Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-14114 SECTION: "J"(1)
11-17-2016
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Damond J. Washington, filed this federal civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He sued Derwyn Burton, James T. Dixon, Zachary Carpenter, Sierra Thompson, Tina Peng, Lindsay Samuel, Jennifer Hull, Amanda Frasier, Lindsay Jeffrey, and "'[a]ll' parties employed by, contracted through, or affiliated with the New Orleans Indigent Defender Board." To better understand the factual bases of plaintiff's claims, the Court held a Spears hearing on October 18, 2016.
See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). "[T]he Spears procedure affords the plaintiff an opportunity to verbalize his complaints, in a manner of communication more comfortable to many prisoners." Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1998). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that a Spears hearing is in the nature of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) motion for more definite statement. Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1996). Spears hearing testimony becomes a part of the total filing by the pro se applicant. Id.
Based on the allegations in his complaint and his testimony at the Spears hearing, the Court finds that plaintiff is making the following allegations in this lawsuit: Plaintiff is a state pretrial detainee awaiting trial on charges of attempted second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. All of individuals he has named as defendants in this lawsuit are public defenders and have played some role in his defense over the course of the state court proceedings. Plaintiff claims that the defendants have failed to provide him with the effective assistance of counsel he is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
I. Standards of Review
Federal law mandates that federal courts "review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Regarding such lawsuits, federal law further requires:
"[T]he term 'prisoner' means any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c).
On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint -
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Additionally, with respect to actions filed in forma pauperis, such as the instant lawsuit, federal law similarly provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action ...
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary damages against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
A complaint is frivolous "if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994). In making a determination as to whether a claim is frivolous, the Court has "not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when the plaintiff does not "plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation, footnote, and quotation marks omitted). The United States Supreme Court has explained:
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Although broadly construing plaintiff's complaint, and fully considering his Spears hearing testimony, the undersigned recommends that, for the following reasons, the complaint be dismissed as frivolous and/or for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
The court must liberally construe a pro se civil rights complaint. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994).
II. Plaintiff's Claims
Alleging that the defendants are public defenders who have failed to provide him with effective assistance of counsel in his state criminal proceedings, plaintiff has sued the defendants in this lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In pertinent part, that statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, for plaintiff's claims to be cognizable pursuant to § 1983, the defendants must have acted under color of state law. Plaintiff's claims therefore clearly fail because it is beyond cavil that "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); accord Brown v. Dove, 519 Fed. App'x 237, 238 (5th Cir. 2013); Amir-Sharif v. Dallas County Public Defenders Office, 233 Fed. App'x 364, 365 (5th Cir. 2007); Wilson v. Nash, 115 Fed. App'x 295 (5th Cir. 2004).
The Court recognizes that claims against an attorney for engaging in a conspiracy with a state actor are cognizable in a § 1983 action. Mills v. Criminal District Court #3, 837 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988); Brown v. Blaize, Civ. Action No. 08-3730, 2008 WL 3876573, at *2 n.2 (E.D. La. Aug. 20, 2008). However, plaintiff makes no such claim in this proceeding. --------
RECOMMENDATION
It is therefore RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and/or for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
New Orleans, Louisiana, this seventeenth day of November, 2016.
/s/ _________
JANIS VAN MEERVELD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE