We recognize that a court can exercise its inherent power to "correct" its own records. See Bolduc v. Commissioner of Correction, 355 Mass. 765, 767 (1969) (court had plenary power to order that mittimus be corrected so as to conform with sentence actually imposed); Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293 (1932) ("There is an inherent and necessary power in a court of justice acting on the motion of an interested party . . . or on its own motion to correct errors and remedy omissions in its records in order that they shall speak the truth"). Here, however, there is no evidence that Boe's probation record is inaccurate or false such that expungement would be permissible under the court's inherent authority to "correct" the record.

See Trustees of Boston Maine Corp. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 367 Mass. 57, 62 (1975), S.C., 372 Mass. 858 (1977), quoting Atkins v. Sawyer, 1 Pick. 351, 354 (1823), and Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293 (1932) ("[O]ver 150 years ago this court regarded it as 'a well settled rule, that any mistake arising from the misprision of the clerk may be amended and set right.' . . . 'There is an inherent and necessary power in a court of justice acting . . . on its own motion to correct errors and remedy omissions in its records in order that they shall speak the truth'"). Whether a court acts on its own motion or on motion of a party, is, in these circumstances, of no consequence.

Atkins v. Sawyer, 1 Pick. 351, 354 (1823). And in Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293 (1932), we said: "There is an inherent and necessary power in a court of justice acting on the motion of an interested party . . . or on its own motion to correct errors and remedy omissions in its records in order that they shall speak the truth." No further citations are necessary to support the rule that if the clerk errs in making an entry on the record, the court may order that error corrected.

That a court has plenary power at any time to correct errors in its records is well established. Balch v. Shaw, 7 Cush. 282, 284. Commonwealth v. Soderquest, 183 Mass. 199, 200. Kacavas v. Toothacker, 278 Mass. 302, 303. Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293. Chagnon v. Chagnon, 300 Mass. 309, 311. Thus the judge rightly ordered the mittimus to be corrected so that it would conform to the sentence actually imposed. Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, there is nothing in G.L.c. 278, § 29C, inserted by St. 1962, c. 310, § 2, which prevents such a correction.

Brown v. Webber, 6 Cush. 560, 563-565. Such a motion was filed but not fully prosecuted (fn. 2). If the bond to dissolve the attachment had been filed in the law action, the attachment would have been dissolved (see Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 294) and the bond would have taken its place without any adjudication that the attachment was invalid. Wolfe might then have had at least plausible basis for contending that the bond was enforceable without regard to whether the attachment was voidable (see Leffler v. Todd, 316 Mass. 227, 233), for the recovery allowed to Wolfe (a) was for the same cause of action for which the law action was brought; (b) was properly determined in the equity proceeding, see G.L.c. 214, § 3 (7); and (c) was within the penal sum of the bond.

It is settled that "There is an inherent and necessary power in a court of justice acting on the motion of an interested party, at the suggestion of one not a party, or on its own motion to correct errors and remedy omissions in its records in order that they shall speak the truth." Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293. Allen v. Moushegian, 320 Mass. 746, 755-756.

It is settled that the judge had authority to correct the first decree entered by him as not conforming to the decision actually made by him. "'There is an inherent and necessary power in a court of justice acting on the motion of an interested party, at the suggestion of one not a party, or on its own motion to correct errors and remedy omissions in its records in order that they shall speak the truth.' Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293, and cases cited. This is a plenary power.

That fact, however, is set forth in the agreement for abridgment of the record for appeal (below referred to) as evidence that was before the judge at the time of the trial. The case is not one coming within the rule that there "is an inherent and necessary power in a court of justice . . . on its own motion to correct errors and remedy omissions in its records in order that they shall speak the truth," Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293; Chagnon v. Chagnon, 300 Mass. 309, 311-312, and cases cited, but is one where the original decree truly represented the decision of the judge. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, we are of opinion that the respondents were persons aggrieved by the entry of the second decree in question, and entitled to appeal therefrom.

In these circumstances it is settled that "There is an inherent and necessary power in a court of justice acting on the motion of an interested party, at the suggestion of one not a party, or on its own motion to correct errors and remedy omissions in its records in order that they shall speak the truth." Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292, 293, and cases cited. This is a plenary power.

Dewey v. Peeler, 161 Mass. 135. Karrick v. Wetmore, 210 Mass. 578, 579. Webb v. Cohen, 280 Mass. 292. Bryer v. American Surety Co. 285 Mass. 336. McDermott v. Justices of the Municipal Courtof the City of Boston, 287 Mass. 563, 568. Prenguber v. Agostini, 289 Mass. 222, 224, 225. A. Doykos T. Pappas, Inc. v. Leventhal, 290 Mass. 375, 376.