Opinion
No. 01-07-00379-CV
Opinion issued November 8, 2007.
On Appeal from the 151st District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2006-43004.
Panel consists of Justices TAFT, HANKS, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Raymond Williams Washington appeals an interlocutory trial court order granting in part Larry Cole's motion for summary judgment. We conclude that we lack statutory authority to consider this interlocutory appeal and therefore dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.
Background
Jimmy and Maddie Taylor sued Larry Cole for breach of warranty of title in order to perfect title on the property that the Taylors had purchased from Cole. In an attempt to cure title to the property, Cole brought an action for judicial foreclosure of the vendor's lien placed on the property when Cole attempted to sell the property to Dorothy Ruth. Ruth bought the property, but defaulted on her payments and subsequently died. Raymond Williams Washington claims to be Ruth's sole heir, and Cole brought in Washington as a third party.
Washington counter-sued Cole. Alleging that Cole defrauded Washington by filing false court records and liens, Washington claimed declaratory judgment, civil conspiracy, negligence, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In response, Cole moved for summary judgment, contending that Washington had no evidence to support any of his causes of action. Without stating its reasons, the trial court granted Cole's motion for summary judgment on all claims except unjust enrichment. In addition to Washington's unjust enrichment claim, the Taylors' claims against Cole also remain pending. Washington appeals the trial court's partial granting of Cole's motion for summary judgment.
Interlocutory Appeal
Unless specifically authorized by statute, we have jurisdiction to review only final judgments. TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 51.012 (Vernon 1997); Stolhandske v. Stern, 14 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). A summary judgment that does not dispose of all issues and parties is interlocutory and may not be appealed absent statutory authority permitting an interlocutory appeal. See Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross, 698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding). The trial court order here does not contain finality language or otherwise state that it is a final judgment, nor does it dispose of all claims and parties. We therefore must determine whether we are otherwise statutorily authorized to consider this interlocutory appeal.
Under Texas procedure, appellate courts possess jurisdiction to consider immediate appeals of interlocutory orders only if a statute explicitly confers appellate jurisdiction. Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352-53 (Tex. 1998); Eichelberger v. Hayton, 814 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). A statute authorizing an appeal from an interlocutory order is in derogation of the general rule that only final judgments are appealable; thus, we strictly construe such a statute. Walker Sand, Inc. v. Baytown Asphalt Materials, Ltd., 95 S.W.3d 511, 514 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
The general Texas statute permitting appeals from interlocutory orders does not include an order granting in part a motion for summary judgment as one of those interlocutory trial court orders from which a party may appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1)-(11) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (setting forth 11 types of appealable interlocutory orders). Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to consider the validity of the trial court's ruling on this interlocutory order.
Conclusion
We conclude that we lack statutory authority to consider the parties' interlocutory appeal and therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.