Opinion
NO. 09-11-00383-CR
02-08-2012
JANET WATTS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 09-07212
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Janet Watts of bribery, sentenced Janet to nineteen years in prison, and assessed a $10,000 fine. On appeal, Janet challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and certain evidentiary rulings made by the trial court. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Factual Background
Janet's son Mario Watts a/k/a "Little Mo" testified that he was an inmate at the Stiles Unit in 2007. On September 30, 2007, Mario told correctional officer Davisha Martin that some inmates wanted cellular telephones and that he would give Martin money if she purchased the telephones. The next day, Martin brought the telephones into the prison. Inmate Eric Henry testified that he was supposed to retrieve the telephones from Martin and deliver them to Mario, as he had done with contraband on other occasions. Sergeant Jerry Bordelon testified that he heard Martin tell Henry to give a package to "Little Mo." Henry warned Martin that Bordelon was watching, and Bordelon saw Martin drop the package into a trash can. Bordelon retrieved the package and discovered the telephones.
Mario heard from other inmates that Martin had been caught. He contacted Martin on the telephone and called Janet to tell her he was probably in trouble. According to telephone records, Janet made and received telephone calls from Martin that same day. She also spoke to the mother of inmate Leonard Seals, who had been caught in possession of an iPhone. Mario testified that he is friends with Seals and that Janet had visited Mario and Seals together at Mario's request.
Martin admitted bringing contraband, including cellular telephones, to Mario on previous occasions. Mario testified that some telephones were placed in Janet's name, but that Janet was unaware that her personal information had been used to activate the telephones. He denied telling Janet that he had used her credit or placed the telephones in her name. According to Mario, Janet had nothing to do with the telephones and had no knowledge of them. He explained that whenever he contacted Janet via telephone, he told Janet that he was using someone else's telephone.
Mario admitted that people wired money to Janet on behalf of other inmates. Kelly Enloe, custodian of inmate visitation records, and several inmates testified that family members or friends of the inmates wired money to Janet. One family member testified that he wired money to Janet on behalf of his grandson, an inmate at the Stiles Unit. One inmate testified that another inmate gave him Janet's name and that his mother subsequently wired money to Janet.
Mario explained that he told Janet that she would be receiving the money and gave her instructions on what to do with the money. Janet explained that when she received the money, she kept the money at home and wired the money once Mario told her to do so. Josh Lyons with the Office of the Inspector General testified that in 2007, Janet received 134 MoneyGrams, which totaled $16,574. Lieutenant Mecheal Jackson searched Martin's vehicle and found a Western Union receipt and two MoneyGram receipts reflecting wire transfers from Janet to Martin. Jackson testified that Janet's MoneyGram records showed transfers from Janet to other correctional officers. Lyons testified that Janet sent 39 MoneyGrams to Martin, which totaled $13,660, and wired $800 to Martin on September 30. Janet testified that she did not know the inmates' family and friends sent the money or why she was sending money to the correctional officers. When Janet asked about the money, Mario stated that he was helping other inmates. Janet explained that Mario instructed her to wire money to Martin because he wanted to help Martin. Janet testified that given Mario's explanations, she was not suspicious.
Mario denied telling Janet what Martin would be doing with the money. Martin and Janet testified that some of the money was from Janet to pay for purses that Martin's friend had purchased for Janet. Martin testified that Mario knew she needed the money and that some of the money was a gift to her. Martin testified that she and Janet never discussed why the money was sent, and Janet never asked about the money's purpose. Martin testified that Janet warned her not to do anything wrong, but never indicated that she knew what was transpiring. Janet admitted asking Martin if she was doing anything wrong and warning Martin not to do anything to jeopardize her job or her children, but Martin denied any wrongdoing. Janet denied knowing that Martin or Mario was doing anything unlawful or that Martin was bringing telephones to Mario. Janet admitted Mario was a "hustler" on the street, but she did not know he was hustling in prison.
Martin admitted bringing contraband into the prison for money she received from Janet. Martin and Mario testified that Janet never paid Martin to purchase telephones. Janet testified that she never sent her own money to Martin. Martin testified that Janet never asked her to use her position as a correctional officer to bring telephones into the prison. Janet denied offering any benefit or money to Martin in exchange for Martin using her position as a correctional officer to take contraband into the Stiles Unit. She testified that she would never bribe anyone because she is not the type of person to pay someone to do something wrong. Martin denied being bribed by Janet.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In issue one, Janet contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. According to Janet, the State failed to demonstrate that she intentionally or knowingly committed an illegal act. Janet argues that the record fails to evidence an agreement to provide money to Martin for the purpose of delivering cellular telephones to inmates.
"[T]he Jackson v. Virginialegal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We assess all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We give deference to the jury's responsibility to fairly resolve conflicting testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
A person commits bribery if she intentionally or knowingly offers, confers, or agrees to confer on another any benefit as consideration for a violation of a duty imposed by law on a public servant. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.02(a)(3) (West 2011). A person acts intentionally when it is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a) (West 2011). A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of her conduct or to circumstances surrounding her conduct when she is aware of the nature of her conduct or that the circumstances exist. Id. § 6.03(b). A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of her conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. Intent or knowledge may be inferred from the accused's acts, words, and conduct. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When it is alleged and proved that the defendant offered a proscribed benefit, it is not necessary to further prove that the offer resulted in a bilateral arrangement or unlawful contract with the other party. Martinez v. State, 696 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, pet. ref'd). The offense of bribery is complete when the offer is made. Id.
In this case, the jury was authorized to find Janet guilty as a principal or as a party to the offense of bribery. "A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.01(a) (West 2011). Under the theory of party liability applicable to this case, the jury must have found beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, (2) Janet solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the other person to commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14 n.3. The jury may consider "events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense, and [] rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). "[C]ircumstantial evidence may be used to prove party status." Id.
The jury heard evidence that Martin was offered money and received money in exchange for her decision to bring cellular telephones into the prison for inmates. Martin had a legal duty not to provide cellular telephones to an inmate in a correctional facility. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.11(a)(3) (West 2011). Janet was aware of Mario's reputation as a "hustler," but she received money on behalf of inmates and followed Mario's instructions to wire money to correctional officers, including Martin, on numerous occasions. Of the $16,574 that Janet received in 2007, she wired $13,660 to Martin. Telephone records and testimony indicate regular contact between Janet, Martin, and Mario. In the month of September alone, there were thirty-seven connections between Janet's telephone and Martin's telephone. On September 30, Janet wired $800 to Martin and her telephone records reflect connections with both Mario's telephone and Martin's telephone. On October 1, after Martin was caught with the telephones, numerous telephone calls were made between Martin, Mario, and Janet.
The jury bore the burden of deciding whether Janet merely wired money at Mario's direction under the belief that Mario was helping Martin and the inmates or acted with an understanding and common design to commit the offense of bribery. See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; see also Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 302. Janet's actions before, during, and after the events of October 1 could lead the jury to reasonably conclude that Janet acted with intent to promote or assist the bribery, and solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid Mario in offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer on Martin a benefit as consideration for a violation of a duty imposed by law. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 7.02(a)(2); see also Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14 n.3; Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64. Because the State alleged and proved the offer of a proscribed benefit, proof of a bilateral agreement was unnecessary. See Martinez, 696 S.W.2d at 933. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Janet intentionally or knowingly offered, conferred, or agreed to confer on Martin a benefit as consideration for a violation of her legal duty to avoid providing cellular telephones to an inmate in a correctional facility. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; see also Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13; Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 36.02(a)(3). We overrule issue one.
Admission of Evidence
In issue two, Janet contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit a letter into evidence. Janet argues that the letter was unauthenticated, hearsay, and harmful. In issue three, Janet challenges the trial court's decision to permit the prison warden to testify during the punishment phase regarding a particular punishment. She argues that the State cannot elicit testimony that the community desires a particular result, that the testimony was based on extraneous matters, and that the testimony resembles irrelevant victim impact testimony.
We review a trial judge's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Oprean v. State, 201 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected[.]" Tex. R. Evid. 103(a); see Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). "We should not overturn the conviction if we have fair assurance from an examination of the record as a whole that the error did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect." Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
During cross-examination, Janet testified that she did not know Seals very well. Over Janet's objections, the trial court allowed the State to introduce into evidence a letter that purported to be from Seals to Janet. Janet testified that she recognized who the letter was to and who it was from, but she did not recognize the letter itself. She testified that she must have received the letter because it came to her address. The letter is addressed to "Mrs. Seals," lists "L. Seals" as the sender, reads as a love letter, and closes with "Love Always 6." The record demonstrates that "6" is Seals's nickname. The letter also references "J.K." Janet testified that Seals called her "Janet Kay" and that her initials are "J.K."
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the trial court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. Tex. R. Evid. 104(b). The requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). This requirement may be satisfied by showing distinctive characteristics, such as appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances. Tex. R. Evid. 901(b)(4); Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (Authorship may be shown circumstantially.).
In this case, the letter and envelope contain sufficient distinctive internal characteristics to support a finding that Seals authored the letter and that Janet was the intended recipient of the letter. See Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 502; see also Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 60. The authentication requirement is met because the evidence supports a finding that the letter is what its proponent claimed it to be, i.e., correspondence from Seals to Janet. See Tex. R. Evid. 104(b), 901(a). The record demonstrates that the letter was offered to show that Janet knew Seals, not to show that Janet and Seals had a romantic relationship. See Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the letter into evidence, we overrule issue two.
During the punishment phase, Senior Warden Richard Alford testified to the problems that the Stiles Unit has had regarding cellular telephones being brought into the prison and explained that he has been working to free the Stiles Unit from contraband. The trial court sustained Janet's objection to Alford's testimony that it would not help his cause if Janet received probation. However, the trial court permitted the following testimony from Alford:
[T]o help combat this issue on the Stiles Unit, there needs to be an accountability process, something to let others know that it isn't okay to violate the law and that just sheer probation isn't an impact on others who are considering or are currently doing it. They need to know that there are serious consequence[s] to what they do; and without that, we can't keep combating this. It's . . . never going to stop the cycle.Alford testified that if Janet received prison time, he would communicate the result to the correctional officers and warn them that this would be the consequence of bringing contraband into the prison.
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Alford's testimony, we cannot say that Janet's substantial rights were affected. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Alford testified that all parties involved in the offense should be treated equally. Janet testified that she could follow the rules if placed on probation. She denied committing the offense of bribery, but testified that a person who did commit such an offense should go to jail. During closing arguments, the defense reminded the jury that Mario and Martin had not been charged with any wrongdoing. Defense counsel argued that sentencing Janet to prison would be unfair to and contrary to Alford's testimony that parties should be treated equally. The prosecutor explained that he could not tell the jury that sentencing Janet to prison would solve the problems in the Stiles Unit. He told the jury that probation should be reserved for someone who has taken responsibility. He argued that prison was appropriate and that the State would be satisfied with a sentence of eleven years or more because such a sentence would send the message to Janet and others that there was no chance for probation. The trial court instructed the jury that it could recommend probation if the prison term assessed did not exceed ten years.
The jury's sentence of nineteen years demonstrates that the jury did not consider probation to be an appropriate option. The jury could have determined that the circumstances of the offense warranted a prison sentence and that probation was not appropriate in light of Janet's refusal to accept responsibility for the offense of which she had been convicted. After examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error, if any, did not influence the jury, or had but slight effect. See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 592. We overrule issue three and affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Do Not Publish Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Horton, JJ.