Opinion
C/A 9:24-01102-RMG-MHC
07-09-2024
Laureen Glaze Washington, Plaintiff, v. Maria Walls; Jennifer Ginn Youmans; Bertrand Dore; Herbert N. Glaze; Leroy Ernest Glaze, Jr.; Leroy Ernest Glaze, Jr., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
This is a civil action filed by Plaintiff Laureen Glaze Washington, a pro se litigant. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
On May 23, 2024, a Proper Form Order was issued giving Plaintiff time to bring her case into proper form by submitting Forms USM-285 for each Defendant. Plaintiff was also advised of material deficiencies in her Complaint and given the opportunity to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff has provided the proper form documents and this case is now in proper form. On June 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 12.
I. BACKGROUND
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to be attempting to allege claims under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. She asserts that she brings claims “[u]nder 31 U.S.C. § 2729 False Claims Act Qui Tam (31 U.S.C. 3729(a)) and Under Rule 55 of the FRCP -DEFAULT JUDGMENT[.]” ECF No. 12 at 4, 10, 16, 22, 28. Defendants are Maria Walls (Walls), the Treasurer for Beaufort County; Jennifer Ginn Youmans (Youmans), the Treasurer for Hampton County; Attorney Bertrand Dore (Dore); Herbert N. Glaze (Herbert Glaze), Plaintiff's paternal uncle; and Leroy Ernest Glaze, Jr. (Leroy Glaze), Plaintiff's brother. ECF No. 12 at 2-3.
The Amended Complaint consists of five standard complaint forms (Complaint for a Civil Case) on which Plaintiff has listed her claims. See ECF No. 12.
Plaintiff and Leroy Glaze previously brought a case (they were both plaintiffs in that action) against Walls, Herbert Glaze, Dore Law Firm, the State of South Carolina, and Beaufort County Probate Judge Kenneth E. Fulp. In that case, Plaintiff and Leroy Glaze appeared to challenge property deeds filed in Beaufort County. The case was dismissed without prejudice because the pro se plaintiffs could not assert claims on behalf of their parents' estates, they failed to state a claim under the FCA and as pro se litigants could not represent the rights of the United States under the FCA, they failed to state a claim under South Carolina law, they could not appeal the results of any ruling from a state court action to this court, and Judge Fulp was entitled to judicial immunity. See Washington v. Walls, No. 9:22-CV-1675-RMG, 2023 WL 4347049 (D.S.C. July 5, 2023).
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff provides few facts, but generally alleges that she received three false records in the mail from Walls on October 6, 2023. ECF No. 12 at 5. She generally appears to claim that Herbert Glaze and Leroy Glaze conspired with Walls to violate her rights under the FCA. Id. at 11, 17. Plaintiff generally alleges that on February 15, 2023, she received false records from Youmans. Id. at 23. She also generally alleges that Dore conspired with Walls to violate her rights under the FCA. Id. at 29. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. ECF No. 12 at 5, 11,17, 23, 29.
In her Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff alleges that she and her heirs “have been denied Generational Wealth/Real Estate from June 1, 2016 to April 1, 2024 due to fraudulent claims from Defendants having illegal Possession or Control of Plaintiff and her heirs real estate property” in Beaufort and Hampton Counties. ECF No. 8 at 4 (errors in original). In her Amended Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that she and her heirs have “Rights to Survivorship” in certain pieces of land in Beaufort and Hampton County. She generally appears to assert that persons who were not heirs received title to the properties and that she and others who she claims should have inherited the properties did not receive title to the properties in question. ECF No. 6 at 4-8.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert claims on behalf of her heirs or any other persons or entities, she may not do so as she is proceeding pro se and has not asserted that she is an attorney admitted to practice in this Court. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1654 allows individuals to “plead and conduct their own cases personally,” the statute does not extend that right to represent other parties. See Myers v. Loudon Co. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that a pro se person's right to litigate for oneself does not create a similar right to litigate on behalf of others); Asad v. Arab Bank, PLC, 117 Fed.Appx. 466, 467 (7th Cir. Nov. 12, 2004) (a plaintiff who is not a lawyer may not represent the interests of any other litigant).
In her supplement to her Amended Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff asserts that on September 23, 2019, she travelled to Beaufort County “to retain legal copies rights to survivorship for parcels 0080 undivided parcel of land at defendant (Walls) Beaufort County Treasurer, Beaufort County Registrar's Deed Office in Beaufort County, South Carolina.” She appears to allege that the property records contain false information. ECF No. 13 at 12-13.
She also asserts that she drove to Hampton County on February 15, 2023, “to retain a legal copy of Plaintiff (Glaze Washington's) Title to Real Estate Tax Map # 176-00-00-021 Undivided Parcels A & B at Hampton County Probate Court Office in Hampton County, South Carolina.” She appears to claim that the records Defendant Youmans gave her contain false information. ECF No. 13 at 9.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case is before the Court for pre-service review. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (pleadings by non-prisoners should also be screened). Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint herein pursuant to the procedural provisions of § 1915, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).
Section 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without paying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. However, to protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolousness can be made where the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 327.
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION/RECOMMENDATION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
A. Appeal(s) of State Court Action(s)
Plaintiff appears to allege that she should have inherited real estate owned by her grandmother and/or father. However, to the extent that she is attempting to appeal the results of a ruling or rulings in the state court, the current action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because federal district courts do not hear “appeals” from state court actions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Hulsey v. Cisa, 947 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2020). To rule in favor of Plaintiff on claims filed in this action may require this court to overrule and reverse orders and rulings made in the state court. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Davani v. Virginia Dep't. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719-720 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293-294 (2005); Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 1997).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is applicable both to claims at issue in a state court order and to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with such an order. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to indicate that this is a case where the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment such that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would not be an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. See Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 676 Fed.Appx. 167 (4th Cir. 2017) (district court erred in applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar appellants' claims where the claims did “not seek appellate review of [the state court] order or fairly allege injury caused by the state court in entering that order”); Thana v. Bd. of Licenser Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 320 (4th Cir. 2016) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not an impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction when the federal complaint raises claims independent of, but in tension with, a state court judgment simply because the same or related question was aired earlier by the parties in state court).
Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court. Secondly, the Congress, for more than two hundred years, has provided that only the Supreme Court of the United States may review (review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right) a decision of a state's highest court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491(3d Cir. 1997). This Court cannot sit in judgment of a state court decision, and must dismiss any claims concerning any state court decisions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth of Virginia Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 3:15CV515, 2016 WL 775783, at *5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2016).
B. Claims under the FCA
Plaintiff appears to only allege claims under the FCA. Under this statute, the United States Attorney General or a private party may initiate a civil action alleging fraud on the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b); see also United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 932 (2009). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (a)(1)(2)(A), (B), (C), and (D). See ECF No. 12 at 5, 11, 17, 23, 29.
The FCA provides, in pertinent part, that a private party may bring an action on behalf of the government against anyone who:
(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented [to the government], a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval [or]
(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim[.]
(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G);
(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property[.]31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1). It is well settled that the United States is the real party in interest in FCA qui tam actions. See United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 961 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he United States is the real party in interest in any False Claims Act suit, even where it permits a qui tam relator to pursue the action on its behalf.”).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the FCA. She is attempting to bring claims under the FCA against Beaufort and Hampton County officials (Walls and Youmans) and private individuals (Dore, Herbert Glaze, and Leroy Glaze) about her claims to certain properties. However, she has not alleged any facts to state a claim for any alleged fraud on the United States, and thus has not stated any claim that falls under the provisions of the FCA. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730.
Even if Plaintiff has stated a claim under the FCA, she may not bring such claims without an attorney. Thus, she may not proceed pro se as to her claims under the FCA. The federal statute governing appearances in federal courts allows a person to proceed pro se on her own personal claims, but it does not permit her to appear pro se on behalf of other persons or entities, including the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”). To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to be the relator in a qui tam action, she may not represent the United States while proceeding pro se, i.e., without assistance of counsel. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 Fed.Appx. 802 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that qui tam claims may not be pursued pro se and that “the need for adequate legal representation on behalf of the United States counsels against permitting pro se suits”); Under Seal v. Under Seal, 467 Fed.Appx. 236 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal because relator was pro se).
C. Failure to State any State Law Claim
As noted above, Plaintiff also asserts diversity jurisdiction. However, she only alleges claims under the FCA (for which she fails to state a claim as discussed above). She has alleged no claims under South Carolina law.
Additionally, much of the Amended Complaint is fairly characterized as being composed of what some courts have described as “buzz words” or “legalistic gibberish.” See, e.g., Rochester v. McKie, No. 8:11-CV-0797-JMC-JDA, 2011 WL 2671306 (D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:11-CV-0797-JMC, 2011 WL 2671228 (D.S.C. July 8, 2011). Plaintiff only makes conclusory statements. She merely alleges that Defendants Walls and Youmans gave her false documents and that the other Defendants conspired with Walls. As such, a substantial portion of Plaintiff's allegations are so generally incomprehensible or filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, and unsupported comments or “gibberish”, that it is unclear what is to be made of them. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); see also Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434 (2nd Cir. 1998); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72 (4th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of Plaintiff's suit as frivolous where allegations were conclusory and nonsensical on their face).
IV. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Default Judgment on April 9, 2024; an Amended Motion for Default Judgment on May 13, 2024; and a supplement to her motions on June 17, 2024. ECF Nos. 8, 6, 13. She claims she is entitled to default judgment because Defendants did not file an answer or other response within twenty-one days of her filing this action. She requests that this court award her monetary damages and reclassify, reappraise, reassess, and survey certain properties in Beaufort and Hampton Counties. See ECF No. 8.
This action was under initial review by the Court at the time Plaintiff filed these motions. See ECF No. 9; see also General Order In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by No Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5015-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007). There is no that Defendants have been served with the Complaint or Amended Complaint in this action. even if Plaintiff attempted to serve Defendants, service has not been authorized in t Thus, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion and Amended Motion for Default Judge Nos. 6 and 8) be denied.
V. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that this action be dismissed, without and service of process, and without leave to amend. It is also recommended that Plaintiff's for Default Judgment (ECF No. 8) and Motion for Amended Default Judgment (ECF DENIED.
If this action is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, such dismissal should be without prejudice. See Platts v. O'Brien, 691 F. App'x. 774 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A dismissal for ... [a] defect in subject matter jurisdiction[] must be one without prejudice because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.”). To the extent that dismissal is based on a failure to state a claim, it is recommended that dismissal be with prejudice as Plaintiff was previously warned of material deficiencies in the Complaint and was given the opportunity to amend. See ECF No. 9.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 796 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.