Rather, the cases cited by plaintiff merely suggest that an attorney acts as an agent of his client and that a client is bound by acts performed by his attorney with authority and within the scope of his employment. See Weiner v. Lee, 669 A.2d 424 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1995); Rothman v. Fillette, 469 A.2d 543 (Pa. 1983) (noting that the law in Pennsylvania is clear that "an attorney must have express authority to settle a cause of action," but holding that when an attorney forges his client's signature on a settlement check and the defrauded party suffers a loss, principals of equity require that the client be bound by the settlement entered into by his attorney). These cases both predate the Third Circuit's decision that an attorney is an independent contractor of his client.

When challenging a contempt finding which is premised on violation of an order that previously became final, an appellant may not challenge or collaterally attack the underlying order. Int'l Org. Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am., Local No. 2 v. Int'l Org. Masters, Mates & Pilots of Am., Inc., 318 A.2d 918, 920 (Pa. 1974) (citation omitted); Weiner v. Lee, 669 A.2d 424, 427-428 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Thus, any collateral attack on the August 15, 2011 order is improper in this case.

A contempt order cannot be collaterally attacked in a later proceeding. Weiner v. Lee, 669 A.2d 424 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Therefore, this Court lacks the authority to reverse or set aside any contempt orders issued against Cindrich by the Allegheny County Court in 2003.

Furthermore, Wei cannot collaterally attack this Court's decision in Wei II in his present appeal from a subsequent decision of the Commission. See Weiner v. Lee, 669 A.2d 424, 427-28 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). The General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure (GRAPP) provide for a petition to reopen a case as follows:

Here, despite the irregularities, a deferential reading of the brief in Plonka's favor reveals that Plonka seeks reversal of the trial court's Contempt Order, because, she contends, the trial court issued the Underlying Order in error. Because Plonka, however, did not appeal the Underlying Order, she has waived any objection to it, see Koken v. Colonial Assurance Co., 885 A.2d 1078 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), and is not permitted to collaterally attack it here in an appeal from the Contempt Order. See Weiner v. Lee, 669 A.2d 424, 427 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). Disregarding, then, Plonka's challenges to the Underlying Order, we must conclude that Plonka fails to raise in her brief any issue and/or argument upon which we can reverse the trial court's Contempt Order. Accordingly, we will deny the Board's application to quash and affirm the trial court's Contempt Order.

Appellate review of an order for contempt is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Weiner v. Lee, 669 A.2d 424 (Pa. Commw. 1995). The Steckmans first argue that the trial court erred in holding them in contempt, when in their view the evidence shows that they acted in good faith and in reliance upon the representations of the Borough's agents concerning permitted activities.