Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4948-11T4
05-07-2014
MARJORIE WEINFELD, Administrator Ad Prosequendum for the Estate of ERIC IAN WEINFELD,1 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN E. PAXTON, Defendant-Respondent.
Stephen E. Klausner, attorney for appellant. The PLK Law Group, attorneys for respondent (Adraea M. Brown, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Ostrer and Carroll.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Somerset County, Docket No. DC-000835-11.
Stephen E. Klausner, attorney for appellant.
The PLK Law Group, attorneys for respondent (Adraea M. Brown, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Eric Weinfeld appeals from an April 25, 2012 order of the Somerset County Special Civil Part that denied his application for attorney's fees and costs. The order was entered following the purported settlement of plaintiff's claim against defendant John E. Paxton for unpaid wages. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff claimed that defendant employed him as an assistant director on defendant's short film project, at an agreed-upon rate of $300 per day for four days. When defendant failed to pay him for his services, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint in the Special Civil Part, alleging violations of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (NJWHL), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to - 56a38 (count one), and the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (count two). The complaint also asserted claims for breach of an oral contract (count three), and quantum meruit (count four). Plaintiff sought $1200 in unpaid wages, as well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the fee-shifting provisions of the federal and state wage and hour laws.
Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. He contended that (1) he was not an "employer" under the applicable wage and hour statutes; (2) plaintiff signed an agreement with defendant's limited liability company and not with defendant individually; (3) plaintiff's status was an independent contractor, not an employee; and (4) plaintiff failed to perform his duties, showing up late and/or under the influence of drugs, thus delaying the film's production.
The matter initially proceeded to trial over a period of three days in May 2011, but ultimately ended in a mistrial due to the trial judge's conflict involving his familiarity with one of defendant's witnesses. The matter was re-listed for trial before a second judge, who conferenced the matter with counsel in chambers. By all accounts, the parties arrived at a settlement, the terms of which, unfortunately, were not placed on the record or reduced to writing.
The parties offer conflicting accounts of the terms of the settlement reached in chambers with the assistance of the court. Plaintiff maintains that defendant agreed to pay $850 to settle the underlying wage claim. He further maintains that the judge stated during the conference that this settlement would make him the "prevailing party", thus entitling him to attorney's fees, albeit in a reduced amount since he agreed to settle for less than his full claim. According to plaintiff, the court then set a schedule for both counsel to file papers addressing the fee issue.
Defendant contends that he agreed to settle the underlying wage claim for $750. He asserts that the judge never declared plaintiff the "prevailing party," or indicated that he was entitled to counsel fees. Rather, the court simply afforded plaintiff the opportunity to submit additional papers to establish any potential entitlement to such fees.
In any event, plaintiff's counsel thereafter submitted a Certification of Services, seeking attorney's fees of $24,083 and costs of $109. Defendant's counsel submitted a certification and brief in opposition. Following plaintiff's reply, the court rendered a decision on the papers, denying plaintiff's fee request. The court found that plaintiff "failed to establish [that] he was a prevailing party" under the NJWHL or the FLSA, as he had "failed to establish that the nature of the relationship between the parties was an employer and employee." This appeal followed.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied the law in denying him an award of counsel fees and costs. Plaintiff further contends that the court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law, and that there was a total lack of evidence in the record to support the court's findings.
Because this appeal arises out of a purported settlement, we begin with basic principles that guide our analysis. Public policy favors the settlement of disputes. Willingboro Mall, LTD. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 242, 253-54 (2013). "Settlement spares the parties the risk of an adverse outcome and the time and expense — both monetary and emotional — of protracted litigation . . . [and] also preserves precious and overstretched judicial resources." Ibid. (citations omitted). In furtherance of the strong policy of enforcing settlements, "our courts 'strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement wherever possible.'" Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008) (internal citation omitted). Therefore, an agreement to settle a lawsuit will be honored and enforced in the absence of fraud or other compelling circumstances. Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983). "Where the parties agree upon the essential terms of a settlement, so that the mechanics can be 'fleshed out' in a writing to be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced notwithstanding the fact the writing does not materialize because a party later reneges." Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J. Super. 575, 596 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 477 (1993).
In the present case, both parties agree that there was a settlement, and that it included submission of the counsel fee issue for the court's consideration and determination. However, they differ as to the settlement's terms. Plaintiff claims that defendant agreed to settle the underlying wage dispute for $850; defendant contends he agreed to pay $750. More significantly, the parties disagree on whether plaintiff qualified as the prevailing party, thus entitling him to an award of counsel fees and costs under the NJWHL and the FLSA. Plaintiff asserts that the judge in chambers clearly conveyed that the settlement rendered him the prevailing party, and that the court then established a schedule to submit additional papers to determine the amount of the fee award. Defendant categorically denies that the judge ruled that plaintiff was the prevailing party. Rather, he maintains his position that he was not an employer for purposes of either the state or federal wage act, and that he settled the case under a breach of contract theory. The record in this regard is far from clear, as the judge conceded in his oral opinion denying plaintiff's fee application:
In its April 25, 2010 oral decision on the counsel fee issue, the court indicated that "there was a settlement in the amount of $750" on the wage claim.
The complaint sought damages under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Act, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, under breach of contract and quantum meruit.
It is not clear under which of these theories the settlement occurred. Plaintiff seemed to think that the court had made the decision that [he was] a prevailing party under either the New Jersey Wage and Hour law or under the Fair Labor Standards Act but the court made no such determination and
it is unclear as to what theory - - under what theory this settlement was reached.
As noted, the settlement terms were not placed on the record or reduced to writing. Faced with the parties' conflicting positions, and the lack of an adequate record, we conclude that a remand is necessary for the trial court to make appropriate findings with respect to the terms of the settlement, and whether that settlement expressly or impliedly contemplated plaintiff as the prevailing party as a predicate to plaintiff's future fee application, or whether it simply left the fee issue entirely to the court's ultimate determination.
We further conclude that, in subsequently deciding the attorney fee issue, the court essentially resolved the factual issues that were at the heart of the parties' dispute. In doing so, the court clearly lacked an adequate evidential basis. Neither party submitted any affidavits or certifications, see Rule 1:6-6, nor was any testimony taken. Nonetheless, the court determined that, "given the factual circumstances of the parties' relationship," plaintiff failed to establish that he "was an employee as opposed to an independent contractor," and hence a "prevailing party under either the [NJWHL] or under the [FLSA]."
Nor, apparently, was the judge supplied with the transcripts from the earlier trial.
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When reviewing a decision resulting from a bench trial, "[t]he general rule is that [factual] findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Here, however, there is no factual support in the record for the judge's findings.
Hence, on remand, the court shall consider such competent evidence as may be necessary to decide the issue of attorney's fees and costs, which the parties by all accounts agreed to submit for the court's consideration. If the proofs are disputed, or depend on credibility evaluations, a plenary hearing is required. Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 322-23 (1992).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION