Opinion
Case No. 1:17-cv-01240-DAD-EPG-PC
05-14-2020
FRANK WELLS, Plaintiff, v. ROSA GONZALES, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF Nos. 58, 75) OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS
Frank Wells ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court are Defendant's motion for summary judgment and Defendant's motion to strike unauthorized sur-replies. For the reasons described below, the undersigned recommends that the motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part and the motion to strike be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on September 15, 2017. (ECF No. 1). The undersigned screened the Complaint and found that it "stated cognizable claims against Defendant Gonzales for violation of Plaintiff's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, unreasonable searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and violation of the Bane Act." (ECF No. 8 at 2). The Court also recommended dismissing Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id.). On July 18, 2018, the District Judge adopted the findings and recommendation. (ECF No. 10).
Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.
On July 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a request for leave to amend and lodged a proposed First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 48). The Court denied leave to amend on March 31, 2020. (ECF No. 91).
On September 4, 2019, Defendant Gonzales filed the instant motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 58). Plaintiff filed an opposition and supplemental opposition, and Defendant filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 63, 68, 70). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed multiple responses to the reply, and Defendant filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's unauthorized responses. (ECF Nos. 71-73, 75). Plaintiff filed an opposition, and Defendant filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 78, 82).
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
This summary of the Complaint is taken from the findings and recommendation issued on April 6, 2018. (ECF No. 8 at 3-6).
Plaintiff is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR"). The Complaint concerns events that occurred while Plaintiff was an inmate at Valley State Prison ("VSP"). On November 16, 2016, Defendant Gonzales, a correctional officer, confiscated from the Main Library, where Plaintiff works, a Native totem of spiritual significance belonging to Plaintiff, which was on display for Native Heritage Month. She physically handled the artifact in a disrespectful manner, not in accordance with Native traditions and practices. Plaintiff approached his supervisor, who told him to speak directly with Defendant and her partner, Correctional Officer Lang. When Plaintiff discussed the issue with Correctional Officer Lang, he was told that he needed to speak with Gonzales because she was the one who "took your Bear." Plaintiff then tried to resolve the issue through the Men's Advisory Council.
The totem was in the shape of a bear carved from soap. (Wells Dep. 67).
When Plaintiff finally attempted to resolve the issue with Gonzales, she became immediately agitated and combative. She eventually asked Plaintiff "what the (expletive) do you want, and hurry up I ain't got all (expletive) day."
Gonzales then ordered Plaintiff to "assume the position and proceeded to perform a body search of Plaintiff aggressively." Gonzales then ordered Plaintiff to stand with hands behind his back and again asked what Plaintiff wanted. Plaintiff requested the return of the native artifact because it was a religiously significant item as identified in the Department Operations Manual and the California Code of Regulations Title 15. Plaintiff goes on to describe more of the interaction, which ended in Gonzales threatening Plaintiff with a write-up for manipulation of staff. Plaintiff then said that he would be utilizing the appeals system to file a staff misconduct complaint. Gonzales responded "Are you threatening me? I'll write you up right now." Plaintiff asked for a "confiscation slip pursuant to policy identified within the CCR Title 15 § 3287(a)(2)," but Gonzales refused to provide one.
Plaintiff again told Gonzales that he intended to exercise his right to file a complaint against Gonzales. Gonzales replied "Do what you're [] gonna do I don't give a (expletive) cause you know I'll do what I gotta do."
Plaintiff returned to his workplace and began writing a staff misconduct complaint using form 602. A few minutes later, Gonzales entered Plaintiff's workplace and "loudly and aggressively began intimidating and threatening co-workers with punitive searches saying 'This (expletive) area is a (expletive) mess! I will be back in two (2) weeks and I'm gonna tear this (expletive) place up.'" Plaintiff was afraid that Gonzales was going to do "something bad against him." Plaintiff feared filing the complaint against Gonzales as a result of her actions. Nevertheless, Plaintiff continued to prepare his grievance.
On November 21, 2016, Plaintiff was told to go to the Main Yard gate because Gonzales wanted to speak with him. Gonzales was waiting for Plaintiff and aggressively ordered Plaintiff to "assume the position." Plaintiff was searched by Gonzales. Then Gonzales ordered Plaintiff to stand with his hands behind his back. Plaintiff was afraid and anxious. Gonzales then told Plaintiff to "drop the issue" or she would write Plaintiff up for manipulation of staff. Plaintiff responded "I requested formally through the proper procedure (form 22 inmate request) for a confiscation slip as required and that I be allowed to determine the disposition." Gonzales yelled at Plaintiff to "drop the issue." Plaintiff interpreted this comment as a threat. Plaintiff told Gonzales that he had submitted the staff complaint and that he thought Gonzales was now retaliating against him.
Approximately seven days later, Plaintiff was summoned to C-facility Program Office by Captain Flores. Captain Flores had the staff complaint and told Plaintiff "Don't you think this is a battle that you should [sic] be choosing?" Captain Flores also told Plaintiff that she knew about Gonzales' aggressive nature that that Plaintiff should just accept it.
On January 25, 2017, other Native Inmates complained about Gonzales for desecrating a Sacred Purification Ceremony. Plaintiff alleges this was the beginning of a pattern of harassment "directed at Plaintiff's Native Culture, Spirituality, Artifacts, and Community." Plaintiff attempted to file a grievance, but it was cancelled because he was not present during the incident he was complaining about. Gonzales then "began maliciously accosting Natives wearing traditional regalia to wit Beaded Necklaces, Headbands, Wristbands, etc... and confiscating said artifacts which are authorized and protected Constitutionally." Plaintiff describes multiple other incidents of confiscation of religious artifacts, harassment of Natives and other religions, and retaliatory actions, including the confiscating of Eagle Feathers held by another inmate.
Plaintiff states that he "now suffers severe stress and fear as a result of the Defendant[']s direct actions and no longer wears or displays his Native regalia (necklaces, medicine bag, wristbands, headwear) in his traditional way for fear that Defendant will confiscate Spiritual belongings. Plaintiff feels deprived of his right to exercise his religious practices."
III. MOTION TO STRIKE
In Defendant's reply to Plaintiff's opposition to summary judgment, Defendant asserted that Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 260 by not reproducing the itemized facts in Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Facts, admitting facts that are undisputed, and denying facts that are disputed with citation to evidence in support of denial. (ECF No. 70 at 2). Defendant also objected and moved to strike some of the evidence offered by Plaintiff in his opposition to summary judgment. (ECF No. 70-1).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's objections to the evidence offered by Plaintiff in his opposition. (ECF No. 71). Plaintiff also filed a response to address the substance of Defendant's reply. (ECF No. 72). Plaintiff also filed a response to Defendant's statement of undisputed facts. (ECF No. 73).
Defendant requests the Court to strike Plaintiff's unauthorized sur-replies. (ECF No. 75). Given the lack of prejudice to Defendant in allowing Plaintiff to file a sur-reply, the Court will treat the sur-reply as including a request to file a sur-reply and recommend granting it nunc pro tunc. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike should be denied.
IV. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Gonzales moves for summary judgment on the entirety of the Complaint. Defendant argues that the undisputed facts in this case establish that Defendant did not violate Plaintiff's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, did not violate RLUIPA, did not retaliate against Plaintiff in violation of the First Amendment, did not violate Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, did not violate the Bane Act, and is entitled to qualified immunity.
A. Summary Judgment Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there "is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Albino v. Baca ("Albino II"), 747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) ("If there is a genuine dispute about material facts, summary judgment will not be granted."). A party asserting that a fact cannot be disputed must support the assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
A party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). If the moving party moves for summary judgment on the basis that a material fact lacks any proof, the Court must determine whether a fair-minded fact-finder could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [fact-finder] could reasonably find for the plaintiff."). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by factual data" are not enough to rebut a summary judgment motion. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Angel v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 653 F.2d 1293, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981)).
In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). In judging the evidence at the summary judgment stage, the Court "must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011). It need only draw inferences, however, where there is "evidence in the record . . . from which a reasonable inference . . . may be drawn"; the court need not entertain inferences that are unsupported by fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330 n.2 (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir. 1983)).
B. Objections to Evidence
To the extent the Court necessarily relied on evidence that has been objected to, the Court relied only on evidence it considered to be admissible. It is not the practice of the Court to rule on evidentiary matters individually in the context of summary judgment.
