Wells v. Auberry

13 Citing cases

  1. Indiana Department of Highways v. Pigg

    533 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    Consequently, Pigg argues he has a right to insure those procedural safeguards through judicial review, pursuant to IND. CODE 4-22-1-14 of the Administrative Adjudication Act. Pigg cites Wells v. Auberry (1985), Ind. App., 476 N.E.2d 869 and Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Gault (1980), Ind. App., 405 N.E.2d 585 in support of his contention. Citing Gault the court in Wells stated in part:

  2. Lawshe v. Simpson

    16 F.3d 1475 (7th Cir. 1994)   Cited 104 times
    Holding that a claim for deprivation of public employment without due process accrues on the date employment is actually terminated

    For example, in Indiana Department of Highways v. Pigg, 533 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Ind.App. 1989), the court affirmed that "Indiana recognizes that the governmental agency's statutory authority or its rules and regulations may . . . create vested rights," but distinguished earlier cases recognizing property rights based on rules and regulations because "there is no indication in the record that the Department's employee handbook grievance procedure set forth duly promulgated rules and regulations." See also Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ind.App. 1985) (rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to statute conferred property right); Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Gault, 405 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Ind.App. 1980) ("the Commission's authority as provided by statute is subject to any rules and regulations which the Commission may have promulgated. So we must consider if, by regulation, Gault was entitled to a determination of cause or any other procedural safeguard."); Town of Speedway v. Harris, 169 Ind. App. 100, 346 N.E.2d 646, 647, 650 (1976) (property interest arose from fire department rules and regulations which had been presented to plaintiff on first day of employment).

  3. Babchuk v. Ind. Univ. Health, Inc.

    1:13-cv-01376-JMS-DML (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2015)

    Similar to the cases Dr. Babchuk relied upon to support his bylaws argument, the cases he cites for his proposition that "Indiana law recognizes that individuals have vested property rights in the application of procedural safeguards contained in policy manuals where those procedures are dictated by state statute," [Filing No. 106 at 35-36], are inapposite. See Panozzo v. Rhoads, 905 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1990) (defendant conceded that retaining position as a police officer was a constitutionally protected property interest, and court agreed); Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (holding employee had protected property interest in continuing employment, and not considering whether she had a protected property interest in the process put in place to protect that interest); Tidwell, 670 F.2d at 511 (holding physician had protected property interest in staff privileges, but not holding there was a protected property interest in the process provided by hospital's bylaws). --------

  4. Curry v. City of Lawrence Utilities Serv. Bd.

    Case No. 1:13-cv-00169-TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 3, 2014)

    However, Indiana courts have allowed claims for wrongful discharge against governmental entities or officials when an employee has a vested right to continued employment. See, e.g., Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869, 873-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (awarding damages under state and federal law when public-employee plaintiff had protected property right to continued employment); see also Morrison, 475 N.E.2d at 1181 (remanding to trial court to allow wrongful discharge claim under Indiana Code § 8-1.5-3-5). Therefore, the Court finds that ITCA immunity would not apply to bar Mr. Curry's state claim for wrongful discharge under Indiana Code § 8-1.5-3-5 and he has a sufficient state law remedy.

  5. Robert v. Carter

    819 F. Supp. 2d 832 (S.D. Ind. 2011)   Cited 7 times
    Finding civil deputy process server's ADA claim foreclosed where he was unable to participate in taser training, which was an essential function of his employment

    Under some circumstances, public employee handbooks can create a vested right in continued employment. Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). Whether Mr. Robert is a special deputy or simply a civil deputy is inconsequential here, as there is no dispute that Mr. Robert retired as a merit deputy in 2007—at that time, he not only took a civil deputy job, but also began receiving his merit deputy retirement benefits.

  6. Wozniak v. Indiana University Board of Trustees

    1:05-cv-919-JDT-WTL (S.D. Ind. Mar. 20, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    See, e.g., Murray v. Monroe-Gregg Sch. Dist., 585 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992) ("an agreement must provide for a definite term of employment in order to alter the at-will status of the employee"). Other appellate courts have looked to see if a state statute or the body's adopted rules and regulations define the employee's property rights or document the mutually explicit understandings, which, in general, may provide a property right.See, e.g.,Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869, 873-74 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) (stating that department rule requiring demotions to be in conformance with rules and regulations gave non-merit deputy sheriff a protected property interest); Town of Speedway v. Harris, 346 N.E.2d 646, 650 (Ind.Ct.App. 1976) (finding probationary firefighter to have a "cognizable Fourteenth Amendment `property' interest" arising from the municipality's rules and regulations). Even under this more general analysis, an entitlement exists only when "the employee cannot be denied employment unless specific conditions are met."

  7. Kennedy v. McCarty

    778 F. Supp. 1465 (S.D. Ind. 1991)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that reserve police officer failed to establish deprivation of a liberty interest by termination where he did not show that the termination affected his primary means of employment

    Even if a property interest was not created by Ind. Code § 36-8-3-4 but was created by local ordinance or private agreement, Mr. Kennedy could not pursue his claim in this court because Indiana permits public employees to sue in state court to vindicate their contract rights whether those rights have been established by private agreement or by reason of a statute or local ordinance that has become a part of a public employee's employment contract. See e.g., City of Peru v. State ex rel. McGuire, 210 Ind. 668, 199 N.E. 151, 153 (1936) (where fireman was dismissed without the hearing provided for by statute he was authorized to seek a writ of mandamus in order to obtain reinstatement; to recover monetary damages "his remedy was an action against the city for breach of contract of employment"); Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ind.Ct.App. 1985) (permitting deputy sheriff to recover lost salary following demotion where prior to demotion he was not given due process protections afforded by departmental rules);Coates v. City of Evansville, 149 Ind. App. 518, 273 N.E.2d 862, 868-69 (1971) (permitting breach of contract action for violation of statutorily created rights). Thus, if Mr. Kennedy had a contractually created property interest in his employment then, because Indiana allows suits to enforce such rights, he could have pursued his claim in state court and, he may not pursue it here.

  8. Felton v. Board of Com'rs of Greene County, (S.D.Ind. 1991)

    796 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Ind. 1991)   Cited 4 times

    Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Mr. Felton's due process claim is GRANTED. Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869 (Ind.App. 1985) does not change this court's conclusion. In Wells the Indiana Court of Appeals found that a regulation of the Marion County Sheriff's Department created a "vested right to the due process procedures afforded by" that regulation and that an officer in the Department "had a protected property right to continued employment at the rank" at which he was employed until such time as he had been afforded due process.

  9. Wynkoop v. Town of Cedar Lake

    970 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. App. 2012)   Cited 8 times

    Rules and regulations, promulgated pursuant to statute, may create vested rights. See, e.g., Wells v. Auberry, 476 N.E.2d 869 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), trans. denied. But no designated evidence shows that the Procedure Manual's provisions were promulgated as legally binding rules and regulations of Cedar Lake.

  10. Henderson v. Sneath Oil Co., Inc.

    638 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    Our responsibility in appellate review is not to consider witness credibility or to reweigh evidence; rather, we focus upon evidence most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences. Wells v. Auberry (1985), Ind. App., 476 N.E.2d 869, 873. Only when that evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion, which is contrary to the conclusion reached by the trial court, shall we find the trial court's decision contrary to law.