Moazed cites Marvin as well Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651 (Watkins) in support of her argument that her causes of action are not barred by the anti-heart-balm statutes. We are unpersuaded.
For instance, if a couple purchased a house and lived together for seven years as a couple, then married, and then divorced a year later, the partner whose name was not on the deed should still get credit for contributing to the purchase of the house for the seven years before the couple married. (Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651, 652-653.) The court in Marvin held, “The provisions of the Family Law Act do not govern the distribution of property acquired during a nonmarital relationship; such a relationship remains subject solely to judicial decision. . . .
The wife "had recently retired as a legal secretary in order to care for her husband, Benjamin, whose condition of emphysema, in turn, caused him to retire and necessitated considerable nursing services." The principal holding of Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 54], was that a marriage did not extinguish a woman's right to recover the value of her homemaker services rendered prior to the marriage. Much of the opinion is devoted to a discussion of Sonnicksen and Brooks.
(See Super. Ct. L.A. County Manual of Proc. for Family Law Dept. (Central Dist.) § XIII B., p. 19, ["Consolidation of Civil Actions. [¶] In the Central District, a Civil Action (including Probate, Guardianships, Personal Injury, Marvin Actions, and Contracts) may be consolidated with Family Law matters. . . ."]; In re Marriage of Johnson (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 57 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 545] ["Marvin" contract consolidated with dissolution action]; Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 54] ["Marvin" contract consolidated with dissolution action].)(2b) That there is express authorization in the Family Law Act to adjudicate the character (as community or separate), amount and existence of premarital debts is further evidence of the propriety of the family law court to adjudicate premarital loans which are related to an asset before it for division.
Most of the numerous cases cited in Marvin where nonmarital cohabiters' oral agreements to pool earnings were upheld involved contributions other than normal homemaking services. However, Marvin states homemaking services alone are lawful consideration. ( Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d, p. 670, fn. 5; see also Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651, 655 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 54].) IV
Rather, such claim must be asserted in a separate action which then, of course, can be consolidated with the dissolution. ( Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651, 653 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 54].) And this wife has failed to do.
There, a spouse was precluded from joining a Marvin claim with the dissolution action, but was encouraged to make the claim in an independent action to be consolidated with the dissolution. And in Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 54], the court consolidated husband's petition for dissolution with wife's separate action for declaratory relief, constructive trust, breach of contract, and fraud. Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106]
, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d 693, holding that a no-contest clause similar to the one herein did not prevent a beneficiary who was the widow of the testator from claiming rights to joint tenancy property, which the testator had attempted to dispose of by will, or her statutory rights to a homestead; Estate of Dow, supra, 149 Cal.App.2d 47, in which a widow's claim to establish that property otherwise disposed of by will was community property was held not to violate the in terrorem clause; Estate of Miller, supra, 230 Cal.App.2d 888, holding that an action to establish a prior oral contract did not violate the no-contest clause; cf. Estate of Madansky (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 685 [ 85 P.2d 576]; but see Estate of Kazian, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 797 and Estate of Howard (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 9 [ 155 P.2d 841], reaching contrary results.) Graham's proposed claim is founded upon her economic contribution as a homemaker to the nonmarital partnership ( Marvin v. Marvin, supra, 18 Cal. 3d at pp. 679-684; Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651, 653-654 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 54]) and is analogous to a surviving spouse's claim to community or joint tenancy property outside the will. However, even if Graham were a surviving spouse, her ability to assert a claim to property standing in the testator's name without invoking the in terrorem clause would depend upon the language of the will expressing the testator's intent.
The rights which have arisen in the premarital period remain enforceable after marriage. ( Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651, 653 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 54].) (1b) Here, on substantial evidence, the court found husband and wife made an express premarital oral agreement to pool and share their resources and be equal owners of property acquired.
Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651 held that where an unmarried couple subject to an implied agreement under Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 later marry, the Marvin agreement nonetheless remains enforceable. (Watkins, at p. 652.)