"Courts have generally concluded that the theory of unjust enrichment protects rights that are essentially `equivalent' to rights protected by the Copyright Act; thus, unjust enrichment claims relating to the use of copyrighted material are generally preempted." Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1308, 1322 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)); Lennon v. Seaman, 63 F. Supp.2d 428, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Alvarez Guedes v. Marcano Martinez, 131 F. Supp.2d 272, 280 (D.P.R. 2001). But see Weigel Broad. Co. v. Topel, No. 83 C 7921, 1985 WL 2360, at *5 (N.D.Ill.

A claim for accounting is a remedy premised on a determination of co-ownership because the duty to account for profits "presupposes a relationship as co-owners of the copyright." Weber v. Geffen Records, 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). A. Ownership Claims

Netzer, 963 F. Supp. at 1316. Accepting for purposes of this appeal that Kaplon said more than once that she would see the written agreement was signed, nothing at all happened after the Agreement was sent to TVT Records on December 10, 1995. Plaintiffs cannot establish that it was reasonable to rely on these empty assurances to forego litigation until more than five years after the Agreement had been forwarded to TVT for signature. See, e.g., Buttry, 68 F.3d at 1494; Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 466-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (no equitable estoppel because plaintiff had unreasonably relied on an "unexceptional string of empty promises" to remedy infringements and protracted negotiations to implement those promises). Accordingly, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Diamond Time should be equitably estopped from relying on the limitations period as a bar to their claims of copyright infringement.

Courts of this district have barred Lanham Act claims where the plaintiffs' trademark allegations merely restate the allegations of their copyright claims, and in particular, fail to show the "requisite affirmative action of falsely claiming originality beyond that implicit in any allegedly false copyright." Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp.2d 628, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that attribution of song authorship to defendant "does not venture beyond that implicit in any allegedly false copyright"). In order for a Lanham Act claim to survive in addition to a copyright claim, "an aggrieved author must show more than a violation of the author's protected right to credit and profit from a creation.

Lipton, 71 F.3d at 473.Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Armstrong, 91 F. Supp.2d at 633. Plaintiffs attempt to make such a showing, arguing that the ProQuest defendants modified their individual contributions in the microform products and that the National Geographic defendants intentionally blurred image credits.

However, accounting claims based primarily on copyright infringement do not satisfy the "extra element" test and are preempted. See Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Arden v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 908 F.Supp. 1248, 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). D. Lanham Act Claim

The author must make a greater showing that the designation of origin was false, was harmful, and stemmed from some affirmative act whereby [defendant] falsely represented itself as the owner.Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N Y 1999) (Motley, J.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Given the most liberal reading of the second amended complaint, plaintiff's Lanham Act claim is based on no more than an alleged copyright violation and is impermissibly duplicative of his claim for relief under the Copyright Act.

This argument is unavailing. As the Honorable Constance Baker Motley summarized governing law in Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), a case in which the plaintiff asserted both copyright and Lanham Act claims in connection with the exclusion of his name from the credits of various songs recorded by the musical group "Guns N' Roses": Aware that nearly every copyright-based claim involves a charge of improper failure to credit a purported author, the Second Circuit has limited the extent to which a copyright-based claim may support a Lanham Act claim. . . . For the Lanham Act to apply to a copyright-based claim, an aggrieved author must show more than a violation of the author's copyright-protected right to credit and profit from a creation.

Netzer, 963 F. Supp. at 1316 (citing Dillman v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1986)). Accord Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). "A plaintiff seeking to invoke either doctrine is also required to demonstrate that his ignorance is not attributable to a lack of diligence on his part.

Thus, when a plaintiff bases their Lanham Act claim "on no more than an alleged copyright violation," the claim "is impermissibly duplicative of his claim for relief under the Copyright Act." Marvullo v. Gruner & Jahr, 105 F. Supp. 2d 225, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); accord Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("the Second Circuit has limited the extent to which a copyright-based claim may support a Lanham Act claim, repeatedly cautioning that 'we reject . . . attempt[s] to convert all copyright claims into Lanham Act violations.'") (quoting Lipton, 71 F.3d at 473). While the defendants insist that Franklin "squarely grounds both Lanham Act claims on his copyrighted Original Work logo," X Gear Mem. at 14, in fact Franklin alleges that X Gear and Tydlacka have unfairly traded on his unregistered trademarked logo irrespective of any copyright claim.