C. Free Exercise & RLUIPA Claims
Defendant Gonzales argues that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff was not substantially burdened from practicing his religion by the confiscation of his soap bear totem because Plaintiff had several additional means of observing his religious beliefs. (ECF No. 58-2 at 17). Defendant argues that VSP's policies and regulations furthered a compelling government interest and were the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. (ECF No. 58-2 at 20). Defendant further argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under RLUIPA because Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are moot because he is no longer housed at Valley State Prison and has been transferred to Mule Creek State Prison. (Id.).
1. Legal Standards
a. Free Exercise
"The First Amendment, applicable to state action by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits government from making a law prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that prisoners retain the protections of the First Amendment. A prisoner's right to freely exercise his religion, however, is limited by institutional objectives and by the loss of freedom concomitant with incarceration." Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "'To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials,' the Supreme Court has directed that alleged infringements of prisoners' free exercise rights be 'judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights.'" Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)). "The challenged conduct 'is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'" Jones, 791 F.3d at 1032 (quoting O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349).
"To merit protection under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, a religious claim must satisfy two criteria. First, the claimant's proffered belief must be sincerely held; the First Amendment does not extend to so-called religions which . . . are obviously shams and absurdities and whose members are patently devoid of religious sincerity. Second, the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns." Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original), supplemented, 65 F.3d 148 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the Supreme Court's disapproval of the "centrality" test and finding that the "sincerity" test in Malik determines whether the Free Exercise Clause applies).
Additionally, "[a] person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in question substantially burdens the person's practice of her religion." Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). "A substantial burden . . . place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." Id. at 1031-32 (9th Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
b. RLUIPA
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA") provides:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution..., even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.
In any RLUIPA claim, one must first identify the "religious exercise" allegedly impinged upon, and then must ask whether the prison regulation or action at issue "substantially burdens" that religious exercise. Greene v. Solano Cty. Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). "RLUIPA does not define 'substantial burden,' but [the Ninth Circuit] has held that 'a substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.'" Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1124-25 (citing San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)). "Generally, the term 'substantial burden' in RLUIPA is construed in light of federal Supreme Court and appellate jurisprudence involving the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prior to the Court's decision in Emp't Div. Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990)." Int'l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006)). "In the context of a prisoner's constitutional challenge to institutional policies, this court has held that a substantial burden occurs 'where the state ... denies [an important benefit] because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.'" Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1125 (citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)).
2. Substantial Burden
At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he stored the soap bear totem in a Native spiritual box along with his Native headdress and other "[N]ative artifacts of spiritual significance," such as "beaded choker, beaded necklaces, rosettes, wristbands, feathers, and other hair adornments." (Wells Dep. 69:4-14). Plaintiff had religious items in his cell and was allowed to keep religious artifacts inside his locker. (Wells Dep. 75:14-23). There were also multiple catalogs available for inmates to purchase items to use to create spiritual artifacts. (Wells Dep. 75:9-13).
Plaintiff received the soap bear totem as a gift from another inmate, Larry Knight. (Wells Dep. 67:23-68:16). Knight told Plaintiff that he made the bear with prayers of Plaintiff in mind for "teachings and songs and dances" that Plaintiff had taught Knight. (Wells Dep. 72:21-23). Plaintiff explained, "This is a common practice among natives that we call gifting, also known as potlatch." (Wells Dep. 72:23-25).
During the deposition, Plaintiff stated:
And I want to be on record as far as the deprivation in the First Amendment. As I cited earlier, potlatch is an extremely sacred part of our practices, I'll use your term, and that is the claim here of the deprivation on my part because I was deprived of being able to gift or give away to the children who needed help and that, in and of itself, is what I'm claiming is the deprivation, in and of itself, as well as being deprived of the artifact in which to do so.(Wells Dep. 77:13-21). ///
"At the time it was the Ronald McDonald House that we were going to be donating to. They were opening up a new house for the children, and I had decided [the soap bear] would be a good piece because it had great spiritual energy and strength that would help the children in their journey to recover and heal. After the Native Heritage Month was completed, I would donate it. At the time it was on display in the library with my other native artifacts, that includes a full headdress, multiple rosettes, and beaded necklaces, wristbands, other effigies that were there, including an eagle and a wolf. None of which the defendant took and were all visible and present." (Wells Dep. 70:11-23).
Although Plaintiff argues that "a desecration of any aspect of his spirituality is a violation of his identity," (ECF No. 63 at 24), a "substantial burden . . . place[s] more than an inconvenience on religious exercise," Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031. Here, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that despite confiscation of the soap bear totem, Plaintiff was in possession of other spiritual artifacts and had access to multiple catalogs available to purchase items to use to create spiritual artifacts. There is no evidence demonstrating that Plaintiff was unable to pray or to engage in potlatch, although the Court recognizes that he was not able to gift the confiscated soap bear totem specifically.
