Opinion
CA No. 3:02-CV-2716-R.
August 3, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed December 5, 2003). For the reasons detailed below, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Linda Webb ("Webb" or "Plaintiff") originally filed class and individual claims against Barnes Group, Inc. ("Barnes" or "Defendant"). Class claims have since been dismissed, as they failed to meet the requirements for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Webb's remaining individual claims allege sexual discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), for failure to promote, pay discrimination, and constructive discharge. Plaintiff also alleges a pay discrimination claim under the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). Plaintiff seeks actual and exemplary damages in addition to attorney's fees.Barnes Group is headquartered in Bristol, Connecticut, and it is comprised of three unincorporated operating groups: (1) Barnes Aerospace; (2) Associated Spring; and (3) Barnes Distribution. Each operating group has its own discrete management team and separate human resources departments. Linda Webb began working for Barnes Distribution's predecessor, Bowman Distribution, in 1973. During her career, Webb worked only for Barnes Distribution or its predecessor, in Arlington, Texas ("Dallas facility"). At the end of her tenure with Barnes, Webb held the position of Distribution Center Manager II ("DCM II").
In May 2000, Barnes purchased Curtis Industries and merged it into Bowman Distribution. The merged entities became known as Barnes Distribution. Jeff Pernus, who had been employed with Curtis Industries since August 1973, took over as the Director of North America Operations for Barnes Distribution. The DCMs for all the distribution facilities, including Webb, reported to Pernus. In 2001, all of Barnes Distribution's distribution operations were consolidated into four large facilities in the United States, and the remaining facilities were closed. Four facilities survived: Reno, Nevada; Edison, New Jersey; Elizabethtown, Kentucky; and Arlington, Texas. Several male DCMs lost their jobs with the Company because their facilities were closed as part of the consolidation. As a result of the distribution warehouse consolidation, the number of orders to be filled and the number of items in inventory at each of the four facilities increased dramatically. Thus, it was further decided that each of these large facilities would be run by a manager with the title of at least Distribution Center Manager I ("DCM I"). DCM I is a salary grade level 16 position. At the time, Webb was a DCM II, which is a salary grade level 15 position.
On October 12, 2001, Pernus awarded the DCM I position in Reno, Nevada, to a female, Lynn Lonn, with whom he had worked for many years at Curtis Industries. That same day, Pernus awarded the DCM I job in Dallas, Texas, to Grady Thompson, whom Pernus had hired into Curtis Industries in 1985. Thompson had a Bachelors Degree and almost seventeen years of experience as a DCM in Atlanta, Georgia. Thompson had supervised the consolidation of the Reno facility prior to turning it over to Lonn and had also supervised the creation of Curtis Industries' distribution facility in Shelbyville, Kentucky, in 1995. In addition, Thompson was already a salary grade level 16 DCM I.
On October 19, 2001, Pernus and Barnes Distribution's Human Resources Manager traveled to Dallas and informed Webb that another person had been selected to be the DCM I in Dallas. During their meeting, they told Webb that they wanted her to continue to work at Barnes, and that her title, salary, and benefits would all remain unchanged. Webb inquired about severance pay at that time. On October 24, 2001, Barnes Distribution's Vice President of Human Resources contacted Webb in an effort to convince her to stay with the company. He followed his call with an email, again explaining that the consolidation would result in extensive workload changes at the Dallas facility, and that the facility would be best served by bringing in another manager to work with her. The email further explained the company's stance on severance pay and their hope that she would remain with Barnes. That same day, Webb resigned her employment with Barnes Distribution, following Defendant's decision to place another employee in the position of DCM I at the Dallas facility.
Webb's claim of pay discrimination rests on her assertions that she was paid less than either the midpoint or minimum point for her grade level between 1999 and 2001. Each year, Barnes Group's corporate office issues U.S. Salary Tables to each of its operating groups which contain salary ranges for each grade level and guidance concerning annual raises and salary planning implementation. Each job at Barnes Group is assigned a "salary grade level." Salary grades are assigned based on the scope and scale of the job responsibilities, which are determined based upon factors such as: (a) the effect of the position on profit and loss in the business; (b) the number of direct reports; and (c) the reporting relationship of the position (i.e., whether it is a position reporting directly to a functional head, or to the office of the presidency). Human Resources managers at Barnes Distribution frequently assign jobs to salary grades before candidates for the positions have even been identified. From 1999 to present, salary grades at Barnes Group ranged from 1 to 37. Within Barnes Distribution specifically, salary grades range from 1 to 25.
In 1999 and 2000, the ranges were identified at minimum, midpoint, and maximum points. From 2001 to the present, the ranges have been identified only at the midpoint and maximum points. Salary minimums were eliminated. Actual job duties for jobs within a particular salary grade differ significantly from job to job. Barnes also issues guidelines for setting salaries. The specific salary-setting guidelines may vary according to operating group based upon external market factors particular to the group's industry (spring manufacturing, for example) or internal factors relating to the group's performance. In addition, operating groups may diverge downward from the guidelines issued to them and operating group line management applies its own discretion to salary treatment. The overriding factor in setting salary was performance. Further, other factors such as educational level, time-in-job, geography/cost of living, market conditions for types of jobs, and a person's prior pay at the job they had before working at Barnes Distribution all could affect an employee's salary.
