Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:98CV-302-S
November 8, 1999.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This action is before the Court on motion of the defendants, City of Louisville, et al., for summary judgment in this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, Ronald Weathers ("Weathers"), alleges the defendants violated his constitutional rights on three separate occasions: the towing of his vehicle and two subsequent traffic stops. For the reasons set forth below, the defendants' motion will be granted.
FACTS 1. The Towing Incident
On March 17, 1998, Ms. Andrea L. Hampton was the victim of a hit and run accident. At the time of the accident she described the vehicle that hit her as a black, four-door sedan, with tinted windows and red pin striping. She did not get the license number at the time of the accident.
Ms. Hampton contacted Officer Stiemle of the Louisville Police Department for help in the investigation of the hit and run. She told him she had located the car that hit her and provided him with the address where she found the vehicle and the license number. After Officer Stiemle had this information he spoke with a witness to the accident, Ms. Engle. He spoke with Ms. Engle because Ms.Engle told Ms. Hampton on the day of the accident that she had seen the car involved in the accident driving through the area where she worked on more than one occasion. From this information, Ms. Hampton apparently searched the area and found the plaintiff's vehicle.
Officer Stiemle proceeded to the address provided by Ms. Hampton and found the car she described. Upon his initial inspection, he noted that there was some body damage on the vehicle consistent with that of being in an accident. He ran the plate number, but could only get an address for the owner, Mary Weathers, located in the western end of Louisville. Unable to contact the owner because he didn't have a phone number, Officer Stiemle contacted a wrecker to have the vehicle towed as evidence in a possible hit and run accident.
After the wrecker arrived, the plaintiff appeared and asked why his car was being towed. The plaintiff denied any involvement in the accident and claimed that the damage was there when he bought the car. Based on Ms. Hampton's statement that this was the car that hit her, and the body damage, Officer Stiemle proceeded to have the car towed for further investigation.
Approximately two weeks after the car was towed, Officer Stiemle completed his investigation and released the hold on the vehicle, which was then returned to the plaintiff without further incident.
2. The Traffic Stops
On or about May 15, 1998 at approximately 9:00 p.m., the plaintiff was pulled over by a police officer. The officer informed the plaintiff that he was running a check on a reported stolen car that fit the description of the plaintiff's vehicle. The officer told the plaintiff that he had run his plates through but wanted to double check to make sure the plaintiff was the owner of the car. The officer looked at the plaintiff's license and registration and told the plaintiff he was free to go.
The same night another police officer stopped the plaintiff. The officer told the plaintiff he was being stopped for having a front headlight out. The plaintiff stated that he only recently realized his headlight was malfunctioning. The officer asked the plaintiff to step out of the vehicle so he could show him which light was out. The officer looked at the plaintiff's license and registration, and then asked the plaintiff if he could search the vehicle. The plaintiff consented to the search. After searching the inside of the vehicle, the police officer allowed him to go.
The plaintiff alleges that these two stops were made without probable cause for the sole purpose of harassing him in retaliation for his filing of this lawsuit. The two officers involved in the traffic stops are not named in this lawsuit. Instead the plaintiff alleges that the City of Louisville through the Louisville Police Department is liable for failure to properly train its officers on the constitutional provisions of improper search and seizure.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A party's failure to establish an element of proof essential to his case and upon which he will bear the burden of proof at trial constitutes a failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
DISCUSSION 1. The Towing Incident
To prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Weathers must show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the defendants deprived him of that right under color of state law. The right to which Weathers alleges he was deprived in this case is that of protection against unreasonable search and seizure governed by the Fourth Amendment. To satisfy the reasonableness requirement, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971). Therefore, the plaintiff must show the defendants acted without probable cause in towing his car.
Probable cause determinations are made by looking at the totality of the circumstances in the particular case. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983), the Court stated that probable cause "does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities." It is well-settled that if probable cause to seize or search a vehicle exists, then a warrant is unnecessary. In California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), the Court found that "[t]he mobility of automobiles, we have observed, `creates circumstances of such exigency that, as a practical necessity, rigorous enforcement of the warrant requirement is impossible.'" Id. at 391 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976)). In Autoworld Specialty Cars v. United States, 815 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit held that where the vehicle is inherently mobile and the officer had probable cause to associate the vehicle with some criminal activity, a warrantless seizure would not violate the Fourth Amendment.
In this case, we believe that Officer Stiemle had probable cause to seize the plaintiff's vehicle. Based on the information provided by the victim and the witness and the vehicle's body damage, it was reasonable for the officer to believe this was the offending car. Because Officer Stiemle believed this could be the vehicle involved in the hit and run, exigent circumstances existed to excuse his failure to obtain a warrant. After notifying the plaintiff that his vehicle was suspected of being involved in a hit and run, Officer Stiemle had no way to ensure the vehicle would remain in its present location and condition if he simply took the plaintiff's word that he had the wrong car. This is especially true given the fact that the driver involved in the accident apparently had no reservations about running from law enforcement as evidenced by the initial hit and run. Therefore, because the vehicle was mobile and Officer Stiemle had probable cause to believe that the vehicle was involved in the hit and run accident, towing the car for further investigation did not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
2. The Traffic Stops
The facts surrounding the traffic stops are undisputed. The plaintiff claims that the City of Louisville violated his Fourth Amendment rights in the first traffic stop because the officer did not have probable cause. The defendants argue that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is required for an investigatory stop and that the officer clearly had reasonable suspicion under the circumstances. We agree. Reasonable suspicion, a lower standard than probable cause, is sufficient for a valid traffic stop. United States v. Braggs, 23 F.3d 1047, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). In this case, the stop was based on a stolen car report matching the description of the plaintiff's vehicle. Clearly this constitutes the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the stop.
The plaintiff alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were further violated in the second traffic stop when the officer searched his car. It is undisputed that the plaintiff voluntarily consented to this search. Voluntary consent has long been recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) ("The Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation."); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1991) (Consensual searches have long been approved because it is no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once they have been permitted to do so.). Because the plaintiff has not alleged any facts or provided any evidence which indicates that his consent was not freely given, his Fourth Amendment claim regarding the second traffic stop and search must fail as well.
For the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that Weathers fails to establish any constitutional violation necessary to establish a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the plaintiff has suffered no constitutional injury, his claims under § 1983 against the City of Louisville for failure to train must also fail. City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Because no constitutional violations occurred in this case, however, the City of Monroe necessarily is not liable to plaintiff.").
Viewing all the facts and inferences in a light most favorable to Weathers, this Court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A separate order will be entered herein this date in accordance with this opinion.
ORDER
Motion having been made by the defendants, City of Louisville, et al., for summary judgment, and for the reasons set forth in the memorandum opinion entered herein this date, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the defendants' motion is GRANTED and the plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all counts and all defendants.