In support of this position, McGraw cites several district court decisions (discussed in depth below) where the injured party's discovery of copyright infringement was deemed to place the party on notice that the bad actor might be infringing other copyrights. Id. at 10 (citing Luar Music Corp. v. Universal Music Group, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 2d 299, 309 (D.P.R. 2012); Fahmy v. Jay-Z, 835 F. Supp. 2d 783, 790 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc. 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Exec. Dev., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 474, 488 (D.N.J. 1999)). GHPI counters by arguing that it reasonably perceived McGraw's voluntary disclosures as the acts of an honest business partner, thus fostering trust in McGraw's good faith rather than cynicism.

The date of discovery "will be later than the date of [infringement] only to the extent that plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence but remained unaware of the [infringement]." Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc. , 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Motley, J.). McGraw-Hill does not dispute that Pelaez became aware of the infringements he alleges in late 2014 (McGraw-Hill 56.1 Counter ¶ 97), but nevertheless contends that Pelaez's claims are untimely, for two reasons.

Thus, the Court's present analysis, whether Plaintiff knew or had reason to know of Defendant's alleged copyright infringement more than three (3) years prior to filing suit, is substantially similar to the Kepner–Tregoe court's laches analysis. Moreover, a reasonable person in Plaintiff's shoes charged with a duty of diligence would have discovered the alleged copyright infringement when Fiebre de Reggaeton and Reggaeton Latino were released and distributed and The Last Don and The Last Don Live were released and distributed in a manner exceeding the scope of the November License and the April License. See Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 458, 465–66 (S.D.N.Y.1999); Wanlass v. Gen. Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1338 (Fed.Cir.1998)(“constructive knowledge of the infringement may be imputed to the patentee even where he has no actual knowledge of the sales, marketing, publication, public use, or other conspicuous activities of potential infringement if these activities are sufficiently prevalent in the inventor's field of endeavor.”); Amador v. McDonald's Corp., No. 07–1323, 2008 WL 5683885, at *11 (D.P.R. Dec. 5, 2008), Report and Recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part by Amador v. McDonald's Corp., 601 F.Supp.2d 403 (D.P.R.2009)(“As a practical matter, where a work has been publicly disseminated ... the copyright owner will be charged deemed to have been on constructive notice of the infringement.”).

Plaintiff did not exercise due diligence in preserving his rights; he apparently sought no confirmation from Riverdeep that it actually revoked Cash's license (such as a copy of the letter that Riverdeep claimed to have sent). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff's equitable estoppel argument must fail. See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (equitable relief has been extended when "complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass" and has exercised due diligence in preserving rights); Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 466-67 (S.D. N.Y. 1999) (no equitable estoppel because plaintiff had unreasonably relied on an "unexceptional string of empty promises" to remedy infringements and protracted negotiations to implement those promises); Netzer v. Continuity Graphic Assocs., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) ("Equitable estoppel is applicable only in situations where demonstrated `egregious wrongdoing' by a defendant prevents a plaintiff from bringing suit on a claim of which the plaintiff is aware."). Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff's direct copyright infringement claim against Riverdeep is barred by the statute of limitations.

If plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment was solely based on Tubb's unfair economic gain from violating plaintiffs' copyright, it would be preempted. Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1985); Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 458, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). However, plaintiffs have asserted a distinct factual basis for this claim which does not overlap with plaintiffs' copyright claims.

Lipton, 71 F.3d at 473.Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Armstrong, 91 F. Supp.2d at 633. Plaintiffs attempt to make such a showing, arguing that the ProQuest defendants modified their individual contributions in the microform products and that the National Geographic defendants intentionally blurred image credits.

Plaintiff points out that a cause of action under the Copyright Act accrues only upon discovery of the illegal conduct and that its claims are therefore timely. See Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996) (copyright cause of action accrues "when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is premised"); Weber v. Geffen Records, Inc. 63 F. Supp.2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same). The court holds that it matters not whether the three year period adopted by the parties stems from a state or federal period of limitations.