Opinion
Case No. C11-1800RSL
04-06-2012
ALISON WARREN, Plaintiff, v. BASTYR UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's "Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint" (Dkt. # 28). Plaintiff seeks to add Dr. Samer Koutoubi as an individual defendant and add charges against Bastyr University and Dr. Koutoubi for Title VII sexual and racial discrimination. The Court GRANTS the motion.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendants' untimely response (Dkt. # 29). Reply (Dkt. # 31) at 2. Defendants are directed, though, to review Local Civil Rule 7.
A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "This policy is 'to be applied with extreme liberality.'" Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given." Id. (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, Defendants raise only one objection to Plaintiff's motion: that Plaintiff has yet to exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC. Response (Dkt. # 29); see Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A person seeking relief under Title VII must first file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, or, if, as here, the person initially instituted proceedings with the state or local administrative agency, within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice."); id. (noting that the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional). In her Reply, Plaintiff conceded that she had yet to comply with this prerequisite, but indicated that she had started the process. Dkt. # 31. She subsequently informed the Court that the EEOC issued her a "right to sue" letter on March 6, 2012. Dkt. # 35-1. That would appear to settle the matter.
While the Court believes there may be an issue as to whether Plaintiff can succeed on her Title VII claims given her apparent delay in filing a charge with the EEOC, it finds that those claims "may be a proper subject of relief" and Plaintiff "ought to be afforded an opportunity to test [those] claim[s] on the merits." Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the motion and directs Plaintiff to file her second amended complaint with the Court.
Compare Dkt. # 28-1 (alleging that Dr. Koutoubi began harassing Plaintiff on February 25, 2011), with MacDonald v. Grace Church Seattle, 457 F.3d 1079, 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the dismissal of Title VII claims as "untimely because [the Plaintiff] failed to file her charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the last alleged discriminatory employment practice").
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Robert S. Lasnik
United States District Judge