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim relative to short-term disability benefits was brought under North Carolina law, not ERISA. Accordingly, Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint is not preempted by ERISA.
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants (Docket #60), is hereby DENIED. A jury trial is set for October 22, 2007 at 8:30 a.m. Parties shall refer to previously issued Trial Order for required filings and deadlines.
IT IS SO ORDERED.