Opinion
No. 04-15-00528-CR
05-11-2016
Larry Darnell WASHINGTON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the County Court at Law No. 5, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 474433
Honorable John Longoria, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
Larry Darnell Washington was convicted of driving while intoxicated. On appeal from the judgment, Washington argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress and that there is legally insufficient evidence to support a finding he was intoxicated. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Washington was charged with operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated and obstructing a public highway and street. Washington pled not guilty, and he filed a motion to suppress, arguing the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The case proceeded to a trial by jury on the charge of driving while intoxicated. After hearing Washington's motion to suppress outside the presence of the jury, the trial court denied the motion. No findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested or made. The jury found Washington guilty. The trial court sentenced Washington to six months in jail and a $600 fine. The trial court suspended the imposition of the jail term and placed Washington on community supervision for one year. Washington appeals.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Washington argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. When no findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress are requested or made, "we must presume that the trial court implicitly resolved all issues of historical fact and witness credibility in the light most favorable to its ultimate ruling." State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In our review of the trial court's ruling, we accord the court's implied findings "almost total deference," provided its determinations are supported by the record. See State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and afford its ruling "'the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.'" Id. (quoting State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and "may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted." State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
A police officer may make a warrantless stop on reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). An officer has reasonable suspicion if he has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably suspect that a particular person has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id. This standard is an objective one, and the court will take into account the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether a reasonable suspicion existed for the stop. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Officer Daniel Karako testified he was on patrol a little after midnight and noticed the car driving in front of him did not have illuminated taillights. Officer Karako testified the brake lights and a turn signal light on the vehicle were working, but once the brake was depressed, "it was obvious that there were no taillights activated." Officer Karako testified he stopped the vehicle because the taillights were not illuminated. The State also introduced a video recording of the stop. Washington contends the videotape is "inconclusive" in determining whether the taillights were on. We disagree. The video clearly shows that neither of the taillights of Washington's vehicle were on. But even if the video were inconclusive, the trial court was free to believe Officer Karako's testimony. Failure to have taillights illuminated when driving at night is a traffic violation. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 547.322 (requiring vehicles to have taillamps); § 547.302 (requiring taillamps be illuminated at nighttime) (West 2011). We conclude the trial court had reasonable suspicion to stop Washington, and the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
Washington next argues there is legally insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was intoxicated. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction, we must consider all of the evidence the jury was permitted to hear, whether or not the evidence was properly admitted. Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 488-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We review the evidence "in the light most favorable to the verdict." Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). "Our role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally," and we must "defer to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Officer Karako testified that he detected the odor of intoxicants on Washington's breath as soon as he came into contact with him, and that Washington had bloodshot, glassy eyes. He testified Washington "had a body sway," was unsure of his balance, and slurred some of his words. Washington told the officer he had been drinking and had consumed "four beers and two shots." Washington initially told Officer Karako he was coming from a bar, but then said he was coming from home, where he had been drinking. Washington later admitted he had been to two adult clubs. Officer Karako testified he had reason to suspect intoxication and decided to perform field sobriety tests.
Officer Karako testified he first performed procedures to ensure Washington was qualified to take the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test and did not have any condition that would interfere with his ability to take a fair test. Officer Karako explained the procedures and testified Washington was qualified to take the exam. Officer Karako testified he administered the HGN test and Washington showed six out of a possible six clues of intoxication. On the walk-and-turn test, Washington displayed six of a possible eight clues of intoxication. Officer Karako testified Washington showed only one clue on the one-leg-stand test, but that Washington did not perform the test as instructed. Officer Karako testified he then concluded Washington was intoxicated and had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties required to safely operate a motor vehicle. The officer testified Washington refused to provide a breath or blood sample.
Washington contends the results of the HGN test should be disregarded and given no weight because Officer Karako did not ask Washington if he had suffered a previous head injury. Washington argues the results of the other two field sobriety tests are insufficient to meet the State's burden to prove intoxication. We disagree with Washington's assertion that we should not consider the HGN test results in our sufficiency review. Officer Karako performed tests to confirm Washington was not disqualified from taking the HGN test by something like a head injury. See Moff, 131 S.W.3d at 489-90 (holding "appellate court must consider all evidence actually admitted at trial in its sufficiency review and give it whatever weight and probative value it could rationally convey to a jury" even if trial court erred in admitting the evidence). Moreover, even if the HGN test results were not probative, the evidence of intoxication is sufficient. Based on Washington's admission that he had been drinking, Officer Karako's observations of Washington, the results of the other two field sobriety tests, and Washington's refusal to provide a breath or blood sample, a rational factfinder could have reasonably concluded that Washington was intoxicated. See Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 449-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hartman v. State, 198 S.W.3d 829, 835-36 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. struck).
Washington did not object to admission of testimony regarding the results of the HGN test.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice DO NOT PUBLISH