Opinion
23A-PC-2102
10-18-2024
Kristopher M. Weber, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Jacob T. Rigney Rigney Law Indianapolis, Indiana Cassandra Hine Resolution Law, P.C. North Judson, Indiana Amy E. Karozos Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marshall Superior Court The Honorable Matthew Sarber, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 50D03-2301-PC-000001
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Jacob T. Rigney
Rigney Law
Indianapolis, Indiana
Cassandra Hine
Resolution Law, P.C.
North Judson, Indiana
Amy E. Karozos
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[¶1] Kristopher Weber filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), alleging in relevant part that his guilty plea was not valid. After an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court denied Weber's petition. Weber now appeals and presents one issue for our review, which we revise and restate as follows: Whether the PCR court clearly erred when it denied Weber's PCR petition.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] In May 2022, Weber agreed to plead guilty to escape as a Level 5 felony and resisting law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement Weber signed, his sentence was left to the trial court's discretion; he also signed an acknowledgment of rights. On October 12, 2022, the trial court held a joint submission of plea and sentencing hearing. During the guilty plea phase of this hearing, the trial court established that Weber understood he was in court to plead guilty, confirmed that Weber understood the nature of the charges against him, advised Weber of his rights and the effect pleading guilty had on those rights, informed Weber of the range of sentences the trial court could impose, and ensured that he was prepared to admit guilt to the charged crimes. Throughout the proceedings, the trial court gave Weber multiple opportunities to ask questions of his trial counsel, Edward Ruiz, and of the trial court itself. Weber took advantage of these opportunities, and at no point did he indicate that he no longer wished to plead guilty. Instead, Weber repeatedly indicated to the trial court that he understood why he was in court, the nature of the charges, his rights and that he was waiving those rights by pleading guilty, the possible sentences the trial court could impose, and that he was admitting guilt to the charged crimes. The trial court ultimately accepted Weber's plea.
[¶4] During the sentencing phase of the October 2022 hearing, Weber introduced evidence of his recent autism diagnosis and his honorable discharge from the military, among other things. The trial court sentenced Weber to a total of four years of incarceration.
[¶5] Three months after the sentencing, Weber filed and amended a PCR petition. Weber alleged in relevant part that he "did not knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily enter the Plea Agreement." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 30. At the evidentiary hearing on Weber's petition, Ruiz testified that Weber "seemed to understand everything we were going over" when they met and that he "had no reason to believe [Weber] did not understand what he was getting into" by pleading guilty. Tr. Vol. II at 17-18; see also id. at 38-39. According to Ruiz, the only time he and Weber "had issues was after [Weber] talked to his mom, then things got derailed" because she would tell Weber not to plead guilty. Id. at 18; see also id. at 25. Ruiz testified that Weber's mother informed him that Weber was autistic, but Weber was not formally diagnosed with autism until a few weeks before the October 12 hearing, "which [Ruiz] thought to be rather convenient." Id. at 17; see also id. at 23. Ruiz further testified that when he had off-the-record conversations with Weber during the guilty plea phase of the October 12 hearing, Weber did not indicate that he no longer wanted to plead guilty; instead, Weber was asking for clarification of the trial court's questions, which Ruiz then explained in layman's terms.
[¶6] In further support of his PCR petition, Weber submitted the deposition testimony of Bradley Mazick, a clinical psychologist. Mazick testified that he evaluated Weber in July and August 2022, and, as a result of his evaluation, he diagnosed Weber with "autism spectrum disorder level 1." Appellant's App. Vol. II at 38. Based on this evaluation and his review of an audio recording of the October 2022 guilty plea and sentencing hearing, Mazick opined that Weber did "not fully understand[] what was happening" at that hearing, as demonstrated in part by Weber giving "very perfunctory" answers such as "Yes, sir," and "Yes, Your Honor." Id. at 39. Mazick further testified that he listened to the audio recording "in that truncated speed," id. at 41; he had never evaluated a defendant for legal sanity or for legal competency; and he may have seen one guilty plea hearing in his lifetime.
[¶7] On August 11, 2023, the PCR court denied Weber's PCR petition. In its order, the PCR court determined that Ruiz's testimony was "[o]f the most weight," Appellant's App. Vol. II at 10, and "substantially disregard[ed]" Mazick's opinions concerning Weber's understanding of the proceedings, id. at 14, explaining:
Dr. Mazick testified at a deposition he did not believe [Weber] understood what was occurring at the October 12, 202[2], hearing. His testimony was based on a review of the audio
recording from the hearing. As with transcripts, audio recordings do not fully preserve all the nuance of an in-person determination made by a judicial officer. Moreover, to make his opinion Dr. Mazick completely ignores the actual words [Weber] said in the hearing and concludes they were "perfunctory." The answers provided under oath, presented live before a judicial officer, should never be construed as perfunctory. As a result, the Court gives little weight to Dr. Mazick's opinion that [Weber] did not understand the proceedings.Id. at 14 n.4. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
The PCR Court Did Not Clearly Err in Denying Weber's PCR Petition
[¶8] Weber contends that the PCR court erred when it denied his PCR petition. As our Supreme Court has explained:
Post-conviction actions are civil proceedings, meaning the petitioner (the prior criminal defendant) must prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013). If he fails to meet this burden and receives a denial of post-conviction relief, then he proceeds from a negative judgment and on appeal must prove "that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision." Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)). When reviewing the court's order denying relief, we will "not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions," and the "findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error-that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)
(quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000)).Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). "For factual matters, we examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the postconviction court's determination and do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses." Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 282 (Ind. 2022) (citing Taylor v. State, 717 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Ind. 1999)).
[¶9] Weber argues that the PCR court clearly erred in concluding that his guilty plea was valid. To be valid, a guilty plea must represent "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 697 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)); see also Ind. Code § 35-35-1-3. In evaluating the validity of a defendant's guilty plea, the trial court must determine, among other things, whether the defendant understands the nature of the charges, has been informed that a guilty plea effectively waives several constitutional rights, and has been informed of the possible sentences for charged crimes. I.C. § 35-35-1-2; see Diaz v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1089, 1094 (Ind. 2010). Generally, if the trial court undertook the steps set forth in Indiana Code section 35-35-1-2 to ensure the defendant's plea was voluntary, that defendant "will have a difficult time overturning his guilty plea on collateral attack." Nix v. State, 212 N.E.3d 194, 203 (Ind.Ct.App.) (quoting Richardson v. State, 800 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003), trans. denied), trans. denied, 215 N.E.3d 350 (Ind. 2023).
[¶10] Weber claims his guilty plea was not valid because his autism disorder prevented him from understanding the guilty plea proceedings. Specifically, on appeal, Weber contends the trial court erred by not giving sufficient weight to Mazick's testimony about Weber's diagnosis and alleged inability to understand those proceedings. First, this argument is a request for us to reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, see Conley, 183 N.E.3d at 282 (citing Taylor, 717 N.E.2d at 92). Second, the PCR court was not required to credit Mazick's testimony about Weber's alleged mental incapacity. See Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. 2018) (citing Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ind. 2010)) ("Even when experts are unanimous in their opinion, the factfinder may discredit their testimony-or disregard it altogether-and rely instead on other probative evidence from which to infer the defendant's sanity."); Galloway, 938 N.E.2d at 709 (citing Cate v. State, 644 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. 1994)); Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004) (concluding the factfinder is "entitled to decide whether to accept or reject testimony that represents a witness's opinion," including an expert witness's opinion).
[¶11] Based on the foregoing, Weber has not demonstrated that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the PCR court's determination that his guilty plea was valid. We therefore affirm the PCR court's denial of Weber's PCR petition.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.