Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc.

67 Citing cases

  1. Elliott v. Cartagena

    19 Civ. 1998 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2025)

    It is “only through plaintiff's claim that he did not authorize defendants' distribution, publication, and/or reproduction of the [song] that anyone profiting must account to plaintiff.” Levine v. Landy, 832 F.Supp.2d 176, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Weber v. Geffen Recs., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)); see also Baiul v. NBC Sports, 708 Fed.Appx. 710, 712-13 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2017) (summary order) (affirming district court's dismissal of accounting, unjust enrichment and conversion claims as they “seek to vindicate rights that are already protected by the Copyright Act”); McKenzie-Morris v. V.P. Recs. Retail Outlet, Inc., No. 22 Civ. 1138 (GHW), 2023 WL 5211054, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2023) (“[A]s numerous courts in this district have found, ‘claims for accounting based on the defendant's alleged misappropriation and exploitation of a copyright work are preempted by the Copyright Act.'”) (collecting cases), reconsideration denied, No. 22 Civ. 1138 (GHW), 2023 WL 6603605 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2023); D'Arezzo v. Appel, No. 22 Civ. 177 (SDA), 2024 WL 4384027, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2024)

  2. Sibanda v. Ellison

    24-CV-6310 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2025)

    Weber v. Geffen Recs., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). “It is only through this basic claim” of copyright infringement “that any enrichment is unjust, . . . or that anyone profiting must account to plaintiff.” Id.; see also McKenzie-Morris v. V.P. Records Retail Outlet, Inc., No. 22-CV-1138 (GHW), 2023 WL 5211054, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2023) (collecting cases).

  3. Sibanda v. Ellison

    24-CV-6310 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2025)

    Weber v. Geffen Recs., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). “It is only through this basic claim” of copyright infringement “that any enrichment is unjust, . . . or that anyone profiting must account to plaintiff.” Id.; see also McKenzie-Morris v. V.P. Records Retail Outlet, Inc., No. 22-CV-1138 (GHW), 2023 WL 5211054, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2023) (collecting cases).

  4. Power v. Connectweb Techs.

    Civil Action 22-10030-JGD (D. Mass. Jul. 15, 2024)

    Finally, to the extent that Power attempts to claim damages for the “exploitation of his work” on the basis that he “was the statutory co-author” of the joint derivative work he claims to have created with Connectweb as an independent contractor, such a claim lies outside the bounds of Power's breach of contract claim in Count VII, and cannot otherwise be asserted. While it is true that a co-owner “must account to other co-owners for any profits he earns from licensing or use of the copyright[,]” Greene, 794 F.3d at 154 (additional quotations and citation omitted), for all the reasons discussed above, Power has failed to introduce any evidence which might support any claim of co-authorship and, therefore, he lacks the ability to bring such a claim. See Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“the duty to account for profits presupposes a relationship as co-owners of the copyright”) (citation omitted).

  5. McKenzie-Morris v. V.P. Records Retail Outlet

    1:22-cv-1138-GHW (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Baiul v. NBC Sports, No. 15-cv-9920, 2016 WL 1587250, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2016) (quoting Dayan Enters., Corp. v. Nautica Apparel, Inc., No. 03-cv-5706, 2003 WL 22832706, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2003)). And as numerous courts in this district have found, “claims for accounting based on the defendant's alleged misappropriation and exploitation of a copyright work are preempted by the Copyright Act.” Id.; see Gary Friedrich Enters., LLC v. Marvel Enters., Inc., 713 F.Supp.2d 215, 230-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing an accounting claim as preempted by the Copyright Act); Carell v. Shubert Org., Inc., 104 F.Supp.2d 236, 249 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); Weber v. Geffen Recs., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Arden v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 908 F.Supp. 1248, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same); see also Baiul v. NBC Sports, 708 Fed.Appx. 710, 712-13 (2d Cir. Sept. 7, 2017) (summary order) (affirming the district-court decision in Baiul and noting that both the subject-matter and general-scope requirements of Copyright Act preemption are met when a state-law claim like accounting seeks to vindicate rights already protected by the Act for works that the Act covers).

  6. Baker v. Coates

    Civil Action 22 Civ. 7986 (JPO) (SLC) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 26, 2023)   Cited 3 times

    . “As pled, this claim ‘not only is based on a copyright claim, but also lacks any extra element making it sufficiently different from a copyright claim to escape preemption.'” Kelley, 2016 WL 5720766, at *8 (quoting Weber v. Geffen Recs., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). “This claim must, therefore, be dismissed.

  7. Jordan v. Golden Bridge Books

    22 Civ. 6154 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 6, 2023)   Cited 7 times

    In so holding, the Court assumes, arguendo, that Jordan's unfair competition claim is not preempted by her copyright infringement claim. See, e.g., Kelley v. Univ. Music Grp. No. 14 Civ. 2968 (PAE), 2016 WL 5720766, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) (citing, inter alia, Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458,462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). To merit default judgment on the unfair competition claim, the Complaint must plausibly allege the “bad faith misappropriation of the labors and expenditures of another, likely to cause confusion or to deceive purchasers as to the origin of the goods.”

  8. iPurusa, LLC v. The Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp.

    Civil Action 22-cv-00966 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2022)   Cited 1 times

    generally preempted.” Video Pipeline, 210 F.Supp.2d at 567 (citing Weber v. Geffen Recs., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Plaintiff does not differentiate this claim in any way from the copyright infringement claim.

  9. Fahey v. Breakthrough Films & Television Inc.

    Civil Action 21 Civ. 3208 (PAE) (SLC) (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2022)   Cited 3 times

    Kelley v. Universal Music Grp., No. 14 Civ. 2968 (PAE), 2016 WL 5720766, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016). (See ECF No. 28 ¶¶ 193-99). “As pled, this claim ‘not only is based on a copyright claim, but also lacks any extra element making it sufficiently different from a copyright claim to escape preemption.'” (Kelley, 2016 WL 5720766, at *8 (quoting Weber v. Geffen Recs., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). As a result, “[t]his claim must, therefore, be dismissed.”

  10. Elliott v. Cartagena

    578 F. Supp. 3d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)   Cited 2 times

    As an initial point, "the duty to account for profits presupposes a relationship as co-owners of the copyright," and is thus tied to the relationship between co-owners rather than co-authors of a song. Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); BMG Rights Mgmt., LLC v. Atl. Recording Corp., No. 16 Civ. 7443, 2017 WL 5125543, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2017) ("In the context of copyright ownership, in particular, a copyright co-owner may bring an accounting claim against other co-owners for profits they made from exploiting the copyright.").