Opinion
Case No. 2:20-cv-00953-RMG-MGB
01-11-2021
Jim Washington, Plaintiff, v. Trident Medical Center, LLC, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Jim Washington, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and submit findings and a recommendation to the assigned district judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed with prejudice and without issuance or service of process.
BACKGROUND
The instant case centers around an underlying medical malpractice action filed by Plaintiff against Defendant in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas on or around September 11, 2015. (See Case No. 2015-CP-10-5000.) On January 14, 2016, the circuit court judge issued a check-the-box Form 4 ("Judgment in a Civil Case") granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's case. On January 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of his action pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure ("SCRCP"). Within the body of this motion, Plaintiff also included two requests "for relief from judgement or order" pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and (3), SCRCP. The circuit court then issued a written order on February 5, 2016, formally dismissing Plaintiff's lawsuit with prejudice. More specifically, the circuit court judge explained that, "having reviewed the pleadings and having considered arguments and legal memoranda of the parties," Plaintiff had clearly failed to comply with certain statutory pre-litigation requirements, including the filing of an expert witness affidavit pursuant to S.C. Code § 15-79-125(A), and his medical malpractice lawsuit was therefore subject to dismissal.
The Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's underlying state court action. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'"). For Plaintiff's underlying state court action, see generally https://jcmsweb.charlestoncounty.org/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (with search parameters limited by Plaintiff's name).
Of relevance to Plaintiff's §1983 claim, the circuit court's order did not explicitly reference Plaintiff's January 27, 2016 motion to reconsider.
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on March 4, 2016, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision by order dated January 10, 2018. The court of appeals then denied Plaintiff's subsequent petition for rehearing on February 22, 2018. (See Case No. 2016-000495.) The South Carolina Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari shortly thereafter and the remittitur was issued on May 30, 2018. (See Case No. 2018-000489.)
Following the dismissal of his lawsuit, Plaintiff proceeded to file a series of unsuccessful motions in circuit court, which are now the focus of the present § 1983 action. Although Plaintiff's allegations are somewhat convoluted and difficult to follow, it appears Plaintiff filed a "motion to reconsider conclusion" with the circuit court on July 6, 2018, along with a subsequent letter requesting a hearing on said motion. In addition to challenging the merits of the circuit court's February 5, 2016 order, Plaintiff's motion raised allegations of extrinsic fraud against Defendant's attorneys for intentionally misrepresenting the facts of Plaintiff's medical treatment to the courts. Plaintiff also argued that the circuit court judge never explicitly adjudicated his Rule 60(b) claims—contained within in his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration filed January 27, 2016—prior to issuing the final order of dismissal.
Plaintiff appears to consider the two Rule 60(b) claims contained within his Rule 59(e) motion as actual "motions"—separate and distinct from his Rule 59(e) motion—that necessitated an independent analysis and ruling.
Plaintiff seems to suggest that after the South Carolina Supreme Court issued the remittitur on May 30, 2018, he called the circuit court to inquire about his "pending" Rule 60(b) claims. The presiding circuit court judge eventually responded via letter dated June 22, 2018, "stating that the Court of Appeals affirmed his order and that all post trial motions were final and instructed Plaintiff to contact his law clerk for further questions on the matter." (Dkt. No. 19 at 37; see also Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2, "The above referenced matter has been closed. Enclosed is a copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion affirming my order and concluding all motions filed.") Plaintiff claims that at some point on or around October 20, 2018, he spoke with a law clerk who, according to Plaintiff, agreed that his Rule 60(b) claims from January 2016 were still pending and/or viable. (Dkt. No. 19 at 55.) The undersigned notes that while Plaintiff seems to characterize and/or interpret this alleged conversation with the law clerk as an "order" or "decision" of the court (see, e.g., id. at 9, 40-41, 51), there is nothing in the state court's records to suggest that any such order was issued by the assigned circuit court judge or that this communication even occurred.
On August 20, 2018, Defendant's attorneys filed a letter with the Clerk of Court objecting to Plaintiff's request for a hearing on his July 6, 2018 motion to reconsider. The letter stated, "[i]n light of the remittitur, this matter is concluded and no further proceedings should be permitted. Therefore, we respectfully request that the Clerk not set a hearing on the motion and that it be denied." Before the circuit court could respond, Plaintiff filed a separate motion to vacate the judgment and amend the pleadings, apparently labeled as a Rule 60(b) motion, reiterating those same arguments raised in his most recent motion for reconsideration. The parties briefed the issues raised in Plaintiff's motion to vacate and a hearing took place before a circuit court judge on February 7, 2018.
The circuit court ultimately rejected Plaintiff's arguments, explaining that matters decided by the appellate court cannot be reconsidered or relitigated in trial court and, thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to rehear Plaintiff's contentions regarding the merits of his malpractice claims. The court also found that to the extent the trial court judge did not expressly resolve Plaintiff's "pending" Rule 60(b) claims in the final written order on February 5, 2016, Plaintiff did not raise the issue with the judge or with the appellate court during his subsequent appeal, and, thus, had effectively abandoned the argument. The court therefore concluded that it was not appropriate for Plaintiff to raise the issue at this stage, two years after-the-fact. And finally, with respect to Plaintiff's allegations of extrinsic fraud, the circuit court "thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff's filings and [found] no evidence of any fraud" as it pertained to Defendant's counsel. Plaintiff's motion to vacate was therefore denied.
On February 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of his motion to vacate under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), SCRCP, once again alleging extrinsic fraud with respect to Defendant's counsel and arguing that he was not given the opportunity to fully present his case in light of his unanswered Rule 60(b) claims. The parties briefed the issues and the circuit court issued an order on March 18, 2019, finding that Plaintiff had "presented no novel facts, arguments, or theories" in support of his motion, and that there was nothing in the record the court "may have misunderstood, failed to fully consider, or perhaps failed to rule on." Plaintiff's motion to reconsider was therefore dismissed.
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the South Carolina Court of Appeals on April 18, 2019, but his claim was later dismissed on January 23, 2020, for failure to serve the record as required under Rule 210(c) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules ("SCACR"). (See Case No. 2019-000640.) Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed without prejudice on February 5, 2020, because Plaintiff had failed to file a petition for reinstatement or rehearing with the court of appeals. (See Case No. 2020-000173.)
Plaintiff claims that he filed a petition for supersedeas/stay under Rule 41, SCACR, on October 28, 2019, requesting a stay of the appeal proceeding and seeking remand in order to allow the circuit court to adjudicate his unresolved Rule 60(b) claims. (Dkt. No. 19, at 23-24.) The parties briefed the issues and the South Carolina Court of Appeals denied Plaintiff's motion.
Plaintiff now brings this federal action against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendant's attorneys violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the law by conspiring with state court officials to "intentionally discriminate against Plaintiff" throughout the course of his underlying medical malpractice case. (Dkt. No. 19 at 4.) After reviewing Plaintiff's initial Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), the undersigned determined that Plaintiff's claims were subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a facially plausible claim for relief. The undersigned issued a proper form order notifying Plaintiff of this determination, explaining why his allegations failed to state a claim under § 1983, and providing him an opportunity to submit an amended complaint that resolved these deficiencies. (Dkt. No. 6.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint shortly thereafter (Dkt. No. 12), followed by a Motion to Amend/Correct on November 4, 2020 (Dkt. No. 16), which the undersigned granted (Dkt. No. 17). Accordingly, the undersigned's assessment here is limited to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 19), which replaces both of his previous complaints in this action.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, the undersigned has evaluated Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent litigant, like Plaintiff, may under certain circumstances commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," "is frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the granting of in forma pauperis status in a case triggers a district court's duty to "sift out claims that Congress found not to warrant extended judicial treatment"). A complaint is frivolous if it is "clearly baseless" and makes "fanciful allegations." Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 ("A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.")
In determining whether a pro se complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court must look to the familiar pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, a complaint filed in federal court "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'" rather than merely "conceivable." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is not bound, however, to accept as true a complaint's bare legal conclusions. Id. When "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim to relief for purposes of § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
DISCUSSION
Although Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is significantly longer than his previous two complaints, the convoluted 111-page pleading ultimately boils down to the same deficient, conclusory claims raised in those earlier filings:
Defendant['s] attorneys had a meeting of the mind with each state court officials in their individual capacities to conspire against Plaintiff to act under color of law of state laws as set forth herein at each stages of the Court proceedings to arbitrarily invoke the rules, policies, practices, procedures, statutes and customs of State of South Carolina as set forth herein for no rational or legitimate reason but solely for the purpose to cover-up all evidence that would entitle Plaintiff to relief from judgment with intent to discriminate against Plaintiff to treat him unequally to prevent him from enjoying his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process of law.(Dkt. No. 19 at 4 (errors in original).) Thus, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to remedy the pleading deficiencies identified in the undersigned's prior order (Dkt. No. 6) and is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
I. Civil Conspiracy Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a claim to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). In other words, a plaintiff suing under § 1983 must establish that his constitutional rights were violated through conduct that constitutes "state action." See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982). Purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, does not constitute state action under § 1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (explaining that to qualify as state action, the conduct in question "must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible," and "the party charged with the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor").
As Plaintiff acknowledges in his Second Amended Complaint, Defendant is a private entity. (Dkt. No. 19 at 4.) Thus, Defendant's actions and those of its counsel are generally precluded from suit under § 1983. See Jackson v. Williams, No. 3:10-cv-3022-JFA, 2010 WL 5644798, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 9, 2010), adopted, 2011 WL 247883 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2011) ("An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under § 1983.") In some instances, however, a private entity that jointly participates in constitutional wrongdoing with a state official may be said to have engaged in state action under § 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). Here, Plaintiff attempts to show such participation by alleging that Defendant's attorneys conspired with the various state court judges involved in his medical malpractice lawsuit "to discriminate against him with intent to treating him differently than other similarly situated petitioners . . . [and] to deprive him of his federal constitutional rights to equal protection of the law and due process of law." (Dkt. No. 19 at 106.) Plaintiff's allegations of conspiracy fall short of the requisite state action under § 1983 for several reasons.
A civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires that the plaintiff prove: (1) defendants acted jointly in concert; (2) that some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the conspiracy resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, W. Va., 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996). "Where the complaint makes only conclusory allegations of a conspiracy under § 1983 and fails to demonstrate any agreement or meeting of the minds among the defendants, the court may properly dismiss the complaint." See McNeill v. Jhonson, No. 3:18-cv-188-FDW, 2018 WL 3868809, at *6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2018) (dismissing pro se § 1983 conspiracy claim during initial review); see also Williams v. Cavedo, No. 3:13-cv-00672-HEH, 2014 WL 852038, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2014), aff'd, No. 14-7002 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014) (explaining that for purposes of initial review under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a pro se plaintiff alleging civil conspiracy must "plead facts that would reasonably lead to the inference that [defendants] positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
As noted above, Plaintiff bases his claims on the deprivation of two constitutional rights: (1) procedural due process and (2) equal protection under the law, the latter of which is generally governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). See Cockrum v. Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 652, 661 (E.D. Va. 2019), dismissed, No. 19-1398, 2019 WL 5152518 (4th Cir. July 5, 2019) (explaining that § 1985(3) protects against conspiracies that deprive persons of "the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"). Although Plaintiff does not make this distinction in his Second Amended Complaint, his allegations suggest that he is invoking both §§ 1983 and 1985. See United States v. Blackstock, 513 F.3d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that courts must consider pro se filings according to their contents, regardless of the label given). (See also Dkt. No. 6, in which the undersigned advised Plaintiff with respect to both §§ 1983 and 1985.) The undersigned therefore considers Plaintiff's allegations under the lens of both statutes in this Report and Recommendation; this first section of the discussion addresses the alleged violations of Plaintiff's due process rights under § 1983, and the second section addresses the alleged violations of his equal protection rights under § 1985(3).
In the instant case, Plaintiff's own allegations fatally undermine any showing of an agreement or meeting of the minds, as he repeatedly asserts that Defendant's attorneys perpetrated extrinsic fraud on the court, which influenced and ultimately resulted in the state courts' adverse judicial determinations against Plaintiff. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 19, at 5-6 (alleging that Defendant's attorneys "committed extrinsic fraud upon the circuit court" by "deliberately misrepresenting . . . facts that Defendant met the standard of care in treatment" and concealing certain "documents and information from the Court"); at 7 (alleging that Defendant's attorneys "defrauded the Court of Appeals and the S.C. Supreme Court" by "deliberately misrepresenting in the first appellate proceedings" that the circuit court had dismissed Plaintiff's January 27, 2016 motion to reconsider, despite the fact that his Rule 60(b) claims had not yet been adjudicated); at 17 (alleging that because Defendant "deliberately misrepresented the facts to the court," certain documents "were excluded" from the record); at 46 (alleging that Defendant "obtained" the February 5, 2016 judgment "by extrinsic fraud upon the court"); at 76 (alleging that Defendant's attorneys attempted to "improperly influence" and "defraud the court" by sending the Clerk of Court a letter on or around September 4, 2018, opposing Plaintiff's request for a hearing on the basis that "all post-trial motions were concluded on appeal").)
As the undersigned noted in the proper form order, "misleading court officials is inconsistent with conspiring with them." (Dkt. No. 6.) To the contrary, Plaintiff's repeated allegations that Defendant's attorneys misled and defrauded the state court in order to violate his due process rights and obtain favorable judgments sound entirely in private action—not mutual understanding or joint concert. See Ellison v. Proffit, No. 4:16-cv-00847-BHH-KDW, 2017 WL 598511, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 588734 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2017) (finding that plaintiff's allegations did not "establish a plausible § 1983 civil-conspiracy claim because they fail[ed] to show any agreement or mutual understanding" among the particular defendants); Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 421 (reiterating that the plaintiff must demonstrate that "each member of the alleged conspiracy shared the same conspiratorial objective"). Thus, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to show that Defendant worked "jointly in concert" with a state actor as required under § 1983.
Moreover, notwithstanding Plaintiff's contradictory claims regarding Defendant's fraud on the court, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint also fails to allege an overt act in furtherance of the purported conspiracy sufficient to "nudge[] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" under Rule 8(a). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In an attempt to show state action, Plaintiff points generally to the unfavorable rulings issued in his medical malpractice lawsuit, suggesting that the state courts' failure to adopt his legal positions reflects their participation in the conspiracy. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 19, at 17 (alleging that the circuit court "had a meeting of the mind[s] and made an agreement with Defendant's attorney . . . to further the conspiracy" by adopting Defendant's legal position as set forth in its memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration filed on March 8, 2019); at 24 (alleging that "the Court of Appeals officials agree[d] to conspire with Defendant's attorney" by rejecting "all of Plaintiff['s] grounds in the Supersedeas/Stay proceeding to deny stay of the appeal and remand solely for the purpose to discriminate. . . ."); at 70-74 (alleging furtherance of conspiracy by failing to rule in accordance with the "controlling law" as set forth in Plaintiff's motion to vacate); at 107-08 (alleging that the court intentionally adopted "Defendant's attorneys['] grounds to deprive Plaintiff of his federal constitutional rights").)
Aside from the conclusory, speculative nature of the allegations above, it is well-established that Plaintiff's lack of success in the underlying state court litigation is insufficient to raise an inference of conspiracy under § 1983. To be sure,
The nature of the judicial function in our adversarial system is to weigh competing arguments in light of the relevant facts and applicable law and, though often difficult, to decide which side wins and which side loses. The fact that a judge accepts one party's arguments and rejects another's cannot, without more, give rise to an inference that the judge conspired with the prevailing party. Were it otherwise, courts would be flooded with conspiracy claims against judges by disgruntled litigants.Stephens v. Herring, 827 F. Supp. 359, 365-66 (E.D. Va. 1993); see also Paul v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., No. 3:13-cv-1852-CMC-PJG, 2014 WL 5025815, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 8, 2014), aff'd, 599 F. App'x 108 (4th Cir. 2015) (summarily dismissing pro se § 1983 conspiracy claim because the state court's decision to ultimately accept the defendants' legal position over that of the plaintiff in the underlying state court action—despite possible misrepresentations by the defendants during those proceedings—was insufficient to state a plausible claim to relief); Ellison, 2017 WL 598511, at *7 (dismissing civil conspiracy claims as conclusory where plaintiff's only allegations of "overt action" were the defendants' litigation tactics, including alleged misrepresentations and the withholding of information, that impacted the outcome of the lawsuit and "made it more difficult" for plaintiff to prevail in the litigation).
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that the allegations in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint are conclusory, frivolous, and therefore insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To conclude otherwise would deem plausible the idea that each of the state court judges involved in Plaintiff's underlying malpractice action independently rendered their respective judicial determinations in favor of Defendant, based not on their legal analyses of the case, but rather, on their participation in a clandestine conspiracy with Defendant to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Such a position is simply untenable. See Paul, 2014 WL 5025815, at *10 (citing Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 422) ("[F]actual allegations must reasonably lead to the inference that the defendants came to a mutual understanding to try to 'accomplish a common and unlawful plan,' and must amount to more than 'rank speculation and conjecture,' especially when the actions are capable of innocent interpretation."); see also Nanni v. Aberdeen Marketplace, Inc., 878 F.3d 447, 452 (4th Cir. 2017) ("[T]o satisfy the plausibility standard, a plaintiff is not required to plead factual allegations in great detail, but the allegations must contain sufficient factual heft to allow a court, drawing on judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the mere possibility of that which is alleged."). The undersigned therefore recommends that the Court summarily dismiss Plaintiff's allegations of civil conspiracy under § 1983.
II. Civil Conspiracy Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
As noted above, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant discriminated against him and violated his right to equal protection under the law suggest that he is also seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). (See supra at pp. 8-9 n.6.) Claims raised under § 1985(3) are limited to private conspiracies predicated on "racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy. Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376-77 (4th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint fails to state a facially plausible claim to relief under § 1985(3) for several reasons.
At the outset, the law is well-settled that to establish a civil conspiracy pursuant to § 1985(3), the plaintiff must show an agreement or a "meeting of the minds" by the defendants to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See id. at 1377. Thus, for the same reasons Plaintiff's conspiracy claim falls short under § 1983, Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint likewise fails to allege facts sufficient to infer the mutual understanding or joint action required to raise a civil conspiracy claim under § 1985(3). (See supra at pp. 9-12.) See, e.g., Gunn v. Cheeks, No. 7:18-cv-3427-HMH-KFM, 2019 WL 831122, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 804658 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2019) (dismissing § 1985(3) claim during initial review where pro se plaintiff "set forth only conclusory allegations," because "conjecture and speculation are insufficient to demonstrate a conspiratorial agreement" or "mutual understanding" as required § 1985(3)); see also Simmons, 47 F.3d at 1377 (noting that the Fourth Circuit has "specifically rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts").
Second, as the undersigned explained to Plaintiff in the proper form order (Dkt. No. 6), civil conspiracy under § 1985(3) must be motivated by a "class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Knight v. Johnson, No. 2:15-cv-03199-DCN-MGB, 2018 WL 3615224, at *9 (D.S.C. May 9, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 3611454 (D.S.C. July 26, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Knight v. Chenega Sec., Inc., 757 F. App'x 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that "Section 1985(3) does not encompass conspiracies motivated by economic, political or commercial animus") (internal citations omitted). Other than Plaintiff's general, conclusory accusations that Defendant conspired with state court officials to "discriminate against Plaintiff" and "treat him unequally," (see, e.g., Dkt. No. 19 at 4), Plaintiff does not raise any factual allegations that indicate a class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that "[i]n order to survive a motion to dismiss an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to demonstrate plausibly that [it] was treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal treatment was the result of discriminatory animus"); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (finding that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the basic pleading standard with complaints containing only "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action"). Without the requisite showing of unlawful discriminatory animus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff cannot raise a plausible claim for civil conspiracy pursuant to § 1985(3) and therefore recommends that the Court summarily dismiss this cause of action as well.
CONCLUSION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the District Court summarily dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance or service of process.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that where the district court has already afforded the pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend his or her complaint, as the undersigned did here, the district court has the discretion to afford the plaintiff another opportunity to amend or may "dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order." Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (internal citations omitted). Because Plaintiff was given an opportunity to amend his claims and failed to cure the identified deficiencies in his Second Amended Complaint, the undersigned recommends, in keeping with the Fourth Circuit precedent, that this action be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE January 11, 2021
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).