At his deposition, Plaintiff answered affirmatively when asked whether he has still been able to pray after November 16, 2016, the day that the soap bear totem was confiscated. (Wells Dep. 106:9-11).
There is also no genuine dispute of material fact that confiscation of the soap bear totem did not coerce Plaintiff into acting contrary to his religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on Plaintiff to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs. See Jones, 791 F.3d at 1031-32. In the Complaint, Plaintiff states that he "now suffers severe stress and fear as a result of the Defendant[']s direct actions and no longer wears or displays his Native regalia (necklaces, medicine bag, wristbands, headwear) in his traditional way for fear that Defendant will confiscate Spiritual belongings." (ECF No. 1 at 17-18). Plaintiff also asserts in his opposition to summary judgment that Defendant's actions generated fear, which deterred Plaintiff from possessing Native artifacts of spiritual significance to the point where Plaintiff sent such artifacts home to preserve their sacred nature. (ECF No. 63 at 23). However, Plaintiff acknowledges that he is allowed to possess Native spiritual artifacts "[a]s long as [they're] not considered a safety and security issue." (Wells Dep. 74:10-11). Further, Plaintiff relies only on a self-serving declaration that lacks detailed facts and supporting evidence to support these assertions (e.g., the difference in how he wore or displayed his Native regalia before and after the incident, or which artifacts Plaintiff in fact sent home due to his fear). See F.T.C. v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Apr. 11, 1997) ("A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.").
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant Gonzales has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Plaintiff was not substantially burdened from practicing his religion by the confiscation of his soap bear totem. Therefore, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the First Amendment free exercise of religion claim and RLUIPA claim.
In light of the Court's conclusion that Plaintiff was not substantially burdened from practicing his religion, the Court declines to address whether the regulation at issue is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, in furtherance of a compelling government interest, and the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.
D. Retaliation
Defendant Gonzales contends that summary judgment is appropriate "because Plaintiff has no evidence that Gonzales retaliated against Plaintiff for filing a grievance against Gonzales and informing Gonzales that he filed a lawsuit against her, and Gonzales' actions advanced legitimate correctional goals." (ECF No. 58-2 at 21). Defendant argues that Plaintiff "lacks evidence to meet two elements: a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action; and that the Defendant's retaliatory action did not advance legitimate correctional goals." (ECF No. 58-2 at 22).
1. Legal Standard
The First Amendment protects a prisoner's right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities and a prisoner's right of meaningful access to the courts. Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). In the context of prisons, a First Amendment retaliation claim is comprised of five basic elements: "(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).
While prisoners have no freestanding right to a prison grievance process, see Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.2003), "a prisoner's fundamental right of access to the courts hinges on his ability to access the prison grievance system," Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995) overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 n.2 (2001). Because filing administrative grievances and initiating civil litigation are protected activities, it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate against prisoners for engaging in these activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567.
2. Analysis
a. November 18, 2016 Conversation Regarding Manipulation of Staff
It is undisputed that Plaintiff approached Defendant Gonzales on November 18, 2016 to informally resolve the confiscation of the soap bear totem. (ECF No. 58-3 at 4; ECF No. 73 at 4). Although the parties characterize the subsequent conversation in contrasting terms—counseling, informing, advising as opposed to threatening—it is undisputed that Plaintiff stated that he intended to file a staff misconduct complaint against Defendant and that Defendant stated that if Plaintiff continued he would be written up for manipulation of staff. (ECF No. 58-3 at 4; ECF No. 73 at 4).
The parties do dispute whether the manipulation of staff write-up would be in the form of a counseling chrono (CDCR form 128) or a rules violation report (CDCR form 115). (ECF No. 58-3 at 4; ECF No. 73 at 4).
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff "does not have evidence that Gonzales ever actually retaliated against him, as she has never written a CDCR form 128A Chrono or a CDCR form 115 Serious Rules Violation Report (RVR) regarding Plaintiff for manipulation of staff." (ECF No. 58-2 at 22). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that "the mere threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out because the threat itself can have a chilling effect." Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009). "The power of a threat lies not in any negative actions eventually taken, but in the apprehension it creates in the recipient of the threat." Id. at 1271.
