Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0445-12T2
05-22-2014
CLAUDIA J. WATERMAN, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and ADP TOTALSOURCE, Respondents.
Law Offices of Louis A. Zayas, attorneys for appellant (Louis A. Zayas, of counsel; Christina A. Vergara, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Donna Arons, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent ADP Totalsource has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Hayden and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 363,497.
Law Offices of Louis A. Zayas, attorneys for appellant (Louis A. Zayas, of counsel; Christina A. Vergara, on the brief).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Donna Arons, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent ADP Totalsource has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Claudia J. Waterman appeals from a July 23, 2012 final agency decision of the Board of Review (the Board), which affirmed the April 16, 2012 decision of the Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal) finding, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), that Waterman was disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to her employment. The Board also modified the Tribunal's decision as to the date of said disqualification. After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.
Matthews Panariello, P.C., a sub-company of respondent ADP TotalSource (employer), employed Waterman as a staff accountant from November 1, 2006, until October 14, 2011, when she quit after giving notice. During the week of September 25, 2011, Waterman approached Chris LaBarbiera, a partner at her employer, to request three unpaid days off so she could care for her children as she had a problem with her childcare provider. LaBarbiera replied that she could take off the time so long as the other three partners approved. One of those partners, Peter Manetta, expressed to Waterman that she needed to figure out her priorities because the employer needed a reliable employee. Waterman was very offended by Manetta as she felt that he was arrogant and he had acted unprofessionally towards her in the past. Consequently, she gave her employer notice that she was quitting in two weeks.
In particular, Waterman alleged that Manetta often made her uncomfortable because he degraded her work in front of others.
LaBarbiera asked Waterman to reconsider and offered her, as an accommodation, per diem work wherein she would not work with Manetta. Waterman declined, again citing her ongoing childcare issues. In her written statement regarding her departure from her employer, Waterman wrote that she was leaving for "personal reasons."
Waterman filed for unemployment benefits on October 23, 2011. On November 28, 2011, the Deputy Director for the Division of Unemployment Insurance (the Deputy) found that Waterman was eligible for benefits beginning on October 23, 2011, because she "left [her] job voluntarily because of the working conditions."
The employer appealed, which resulted in a telephone hearing before the Tribunal on April 13, 2012. Waterman, LaBarbiera, and Manetta testified. On April 16, 2012, the Tribunal reversed the Deputy's decision and concluded that Waterman "left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work and [was] disqualified for benefits as of 10/23/11 in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)." The Tribunal made the following findings:
[Waterman] left work because of lack of child care and because she felt one of the partners was arrogant when speaking to her. [Waterman] leaving work due to lack of child [care was] personal and not attributable to the work. The partner did not use any profanity when speaking to [Waterman]. Although this partner may have been arrogant in the way he spoke to [Waterman], [she] ha[d] not demonstrated that the working conditions were abnormal, or the partner's actions [were] cause sufficient to leave the ranks of the employed to join the ranks of the unemployed.
On May 2, 2012, Waterman appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Board. After reviewing the record below, the Board affirmed the decision. The Board found no need for a further hearing because Waterman "was given a full and impartial hearing and a complete opportunity to offer any and all evidence[.]" The Board modified the decision of the Tribunal in disqualifying Waterman beginning October 23, 2011, changing it to October 9, 2011, which was "the Sunday before [her] last day of work." This appeal followed.
Contrary to Waterman's assertion, this date modification, based upon her undisputed last day of work as established at the Tribunal hearing, did not deny her due process as she had already received notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard in front of the Tribunal. See Garzon v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor, 370 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2004) (requiring "adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard"). We have considered Waterman's argument concerning the modification and find it without sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
--------
Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). In challenging an agency conclusion, the claimant carries a substantial burden of persuasion, and the determination of the administrative agency carries a presumption of correctness. Gloucester Cnty. Welfare Bd. v. N.J. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 93 N.J. 384, 390-91 (1983). We also accord substantial deference to the agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing. Bd. of Educ. of Neptune v. Neptune Twp. Educ. Ass'n, 144 N.J. 16, 31 (1996).
Further, "[w]e are obliged to defer to the Board when its factual findings are based on sufficient credible evidence in the record." Lourdes Med. Ctr. of Burlington Cnty. v. Bd. of Review, 197 N.J. 339, 367 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We overturn an agency determination only if it is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unsupported by substantial credible evidence as a whole, or inconsistent with the enabling statute or legislative policy. Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 100 N.J. 57, 71-72 (1985) (citing Gloucester Cnty. Welfare Bd., supra, 93 N.J. at 391).
A person is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits
[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment, which may include employment for the federal government, and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate, as determined in each case.
[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]
In order to avoid disqualification, the claimant has the burden of establishing that she left work for good cause related to work. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 218 (1997). "'Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Medwick v. Review Bd., 69 N.J. Super. 338, 345 (App. Div. 1961)). An employee's "decision to leave employment must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones." Ibid. Moreover, "it is the employee's responsibility to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Ibid. (citing Condo v. Review Bd., 158 N.J. Super. 172, 175 (App. Div. 1978)).
Thus, an employee who quits a job without a sufficient work-related reason is disqualified from benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). An employee who leaves work for a good, but personal reason is also subject to the disqualification. See Pagan v. Bd. of Review, 296 N.J. Super. 539, 542-43 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 150 N.J. 24 (1997). Childcare issues are among the personal reasons that do not constitute good cause. Espina v. Bd. of Review, 402 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (App. Div. 2008) (citing N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)).
Applying our highly deferential standard of review, we find no occasion to interfere with the Board's decision. The record amply supports the Board's conclusion that Waterman voluntarily left her employer without good cause related to her work when she quit her job. Waterman's assertion, citing Associated Util. Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Review, Dep't of Labor & Indust., 131 N.J. Super. 584 (App. Div. 1974), that she was forced to leave because she was verbally abused and harassed lacks merit. The Tribunal's findings, based largely on Waterman's own testimony, did not demonstrate the level of abuse and harassment necessary to support a finding of work-related mistreatment.
Rather, the record supports the Board's determination that Waterman quit due to childcare issues and because she felt her work was criticized too harshly or with an air of arrogance. Moreover, when offered a reasonable accommodation to work per diem for the other partners, Waterman declined, highlighting that she voluntarily quit and refused to take the necessary steps to remain employed. See Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288. As leaving work due to childcare issues, see Espina, supra, 402 N.J. Super. at 93, or mere dissatisfaction with one's working environment, see Domenico, supra, 192 N.J. Super. at 288, is not sufficient to qualify for benefits, we must reject Waterman's claim.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF APPELLATE DIVIDION