An agreement to forbear to sue in consideration of a written promise by a third person to pay the debt of another constitutes a valid contract. Markel v. DiFrancesco, 93 Conn. 355, 359, 105 A. 703; Waters v. White, 75 Conn. 88, 91, 52 A. 401; see also Savings Bank of Rockville v. Cohn, 116 Conn. 480, 485, 165 A. 607; 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) 135. From the finding now before us, with the necessary corrections, it appears that the defendant's parents owed the plaintiff the sum in suit; that it was an existing debt; that the plaintiff demanded payment of it; and that as a result the defendant signed the forbearance contract. On these facts, the trial court was in error in ruling that the contract was invalid.

An agreement by the plaintiff with the defendants to forbear to take proceedings to foreclose the mortgage would constitute a sufficient consideration for the assumption agreement. Linvitz v. Galeckis, 110 Conn. 174, 177, 147 A. 592; Waters v. White, 75 Conn. 88, 91, 52 A. 401; Mascolo v. Montesanto, 61 Conn. 50, 23 A. 714; Prime v. Koehler, 77 N.Y. 91; 1 Page, Contracts, § 550. But forbearance to exercise a legal right, without request or agreement, is not sufficient, although actual forbearance, if incompatible with any other supposition or condition, combined with other significant circumstances, may suffice to establish such an agreement. Linvitz v. Galeckis, supra, p. 177; Waters v. White, supra, p. 91; State ex rel. Marsh v. Lum, 95 Conn. 199, 203, 111 A. 190; Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 522, 527; 74 A. L. R., note, p. 301 et seq. The trial court did not find that there was an agreement to forbear, without which, as we have seen, the actual forbearance does not afford the requisite consideration for the assumption agreement.

While it would be within the province and right of the trial court to discredit and reject all or part of his testimony or to adopt, as true, one of two or more conflicting statements made by him, this privilege does not extend to the finding of a fact, contrary to that to which he testified, and which does not find support elsewhere in the evidence or by appropriate inference therefrom. A material fact cannot be said to have been found without evidence if there is some testimony in its support — although slight — and none to the contrary ( Waters v. White, 75 Conn. 88, 52 A. 401), but a finding of fact may not be based on mere conjecture, but must be founded, at least, upon evidence creating a probability so strong as to induce a reasonable belief in an impartial mind. Barry v. Miller, 104 Conn. 362, 365, 133 A. 37; Hubert v. New York, N. H. H.R. Co., 90 Conn. 261, 277, 96 A. 967; 23 Corpus Juris, pp. 51, 54. In our judgment the evidence affords no substantial support for the finding that Stenstream signed the Meagher waiver and it is corrected accordingly.

The agreement to forbear by one when accepted by another and acted upon is a sufficient consideration. Waters v. White, 75 Conn. 88, 52 A. 401. A second criticism of the charge is that it is adapted to the defense of fraudulent representations, and not to that of a unilateral mistake known to the other party and taken advantage of by him.

It is said that while there was forbearance on the part of the teachers in this matter, there was no promise to forbear and therefore no real consideration for the promise of increased pay. But actual forbearance is evidence of an agreement to forbear, and in the absence of proof to the contrary is often held to be incompatible with any other condition. Waters v. White, 75 Conn. 88, 91, 52 A. 401; Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 Conn. 522, 527; Boyd v. Freize, 71 Mass. 552, 555. This latter is the situation here shown.

" General Statutes, § 4387. In Waters v. White, 75 Conn. 88, 52 A. 401, where the payee of a note was induced to forbear taking immediate steps to rescind the loan for which the note was given, upon the ground of the maker's fraud, in reliance upon the signing of the note by the maker's wife, this court held that her signature was based upon a sufficient consideration so as to render her liable thereon, and that this state of facts authorized an implication that the promisee did agree to forbear. The appellants complain of certain detached extracts from the charge, which were as follows: "If she signed this note to get credit for her husband, she, of course, would be liable.

When filed, it is required to be printed in the appeal record. Practice Book, 1908, p. 275, § 23. It may be resorted to by this court for the purpose of ascertaining the rulings of the trial court upon questions of law, or for interpreting the finding of facts. Cummings v. Hartford, 70 Conn. 115, 124, 38 A. 916; Waters v. White, 75 Conn. 88, 92, 52 A. 401. Such a stipulation as that filed does not become a part of the record unless made so by the trial court. It is merely a substitute, for use in the trial court, for the regular legal evidence of the facts stated in it. 1 Greenleaf on Ev. (13th Ed.) § 205.