Defendant generally argues that Plaintiff lacks evidence to establish a causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. (ECF No. 58-2 at 22). "[A] plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was 'the "substantial" or "motivating" factor behind the defendant's conduct.'" Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). "To raise a triable issue as to motive, [a plaintiff] must offer 'either direct evidence of retaliatory motive or at least one of three general types of circumstantial evidence of such motive.'" McCollum v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 647 F.3d 870, 882 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002)). The three general types of circumstantial evidence include: "(1) proximity in time between protected [conduct] and the alleged retaliation; (2) [that] the [defendant] expressed opposition to the [protected conduct]; [or] (3) other evidence that the reasons proffered by the [defendant] for the adverse . . . action were false and pretextual." McCollum, 647 F.3d at 882 (second, third, and fifth alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen, 283 F.3d at 1077).
Plaintiff has put forth circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding the causal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse action. First, the comment of a manipulation of staff write-up occurred immediately after Plaintiff informed Defendant that he would be writing a staff misconduct complaint against her. Second, Gonzales herself states that the alleged violation of manipulation of staff was in fact the threat of filing a complaint. (See Gonzales Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 58-4 ("Wells' conduct would be a manipulation of staff because he was threatening to '602' me [file a staff complaint] in an attempt to keep unauthorized contraband, as he could not prove that the item belonged to him, and he would be avoiding the rules since authorized religious items have to be processed through Receiving and Release (R&R) and listed on an inmate's property card so correctional staff can verify ownership via proof of purchase or documentation.")).
Defendant also generally argues that Plaintiff lacks evidence to establish that Defendant's retaliatory action did not advance legitimate correctional goals. (ECF No. 58-2 at 22). "[P]rison officials may not defeat a retaliation claim on summary judgment simply by articulating a general justification for a neutral process, when there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the action was taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right." Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003).
Defendant contends that "preventing contraband is a legitimate, compelling interest" and that she "had legitimate penological reasons to counsel Plaintiff." (Id. at 25). There is no doubt that "[c]ontrolling contraband within a prison is a legitimate penological interest." Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, the question is whether threatening to write Plaintiff up for manipulation of staff in response to Plaintiff stating that he would file a staff misconduct complaint reasonably advanced the goal of controlling contraband. The Court finds that it does not. Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to file a grievance, even if the subject of that grievance concerns his purported right to keep something that a prison official believes is contraband. Filing a grievance does not itself entitle him to keep the artifact. It merely provides a method to express his complaint and receive direction from the prison. Filing a grievance, or threatening to file one, is not a manipulation of staff. It is a First Amendment right. Thus, threatening to write Plaintiff up for manipulating staff did not reasonably advance the goal of controlling contraband, especially as the contraband in question (i.e., the soap bear totem) had already been confiscated.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has put forth evidence that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant Gonzales threatened to write Plaintiff up for manipulation of staff in response to Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff misconduct complaint and whether the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.
b. November 18, 2016 Pat Search
It is undisputed that on November 18, 2016 Defendant Gonzales conducted a pat search of Plaintiff that was "not outside the procedural standard." (ECF No. 58-3 at 5; ECF No. 73 at 5). It is also undisputed that the pat search occurred prior to Plaintiff and Defendant engaging in any conversation regarding the soap bear totem confiscation, the staff misconduct complaint, or manipulation of staff. (Wells Dep. 79:21-25).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Gonzales has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant did not conduct the November 18, 2016 pat search in retaliation for Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff misconduct complaint.
c. November 18, Law Library Search Announcement
The parties characterize the announcement in contrasting terms—informing as opposed to threatening—but it is undisputed that on November 18, 2016, Defendant Gonzales stated to the inmates working in the law library clerk section that the area was substandard and that she would re-examine the area in two weeks. (ECF No. 58-3 at 5; ECF No. 73 at 5). It is also undisputed that the announcement occurred after Plaintiff informed Defendant that he intended to file a staff misconduct complaint against her. (Wells Dep. 86).
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because "Plaintiff does not have evidence that filing a grievance was the substantial or motivating factor behind the search, because even though Plaintiff had informed Gonzales that he intended to file a staff complaint against her, she still would have searched him, his work area, and his property, even if he had not informed her of his intentions, because it is part of Gonzales' job to regularly conduct searches for contraband and uphold security at VSP." (ECF No. 58-2 at 23).
Plaintiff has put forth circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents a genuine issue of material fact whether Plaintiff's intent to file a grievance was a substantial or motivating factor behind Defendant Gonzales's announcement of a law library search. First, the announcement occurred soon after Plaintiff informed Defendant that he would be writing a staff complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 12-13; Wells Dep. 86). Second, as set forth above, Plaintiff's protected conduct would be the basis for a manipulation of staff write-up and thus, demonstrates Defendant's expressed opposition to the protected conduct.
In her declaration, Defendant Gonzales cites to title 15, California Code of Regulations section 3287(c) in support of her argument that she "informed the inmates because it is part of my job to conduct work area inspections to control contraband, recover missing or stolen property, and maintain proper security of the institution." (Gonzales Decl. ¶ 9). Although Defendant Gonzales's job responsibilities include conducting work area inspections, "prison officials may not abuse a valid procedure 'as a cover or a ruse to silence and punish' an inmate. Shepard v. Quillen, 840 F.3d 686, 694 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289) (citing Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 948 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the "policy [against retaliation] applies even where the action taken . . . would otherwise be permissible")).
Section 3287(c) provides: "Inspections of inmate cell or living areas, property, work areas, and body shall be conducted on an unannounced, random basis as directed by the institution head." Cal. Code. Reg. title 15, § 3287(c) (emphasis added). Therefore, Defendant's announcement of a preplanned work area inspection was in violation of regulations and for that reason does not appear to advance legitimate correctional goals.
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has put forth evidence that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant Gonzales announced a punitive search of the law library in response to Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff misconduct complaint and whether the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.
d. November 21, 2016 Search and Threat
Plaintiff alleges that on November 21, 2016, he was told to go to the Main Yard gate because Defendant Gonzales wished to speak with him. Defendant was waiting for Plaintiff and aggressively ordered Plaintiff to "assume the position." Defendant searched Plaintiff, ordered Plaintiff to stand with his hands behind his back, and then told Plaintiff to "drop the issue" or she would write Plaintiff up for manipulation of staff. Plaintiff responded "I requested formally through the proper procedure (form 22 inmate request) for a confiscation slip as required and that I be allowed to determine the disposition." Defendant yelled at Plaintiff to "drop the issue." Plaintiff told Gonzales that he had submitted the staff complaint and that he thought Gonzales was now retaliating against him.
Defendant Gonzales argues that summary judgment is appropriate because the undisputed evidence (i.e., Defendant's timesheet summary report) shows that she was out on vacation and not at VSP on November 21, 2016. (ECF No. 58-2 at 23). In his response to Defendant's statement of undisputed facts, Plaintiff disputes Defendant's declaration that she was not present at VSP on November 21, 2016, relying on the statement of facts set forth in the Complaint. (ECF No. 73 at 6). Plaintiff's only evidence is his deposition testimony, (Wells Dep. 85), and it is not enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendant was present at VSP on November 21, 2016 and conducted a retaliatory search of Plaintiff. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.").
The Court considered whether the incident described by Plaintiff could have taken place on a different date. Notably, however, Plaintiff does not raise this argument in his opposition to summary judgment. On the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Gonzales "offers [an] untruthful statement" by "say[ing] she was not present on Nov[ember] 21, 2016." (ECF No. 72 at 10).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Gonzales has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant did not conduct any search or issue any threat on November 21, 2016 in retaliation for Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff misconduct complaint.
e. Confiscation of Other Inmates' Property
With respect to retaliation in the form of confiscation of other inmates' property, Defendant Gonzales argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the legal rights of others and there is no causal connection because Defendant would have taken the same actions in the absence of the protected conduct. (ECF No. 58-2 at 24).
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue as to Defendant Gonzales's retaliatory motive regarding the confiscation of other inmates' property. Plaintiff does not offer direct evidence that Defendant Gonzales's confiscation of other inmates' property was motivated by Plaintiff's protected conduct. Plaintiff also does not offer evidence demonstrating that the reasons offered by Defendant for the confiscation of other inmates' property were false or pretextual or that her actions did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. See Sealey v. Busichio, 696 F. App'x 779, 781 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) ("Pure speculation, without 'any basis in personal knowledge for the plaintiff's subjective belief about the defendant's motive' is not cognizable evidence." (quoting Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001))).