Approximately 75 different Vice Presidents, Directors, or Managers within Barnes Distribution determine the salaries of their direct reports based upon each individuals' performance in their particular jobs. Within the operations department alone, at least fifteen managers make salary recommendations. The performance component is based on the individual employees' most recent performance evaluations. Barnes Distribution's philosophy is to strive for a clear linkage between the individual employee's performance and the amount of their merit raise.
Barnes Distribution's managers forward their individual salary recommendations to Barnes Distribution's Vice President of Human Resources and Barnes Distribution's Manager of Compensation and Benefits, who, in turn, review them with Barnes Distribution's Office of the President, including Barnes Distribution's President and Barnes Distribution's Chief Operating Officer. Meetings are then scheduled with the department heads to sit down and go through the salary recommendations, focusing on the performance of individuals. The salary decisions of Barnes Distribution's Office of the President are then submitted to Barnes Group's corporate office. Barnes Group's Chief Executive Officer, Senior Vice President of Human Resources, and Global Director of Compensation and Benefits meet with Barnes Distribution's Vice President of Human Resources and the Office of the President to review Barnes Distribution's salary decisions. Corporate review focuses on the employees in grade levels 17 and above, who are considered to be senior management. Once the salary planning process is complete, the merit-based raises take effect prospectively.
Webb puts forth claims of pay discrimination under the EPA and Title VII, as well as claims under Title VII of constructive discharge and failure to promote. Each will be discussed in turn.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Melton v. Teachers Ins. Annuity Ass'n of Am., 114 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1997). The court must decide all reasonable doubts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994); Walker v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). As long as there appears to be some support for the disputed allegations such that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the motion must be denied. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a claim upon which summary judgment is sought, the moving party may discharge its summary judgment burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits or depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431-32 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment will be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Because employment discrimination claims "involve nebulous questions of motivation and intent," summary judgment is generally an inappropriate tool for resolving these cases. Thornbrough v. Columbus Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 640-41 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). However, if Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, Bauer v. Albermarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999), or if defendant presents strong evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and the plaintiff is unable to counter with additional evidence of pretext, summary judgment may be properly granted. Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994).
B. Failure to Promote Claim
Following Defendant's 2001 decision to consolidate its distribution into four large facilities and close the remaining facilities, Defendant selected Grady Thompson (not Plaintiff) as the Dallas facility's DCM I. Grady Thompson had been a manager of a distribution center since 1985; he had implemented and supervised the configuration of two distribution facilities; he held a Bachelors degree; and, he had experience in the specific system Barnes sought to implement in the Dallas facility. By contrast, Webb had managed a distribution center since 1997; she had never supervised the configuration of a distribution facility; Webb had held a GED and an Associates degree; and, she had comparatively little experience with the system to which Barnes planned to transition the Dallas facility. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant illegally failed to promote her from DCM II to the position of DCM I at the Dallas facility. Plaintiff was asked to remain with the company with her salary, title, and benefits unchanged. Also during this reorganization, three male DCMs lost their jobs.
In reviewing discrimination claims, courts apply the familiar burden-shifting framework applied by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1990). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, thus creating a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). Once the employer puts forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, all presumptions drop from the case. See Grimes v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of showing pretext on the part of the employer. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993); Swanson v. General Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1186 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1997).
To prove a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Webb must prove: (1) that she belongs to a protected class; (2) that she sought and was qualified for the promotion; (3) that she was rejected for the promotion; and (4) that Barnes continued to seek someone to fill the position with Plaintiff's qualifications. See Haynes v. Pennzoil Co., 207 F.3d 296, 300 (5th Cir. 2000). Webb, as a female employee, belongs to a protected class. This Court finds that Plaintiff was qualified for the position of DCM I and that she "applied" for it insofar as any other employee "applied" for the position. Candidates for the position did not formally apply, but qualified candidates from within the company were considered for the promotion. Webb was rejected for the position, and it was offered to another. Webb also contends that Barnes continued to seek applicants with her same qualifications.
Barnes explains that it chose the best-qualified person to fill the DCM I position. In so doing, Defendant put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to promote Webb. See Manning v. Chevron Chemical Co., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 881-82 (5th Cir. 2003). To establish pretext and counter Defendant's showing, Webb must demonstrate that she was "clearly better qualified" than Grady Thompson. See id. at 882. She cannot. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's Title VII failure to promote claim.
C. Pay Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff advances pay discrimination claims under the EPA and Title VII. The EPA requires that "equal wages reward equal work." Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health Science Center San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)). To prove a prima facie case of pay discrimination under the EPA, Webb must show that Barnes differently compensates employees for equal work. Id. To prove "equal work," Webb must show that the "skill, effort, and responsibility" required of the employees to whom she compares herself was "substantially equal" to that expected of Plaintiff. Pearce v. Wichita County, City of Wichita Falls, Texas, Hospital Board, 590 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Brennan