Opinion
March 20, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunkin, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The attorney for the plaintiff wife submitted a detailed affirmation in which she provided the basis for her fee request. She expressly offered to provide testimonial evidence as well. Although he had initially requested a hearing on the issue, the defendant husband, who was then acting pro se, eventually acquiesced to a resolution of the plaintiff's application for counsel fees based on affirmations. The papers submitted furnished an adequate basis upon which to award counsel fees in the sum of at least $7,500, plus costs. Considering, inter alia, the marked disparity in the incomes of the parties, we see no improvident exercise of discretion in the court's determination that the defendant should be responsible for the payment of these fees (see, e.g., Merzon v. Merzon, 210 A.D.2d 462; Denholz v. Denholz, 147 A.D.2d 522; Hackett v. Hackett, 147 A.D.2d 611).
The record shows that the defendant earned a gross income of $51,351.78 in 1991, which is approximately three times the amount earned by the plaintiff. Under all the circumstances presented, the award of maintenance in the sum of $225 per week is not excessive (see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 149 A.D.2d 842).
The Supreme Court's judgment was based on the premise that the defendant's employment would continue, and there is nothing in the evidence presented at trial which would undermine this premise. The defendant's post-trial assertion that he had lost his job is not substantiated, and is not properly part of the evidence reviewable on appeal. If the defendant has in fact lost his job, his remedy is to move for a downward modification of his maintenance obligation (e.g., Neumark v. Neumark, 189 A.D.2d 863).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. Bracken, J.P., Pizzuto, Altman and Krausman, JJ., concur.