Opinion
Civil 6:21-CV-01330-ADA-JCM
07-06-2022
SEAN WEATHERFORD, Plaintiff, v. GATX CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
TO: THE HONORABLE ALAN D ALBRIGHT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JEFFREY C. MANSKE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), and Rules 1(f) and 4(b) of Appendix C of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges.
Before the Court is Defendants GATX Corporation (“GATX”), Joe Budzisz, Cody Smith, Michael Deason, and Chris Zeig's (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 10). For the following reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sean Weatherford began working at GATX on February 24, 2015, in railcar repair and was a member of the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial, and Service Workers International Union, Local 1822 (the “Union”). Pl.'s Pet. at 2, ECF No. 1-5. On November 15, 2019, Smith inspected the railcar that Plaintiff and two others were working in to ensure the health and safety of the employees. Id. at 2-3. While looking into the railcar, Smith claimed that Plaintiff and the other two employees were not wearing their respirators. Id. On November 19, 2019, GATX put Plaintiff on a five-day suspension as a result of the incident. Id. at 3. Following the suspension, GATX discharged Plaintiff on November 25, 2019. Id.
On April 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), claiming the Union failed to represent him, timely file grievance paperwork, request a hearing within the appropriate timeframe, or ask for an extension of time in which to file a grievance. Defs.' Mot. Ex. B, ECF No. 10-2. On July 8, 2020, Plaintiff filed a first amended charge against the Union (the “amended charge”), arguing the Union failed to process Plaintiff's grievance for arbitrary, discriminatory, or perfunctory reasons or in bad faith, and the Union willfully misinformed Plaintiff about the status of his grievance. Defs.' Mot. Ex. C, ECF No. 103.
Plaintiff alleges Budzisz, as union president, breached the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Plaintiff's employer, GATX, and the Union, by failing to (1) represent a union employee, (2) timely file grievance paperwork, (3) request a hearing within the appropriate timeframe, (4) ask for an extension of time in which to file a grievance, and (5) take witness statements, as stated in the grievance process of the CBA. Pl.'s Pet. at 4. Further, Plaintiff alleges that Budzisz, Smith, Deason, and Zeig were negligent in their investigations of the incident and failed to fully investigate or interview key witnesses. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff also alleges that he was wrongfully discharged by GATX because of the CBA breach. Id. at 5. Defendants removed this case to the Court on December 21, 2021. Notice Removal 1, ECF No. 1.
Defendants filed the present Motion, arguing they are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because: (1) Plaintiff's state-law claims are a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim that is time-barred under the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”); and (2) the individual defendants are improper defendants pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA. Defs.' Mot. at 12. Plaintiff did not file a response to the Motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings “after the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Motions pursuant to Rule 12(c) are analyzed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Phillips v. City of Dallas, 781 F.3d 772, 775 (5th Cir. 2015).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).
The court determines whether the plaintiff has stated both a legally cognizable and plausible claim; the court should not evaluate the plaintiff's likelihood of success. Lone Star Fund V. (U.S.), LP v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010). Based upon the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A court, however, need not blindly accept each and every allegation of fact; properly pleaded allegations of fact amount to more than just conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions. Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
When the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct, then the claim is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard, unlike the “probability requirement,” requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. A pleading offering “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's state-law claims are preempted by a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim that is time-barred.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's state-law claims constitute a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim, which is barred by the applicable six-month statute of limitations (“SOL”). Defs.' Mot. at 5. The Court should grant Defendants' motion because § 301 of the LMRA preempts Plaintiff's state-law claims and Plaintiff failed to file suit within the six-month SOL period.
Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiff alleges state-law claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge. Pl.'s Pet. at 3-5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached the CBA between GATX and the Union by failing to fully investigate the incident or interview witnesses and, as a result, GATX wrongfully discharged Plaintiff. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also alleges that Budzisz, in his capacity as union president, failed to represent Plaintiff, a union employee, by failing to follow the grievance procedures. Id. at 4-5.
A breach of contract claim for a violation of a CBA is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Parham v. Carrier Corp., 9 F.3d 383, 390 (5th Cir. 1993). Additionally, when the resolution of a state-law tort claim depends on the analysis of a provision within a CBA, the state-law claim is preempted by § 301. Id. Under § 301, the terms of the agreement bind employees and dictate the enforcement of their contractual rights. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967). If the CBA has an exclusive and binding grievance procedure, the employee must exhaust all remedies under the provision to bring a valid § 301 suit. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). The outcomes of grievance remedies are typically final and binding but are subject to limited judicial review. DelCostello v. Int'l Broth. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983). For instance, an employee may still sue his union when an agent of the union breaches the duty of fair representation during the grievance procedures. Id.
The duty of fair representation is implied under the National Labor Relations Act, requiring unions to give an honest effort to serve the employees' interests. Id. A claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation arises when an employee alleges that his union represented him in a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory way. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 164. Duty of fair representation claims tend to arise out of claims against an employer for wrongful discharge. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976).
When an employee has a § 301 claim against his employer and a duty of fair representation claim against his union, he can bring a “hybrid” suit against his employer or union, or both. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165. Regardless of who the employee sues, he must prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation and that the employer breached the CBA. Id.
Here, Plaintiff's state-law claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge are based upon an alleged breach of the CBA between Plaintiff's employer, GATX, and the Union. Section 301 of the LMRA preempts these claims because the contract in question is a CBA. Since the wrongful discharge claim is dependent upon an analysis of the terms of the CBA, it is also preempted by § 301.
Plaintiff also claims that Budzisz, as union president, failed to represent a union employee by not carrying out the grievance procedures outlined in the CBA. Pl.'s Pet. at 4. Plaintiff's state-law claims constitute a duty of fair representation claim because the duty of fair representation requires the Union to represent all employees in the enforcement of the CBA. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177. Plaintiff's claims explicitly state that Budzisz failed to represent him, which means that Budzisz failed to uphold the duty of fair representation. Therefore, the Court understands Plaintiff's claims as a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim.
Hybrid actions are permitted by § 301 of the LMRA and are subject to the six-month statute of limitations established in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 163-64; see also Miranda v. Nat'l Postal Mail, 219 Fed.Appx. 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The six-month SOL period begins to run when the employee knew or should have known of the breach. Barrett v. Ebasco Constructors, Inc., 868 F.2d 170, 171 (5th Cir. 1989).
Defendants argue that the limitations period began running on three possible dates: November 25, 2019, November 29, 2019, or April 23, 2020. Defs.' Mot. at 8-12. The November dates are based on deadlines for the grievance procedures outlined in the CBA, and the April date is when Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB. Id.
First, Defendants argue that the elapsing of strict deadlines for grievance procedures outlined in a CBA will trigger the running of the limitations period in a § 301/duty of fair representation suit. Id. at 9. In this case, the CBA sets out specific deadlines in the grievance procedures that the employee must meet before he can file a lawsuit. Defs.' Mot. Ex. A at 45, ECF No. 10-1. The CBA gives an employee five workdays from the date of suspension to request a hearing, and if no hearing is requested, the suspension automatically becomes a termination. Id. Further, if a hearing is requested, the CBA gives the employee five additional workdays from the date of the hearing to file a grievance. Id. Here, GATX suspended Plaintiff on November 19, 2019; thus, the five-day period to request a hearing ended on November 25, 2019, and the five-day period to file a grievance ended on November 29, 2019.
Second, Defendants argue that at the latest, Plaintiff knew of the alleged breach by April 23, 2020-when he filed a charge with the NLRB. Defs.' Mot. at 10. The Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed whether filing a charge with the NLRB will initiate the running of the limitations period in a § 301/duty of fair representation suit. Other courts generally hold that affirmative statements made by the employee of his belief that the union breached its duty of fair representation initiate the running of the limitations period. See, e.g., Carmena v. Brown-Eagle Corp., 722 F.Supp. 264, 266 (M.D. La. 1989); Simmons v. Howard Univ., 157 F.3d 914, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Washington v. Serv. Emps. Intern. Union, Local 50, 130 F.3d 825, 826 (8th Cir. 1997). For example, in Carmena, the employee filed a charge stating that the union failed to represent him by failing to timely file a grievance. 722 F.Supp. at 266. The court found that filing the charge with the NLRB for failure to represent indicated the plaintiff knew the union was not acting upon the grievance and breached the duty of fair representation. Id.
Regardless of whether the limitations period began running on either of the November dates, the latest date the limitations period began to run is April 23, 2020, which still falls outside the six-month limitations period. For this reason, the Court should grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In the present case, Plaintiff filed a charge with the NLRB, claiming the Union failed to represent him by failing to timely file a grievance. Defs.' Mot. Ex. B. The amended charge reiterated the claims that the Union failed to timely process Plaintiff's grievance regarding his termination. Defs.' Mot. Ex. C. Like in Carmena, Plaintiff explicitly alleged the Union failed to represent him by failing to timely file a grievance. Since Plaintiff explicitly stated his belief that the Union failed to represent him in his charge, the latest date that the limitations period began running is April 23, 2020. Plaintiff filed the suit over a year later on November 22, 2021. Therefore, the Court should grant judgment on the pleadings because the claim falls outside the six-month limitations period for hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claims.
B. The individual defendants are improper parties to a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim under 29 U.S.C. § 185(b).
Finally, Defendants argue that Smith, Deason, and Zeig are improper defendants because individual employees are improper parties to a § 301 suit. Defs.' Mot. at 12. Defendants also argue that Budzisz is an improper defendant because union representatives are improper parties in § 301/duty of fair representation suits. Id. at 13. The Court should grant Defendants' motion as to the individual defendants because, in a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation suit, only signatories of the CBA are proper defendants.
Individual employees of entities are not proper parties to a suit under § 301 of the LMRA. Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., Inc., 631 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1980). Section 301 suits are confined to the signatories of the CBA involved. Id. Section 301 of the LMRA states, “Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(b). The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that agents and employees of a union are exempt from personal liability in judgments against the union. Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248 (1962).
Here, Smith, Deason, and Zeig are all employees of GATX and are not signatories to the CBA. The signatories of the CBA are GATX and the Union. Applying 29 U.S.C. § 185(b), the individual Defendants are improper parties because they are employees of GATX. Ramsey, 631 F.2d at 1212.
Similarly, Budzisz is not a signatory of the CBA and is only the union president. Based upon 29 U.S.C. § 185(b), only the Union as an entity can be sued on behalf of the employees it represents. Budzisz is a union representative, and since agents of a union are exempt from personal liability in judgments against the union, Budzisz cannot be sued for failing to represent Plaintiff. See Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 248. Therefore, Smith, Deason, Zeig, and Budzisz are improper defendants because they are not signatories of the CBA and are either individual employees of GATX or representatives of the Union.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 10) be GRANTED.
V. OBJECTIONS
The parties may wish to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which they object. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. See Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings and recommendations in the Report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Except upon grounds of plain error, failing to object shall further bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150-53; Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1415.