Plaintiff responds that this claim is qualitatively different than a copyright claim because it relates to his right to receive proceeds generated from the use of his photographs. “ ‘Courts have generally concluded that the theory of unjust enrichment protects rights that are essentially ‘equivalent’ to rights protected by the Copyright Act; thus, unjust enrichment claims relating to the use of copyrighted material are generally preempted.' ” Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (quoting Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc., 963 F.Supp. 1308, 1322 (S.D.N.Y.1997)). In Netzer, “the gravamen of the unjust enrichment claim [was] unauthorized exploitation of Ms. Mystic [a comic book character] without providing an accounting.”

A claim for accounting is a remedy premised on a determination of co-ownership because the duty to account for profits "presupposes a relationship as co-owners of the copyright." Weber v. Geffen Records, 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). A. Ownership Claims

Courts of this district have barred Lanham Act claims where the plaintiffs' trademark allegations merely restate the allegations of their copyright claims, and in particular, fail to show the "requisite affirmative action of falsely claiming originality beyond that implicit in any allegedly false copyright." Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp.2d 628, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that attribution of song authorship to defendant "does not venture beyond that implicit in any allegedly false copyright"). In order for a Lanham Act claim to survive in addition to a copyright claim, "an aggrieved author must show more than a violation of the author's protected right to credit and profit from a creation.

However, like the Ninth Circuit, "[a]ware that nearly every copyright-based claim involves a charge of improper failure to credit a purported author, the Second Circuit has limited the extent to which a copyright based claim may support a Lanham Act claim." Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2 d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Lipton, 71 F.3d at 473-74). The Second Circuit has held that mere copyright infringement and the presence of a false copyright notice alone are not enough to support a claim of reverse passing off under Section 43(a).

This argument is unavailing. As the Honorable Constance Baker Motley summarized governing law in Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), a case in which the plaintiff asserted both copyright and Lanham Act claims in connection with the exclusion of his name from the credits of various songs recorded by the musical group "Guns N' Roses": Aware that nearly every copyright-based claim involves a charge of improper failure to credit a purported author, the Second Circuit has limited the extent to which a copyright-based claim may support a Lanham Act claim. . . . For the Lanham Act to apply to a copyright-based claim, an aggrieved author must show more than a violation of the author's copyright-protected right to credit and profit from a creation.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants not only copied his logo, but that they have falsely represented themselves as the creator and owner of the logo, which has resulted in consumer confusion. (Compl. ¶¶ 39-41.); see Webber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[To allege a separate trademark infringement claim], [t]he [plaintiff] must make a greater showing that the designation of origin was false, was harmful, and stemmed from some affirmative act whereby [defendant] falsely represented itself as the owner."). V. COUNT III IS DISMISSED AS TO PUBLISHING DEFENDANTS, BUT

Consistent with the general rule, this Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claim of unjust enrichment is equivalent in substance to a copyright infringement claim, because the cause of action is based on the same conduct alleged to violate the Copyright Act. See Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1995) (unjust enrichment claim relating to use of copyrighted material preempted); Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); American Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entertainment Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same). At its core, Plaintiffs' state law theory of recovery is based on the alleged wrongful transmission of Alvarez Guedes' sound recordings over the airwaves.

The author must make a greater showing that the designation of origin was false, was harmful, and stemmed from some affirmative act whereby [defendant] falsely represented itself as the owner.Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 463 (S.D.N Y 1999) (Motley, J.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Given the most liberal reading of the second amended complaint, plaintiff's Lanham Act claim is based on no more than an alleged copyright violation and is impermissibly duplicative of his claim for relief under the Copyright Act.

. “As pled, this claim ‘not only is based on a copyright claim, but also lacks any extra element making it sufficiently different from a copyright claim to escape preemption.'” Kelley, 2016 WL 5720766, at *8 (quoting Weber v. Geffen Recs., Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). “This claim must, therefore, be dismissed.

In so holding, the Court assumes, arguendo, that Jordan's unfair competition claim is not preempted by her copyright infringement claim. See, e.g., Kelley v. Univ. Music Grp. No. 14 Civ. 2968 (PAE), 2016 WL 5720766, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016) (citing, inter alia, Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458,462 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). To merit default judgment on the unfair competition claim, the Complaint must plausibly allege the “bad faith misappropriation of the labors and expenditures of another, likely to cause confusion or to deceive purchasers as to the origin of the goods.”