Plaintiff proffers numerous staff misconduct complaints filed by himself and other inmates regarding Defendant Gonzales's actions, including confiscation of spiritual property. However, the adjudication of said complaints conclude that Defendant Gonzales did not violate CDCR policy. (ECF No. 63 at 71, 72; ECF No. 68 at 38, 43, 49, 54, 60, 64, 74, 78, 83, 89, 92, 106, 120, 124, 129, 148, 159, 166). These complaints, which Plaintiff offers to "establish[] habit and intent," (ECF No. 68 at 10), are insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Gonzales has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendant did not confiscate other inmates' property in retaliation for Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff misconduct complaint.
3. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff has put forth evidence that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendant Gonzales threatened to write Plaintiff up for manipulation of staff and announced a punitive search of the law library in response to Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff complaint and that such actions did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Therefore, the undersigned recommends denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the First Amendment retaliation claim.
E. Fourth Amendment
Defendant Gonzales argues that she did not commit an unreasonable search and seizure of Plaintiff. Defendant contends that both parties agree that her pat down body search of Plaintiff on November 18, 2016 was not outside the procedural standard and that it is undisputed that she did not work on November 21, 2016 and did not search Plaintiff that day. (ECF No. 58-2 at 25).
1. Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. Const. amend. IV, and the Ninth Circuit has "recognized that the Fourth Amendment does apply to the invasion of bodily privacy in prisons." Bull v. City & Cty. Of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citing Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Supreme Court has recognized that the "test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application" and in the context of prisons, it requires "[b]alancing the significant and legitimate security interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 560 (1979). In evaluating the reasonableness of a particular search, the Supreme Court instructs that "[c]ourts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Id. at 559.
In Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010), the Ninth Circuit addressed a Fourth Amendment claim regarding a visual strip search of an inmate returning from an outside work detail. 591 F.3d at 1227. The Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claim that the correctional officer's use of a "raffle" to select the plaintiff for the strip search was "excessive, vindictive, harassing, and unrelated to any legitimate penological interest." Id. (quoting Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 332). The Ninth Circuit held that whether the correctional officer targeted the plaintiff "for the search for non-penological reasons is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment" because "an action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action." Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1228 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)).
2. November 18, 2016 Search
It is undisputed that the November 18, 2016 pat search of Plaintiff was "not outside the procedural standard." (ECF No. 58-3 at 5; ECF No. 73 at 5). It is also undisputed that Plaintiff and other inmates were on the Main Yard. (ECF No. 58-3 at 5; ECF No. 73 at 5). The CDCR's Department Operations Manual ("DOM") provides that in non-housing areas "[r]andom or spot-check inspections of inmates shall occur as a means to prevent the possession and movement of unauthorized and dangerous items and substances into, out of, or within the facility." DOM § 52050.16.1. "Controlling contraband within a prison is a legitimate penological interest," Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1228, and it is well established that even more invasive searches than the pat search at issue here have been upheld as reasonably related to this interest. See, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 558-60 (finding visual body cavity searches conducted after every contact visit as a means of preventing possession of weapons and contraband did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Bull, 595 F.3d at 966 (finding visual strip searches of all arrestees who were to be introduced into general jail population for custodial housing to address a serious problem of contraband smuggling did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Michenfelder, 860 F.2d at 333 (finding visual body cavity searches whenever inmate leaves or returns to the unit, as well as when inmate travels under escort within the unit was reasonably related to legitimate penological interest of preventing possession of contraband and weapons).
Although Plaintiff asserts that the search was conducted as a punitive measure intended to embarrass, (ECF No. 63 at 12-13), the Ninth Circuit has held that whether a correctional officer has targeted an inmate "for the search for non-penological reasons is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment" because "an action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action," Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1228 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Gonzales has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the November 18, 2016 search given that the search was within the procedural standard and was reasonably related to the legitimate penological interest of controlling contraband within the prison.
3. November 21, 2016 Search
As set forth in section IV(D)(2)(d), supra, Defendant Gonzales has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendant was present at VSP on November 21, 2016 and conducted a retaliatory search of Plaintiff. The undisputed evidence (in the form of Defendant's timesheet summary report) shows that she was not at VSP and was out on vacation on November 21, 2016. (ECF No. 58-2 at 23). Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint and his deposition testimony are not sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 ("When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.").
Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant Gonzales has established there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the nonexistence of the alleged November 21, 2016 search.
4. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendant Gonzales has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the November 18, 2016 search and the nonexistence of the alleged November 21, 2016 search. Therefore, the undersigned recommends granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claims.
F. Bane Act
California's Bane Act provides:
(a) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. . . .Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. "The essence of such a claim is that 'the defendant, by the specified improper means . . . tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or force the plaintiff to do something he or she was not required to do.'" Boarman v. Cty. of Sacramento, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1287 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883 (2007)). "[T]he Bane Act does not require the 'threat, intimidation or coercion' element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation alleged." Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cornell v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 356, 382-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)).
(b) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with, as described in subdivision (a), may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action . . . to eliminate a pattern or practice of conduct as described in subdivision (a).
Defendant Gonzales argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff does not have a constitutional or legal right to file a staff complaint to obtain contraband or a right to possess unauthorized contraband and that Defendant's actions were for legitimate penological purposes. (ECF No. 58-2 at 26). However, Plaintiff does have a constitutional right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities. See Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) ("The First Amendment guarantees a prisoner a right to seek redress of grievances from prison authorities and as well as a right of meaningful access to the courts."); Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[T]he form of the complaints—even if verbal, let alone, as here, written—is of no constitutional significance, and . . . threats to sue fall within the purview of the constitutionally protected right to file grievances."). This right does not depend on whether the grievance is correct or incorrect. Even if the bear totem were contraband and Plaintiff were legally incorrect in asserting a right to the totem, (which the Court is not finding), Plaintiff would still have a right to file a grievance about it. Filing a grievance is the legal method to have claims heard by prison officials. Prisoners have a right to file them, even when prisoners are wrong in their claims.
And as noted above, Plaintiff has put forth evidence that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendant Gonzales threatened to write Plaintiff up for manipulation of staff and announced a punitive search of the law library in response to Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff misconduct complaint and whether such actions did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Thus, the undersigned recommends denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the Bane Act claim.
G. Qualified Immunity
Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
In determining whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must decide (1) whether facts alleged or shown by plaintiff make out a violation of constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the officer's alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Courts are "permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. In resolving these issues, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all material factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff. Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2003).
As set forth in section IV(D)(2), supra, the Court has found that Plaintiff has put forth evidence that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, presents genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Defendant Gonzales threatened to write Plaintiff up for manipulation of staff and announced a punitive search of the law library in response to Plaintiff's declaration that he would file a staff misconduct complaint and whether such actions did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Therefore, the Court will turn to whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of Defendant Gonzales's alleged misconduct.
Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2017), concerned retaliation against a prisoner who submitted written complaints to prison officials in which he threatened to initiate civil litigation if his concerns were not addressed. 872 F.3d at 1033-34. The prisoner was disciplined for his threats to sue under a regulation that barred prisoners from intimidating or coercing prison staff. Id. at 1034. The Ninth Circuit held that it was "clearly established when Entler filed his grievances in 2012 that he had the 'constitutional right' to do that—a right that did not 'hinge on the label' the prison placed on his complaints." Id. at 1041 (citations omitted). See also id. at 1039 ("[T]he form of the complaints—even if verbal, let alone, as here, written—is of no constitutional significance, and . . . threats to sue fall within the purview of the constitutionally protected right to file grievances."). The Ninth Circuit cited its decades-old precedent "in the analogous Title VII retaliation context" that stated there is "no legal distinction to be made between the filing of a charge which is clearly protected, and threatening to file a charge." Id. at 1042 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 685 F.2d 1149, 1156 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982)). Entler also noted with approval an out-of-circuit district court case, which held that "plaintiff's conduct in threatening to file a [prisoner] complaint was protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of the right to petition the government for redress of grievance." 872 F.3d at 1042 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sprau v. Coughlin, 997 F. Supp. 390 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)).
Based on the foregoing, it was clearly established in November 2016 that Plaintiff's threat to file a staff complaint against Defendant Gonzales was protected conduct. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:
1. Defendant's motion to strike (ECF No. 75) be DENIED; and
2. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 58) be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
3. Defendant Gonzales be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's Free Exercise, RLUIPA, and Fourth Amendment claims; and
4. Defendant Gonzales be denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim and Bane Act claim; and
5. Defendant Gonzales be denied qualified immunity.
These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within THIRTY (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections.
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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 14 , 2020
/s/_________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE