Opinion
CACivil Action Number 99-3442, Section "L" (1)
April 23, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
The issues in this case arose from an incident that occurred on November 23, 1998 between Plaintiff Leo Washington and Defendants James Price, Douglas Zemlik, Michael Troxclair and other police officers that were not defendants in this case. Plaintiff sued these offices and the City of Gretna alleging that the officers violated his constitutional rights as well as the laws of Louisiana when he was arrested at his home. This case came for trial before a jury on January 22, 2001. After the Plaintiff presented his case, the Court granted Defendant's Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law as to Plaintiff's claims against the City of Gretna. Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant Police Officers were submitted to the jury for consideration. On January 26, 2001, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Defendant Officers. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for a New Trial. After a review of the facts and the applicable law, for the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
I. STANDARD FOR A NEW TRIAL
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 allows a Court to grant a new trial, where there has been a trial jury, "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States."
The dicision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is generaly within the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed upon appeal for an abuse of that discretion. See Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982). A new trial may be granted if the trial court finds that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its course. Smith v. Transword Drilling, 773 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir. 1970)).
As the Fifth Circuit has stated:
It is a well-settled rule in this circuit that a verdict can be against the great weight of the evidence, and thus justify a new trial, even if there is substantial evidence to support it. What courts cannot do . . . is to grant a new trial simply because [the court] would have come to a different conclusion then the jury did.Peterson v. Wilson, 141 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Court can consider the complexity of the issues presented to the jury, the extent to which the evidence is in dispute, and the presence of any pernicious or undesirable occurrences at the trial when evaluation a request for a new trial. See Shows, 671 F.2d at 930.
II. PLAINTIFF'S GROUNDS FOR REQUESTING A NEW TRIAL
The Plaintiff lists the following grounds as reasons for requesting a new trial: 1) the evidence is greatly disputed and the Defendants gave conflicting testimony throughout the course of this case; 2) Defense counsel made inappropriate statements during closing arguments; 3) the Court made certain erroneous evidentiary rulings; and, finally, 4) Plaintiff has discovered new evidence that would probably have changed the outcome of the trial.
A. DEFENDANTS' TESTIMONY
Plaintiff correctly notes that the jury was presented with varying versions of the events that transpired on November 23, 1998 and that certain parts of the Defendants' testimony was inconsistent. Plaintiff further points out that there was testimony to the effect that the condition of Mr. Washington's front door lock was consistent with its being forcibly opened. After reviewing these inconsistencies, the Court finds that they fall short of demonstrating that the great weight of the evidence was in favor of the Plaintiff's version of events.
As the finder of fact the jury has the exclusive province and authority to assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Brady v. Fort Bend County, 145 F.3d 691, 714 (5th Cir. 1998). In this case, the jury was attentive during the trial and participated in lengthy deliberations before reaching their verdict. It appears that when presented with the totality of the evidence the jurors simply did not find that Mr. Washington had carried his burden and, therefore, found for the Defendants. The facts in this case were not complex. The case really boiled down to a credibility call. Each side had inconsistencies. The jury believed the Defendants and disbelieved the Plaintiff. There was ample evidence from which the jury could have reached their conclusion. In particular, the jury could have noted the numerous inconsistencies in Mr. Washington's testimony, including that: the injuries he sustained could be inconsistent with the vigorous beating he alleges he received; despite his statement that many neighbors witnessed the incident, he did not call numerous witnesses to corroborate his version of events; the statement he allegedly made to the Officers regarding his association with the NAACP was untrue; and his claim that the beating caused him to lose significant business opportunities when other testimony showed that the business was lost for reasons completely unrelated to Mr. Washington's alleged injuries. After considering all the evidence, the jury could have simply discredited Mr. Washington's version of events. The inconsistences in the Defendants' testimony highlighted by the Plaintiff do not amount to evidence that points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of Mr. Washington that this Court would conclude that the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence or that allowing it to stand would result in a miscarriage of justice.
B. STATEMENTS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
Plaintiff next argues that Defense Counsel made statements during closing argument that are the kind of undesirable occurrences that necessitate a new trial. Specifically, Defense Counsel referred to Plaintiff's Counsel "as big, bad George Fowler" and alluded to the substantial resources and expertise of Mr. Fowler's law firm. Defense Counsel also stated that the Defendant Police officers "work for small money" despite the parties' agreement not to introduce evidence of the officers' ability to pay any judgment against them.
In its final instructions, the Court instructed the jurors that statements made by lawyers are not evidence and that what the lawyers say is not binding upon the jury. The defense did not put on any evidence of the Defendants inability to pay any judgment or that Mr. Fowler was doing anything other than zealously representing his client. Without evidence to back-up these statements, the Court finds that Defense Counsel's statements were harmless and that they certainly do not amount to grounds for a new trial.
C. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
Plaintiff next points to evidentiary rulings which he believes, if allowed to stand, would result in a miscarriage of justice. First, the Court refused to allow Plaintiff to introduce the FBI report regarding this incident. During the course of the trial, Plaintiff argues that the Defendants alluded to the report and Chief of Police B.H. Miller testified that the report exonerated the Gretna Police Department. Defendants respond that the FBI report was offered only in the rebuttal potion of Plaintiff's case and without Defense Counsel being afforded an opportunity to review the report. The parties agree that the FBI report did not reach a conclusion as to the substance of Mr. Washington's allegations. The Court finds that the report would not have aided the jury in resolved the question of credibility in this case; the Court's decision to reject the report was proper, and did not result in a miscarriage of justice.
Plaintiff further argues that the Court's decision to exclude both the citizen complaints led against Defendant Zemlik, and the City of Gretna Police Department's Internal Affairs vision ("IAD") reports regarding citizen complaints was erroneous. As the Court explained to parties during the trial, these documents show that the City of Gretna was investigating citizen complaints internally. Further, none of the allegations in the complaints were substantiated after the IAD investigations. The number of citizen complaints filed against a police officer bears no relationship to their validity. See Brooks v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987). Allowing the introduction of unfounded or unsubstantiated complaints would have prejudiced the Defendant Officers and they were properly excluded at trial.
D. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
A trial court can grant a new trial when a party has newly discovered evidence if such evidence would probably have changed the outcome of the trial, and could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence and is not merely cumulative or impeaching. See White v. Cooper, 919 F. Supp. 1022, 1031 (E.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd 129 F.3d 609. Plaintiff argues that the outcome of this trial would probably have been changed by his recent discovery of Williams v. Leagans, et al., a case that was pending before Judge Lemmon of this Court at the time of Mr. Washington's trial. Williams v. Leagans includes a claim against the City of Gretna for a violation of another plaintiff's civil rights by a Gretna Police Officer. Plaintiff requested information about such cases from the Defendants in interrogatories and the existence of this case was not revealed in Defendants' responses. Defendants argue that their omission of this case was merely an oversight. It appears that the Defendants had a duty to disclose the existence of this case in their interrogatory responses and they failed to do so. However, Defendants' compliance with the rules of discovery would not have changed the outcome of this trial. Plaintiff argues that because the incident complained of in Williams v. Leagans occurred prior to Mr. Washington's arrest, it could be used; how he was harmed by a policy or custom of the Gretna Police Department which violated his "rights. The Court disagrees.
The Court granted Defendant's Rule 50 Motion for Judgement as a Matter of Law as to Plaintiff's claims that the Gretna Police Department had a policy or custom in place that violated Plaintiff's civil rights. The existence of this one unresolved case would not have changed the Court's ruling and, therefore, this evidence would not have been considered by the jury and would not have changed the outcome of this trial. Moreover, this evidence could only be significant if the Police Officers were liable for some underlying tort against Mr. Washington. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of: a policy maker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose "moving force" is the policy or custom) (emphasis added). Here, the jury did not impose liability on the officers, so they could not have imposed municipal liability on the City of Gretna. Therefore, evidence of another complaint against the Gretna Police Department could not have effected the outcome of the trial.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial is DENIED.