Opinion
No. 05-19-00365-CR
08-05-2020
STEVEN WARE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F18-76179-R
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whitehill, Osborne, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Carlyle
A jury found Mr. Ware guilty of burglary of a building. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 30.02(a). At punishment, he entered true pleas to two enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years' confinement. Mr. Ware challenges his conviction on the ground that the trial court failed to informally inquire into his competency to stand trial. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
We review a trial court's decision not to conduct an informal competency inquiry for abuse of discretion. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420, 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 692 & n.31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The trial court is in a better position to evaluate a defendant's competency, and we will not reverse its decision unless it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.
"A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a). A trial court must conduct an informal competency inquiry if evidence comes to the court's attention suggesting the defendant may be incompetent. Id. art. 46B.004(b).
"Evidence suggesting the need for an informal inquiry may be based on observations made in relation to one or more of the factors described by Article 46B.024 or on any other indication that the defendant is incompetent . . . ." Id. art. 46B.004(c-1). The article 46B.024 factors include the defendant's capacity to: (a) "rationally understand the charges against the defendant and the potential consequences of the pending criminal proceedings"; (b) "disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind"; (c) "engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options"; (d) "understand the adversarial nature of criminal proceedings"; (e) "exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior"; and (f) "testify." Id. art. 46B.024(1)(A)-(F). Considerations also include whether, "as supported by current indications and the defendant's personal history," the defendant suffers from a mental illness and, if so, how it affects the defendant's capacity to reasonably and rationally participate in his own defense. Id. art. 46B.024(2)-(4).
Mental illness does not by itself suggest incompetency; there must also be evidence raising the possibility that the defendant's mental illness "operates in such a way as to prevent him from rationally understanding the proceedings against him or engaging rationally with counsel in pursuit of his own best interest." Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 691; see also Clemens v. State, No. 05-15-00025-CR, 2016 WL 347149, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding evidence of mental illness did not warrant informal inquiry without evidence the mental illness affected defendant's ability to rationally consult with his lawyer or understand the proceedings against him).
Mr. Ware contends evidence of his mental illnesses, as well as his behavior during pretrial proceedings, required an informal competency inquiry. With respect to his mental illnesses, Mr. Ware relies on a court-ordered mental evaluation introduced into evidence during the punishment phase. The evaluation concluded Mr. Ware evidences both an unspecified bipolar disorder and an unspecified "Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder." The same mental evaluation, however, concluded Mr. Ware's competency was not in question, noting he "is fully oriented and appears to understand why [he] is incarcerated and the roles of the attorneys and judge involvement in [his] case." Mr. Ware's mental evaluation did not suggest his mental illnesses affected his ability to understand the proceedings against him or participate in his own defense. Thus, it did not trigger the trial court's duty to conduct an informal inquiry. See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 691; Clemens, 2016 WL 347149, at *3.
Mr. Ware cites two exhibits containing documentation related to the personal-recognizance bonds on which the court released him from custody before trial. Although each exhibit contains a separate order for a mental evaluation, the same mental evaluation is included in each exhibit.
With respect to Mr. Ware's behavior at the pretrial proceedings, he relies on the following exchange as evidence he was "unfocused and partially delusional":
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Ware, good morning sir. Have you made an election of punishment with your lawyer yet?
Mr. Ware?
THE DEFENDANT: I made it with Jesus because y'all going to do what you want to do anyway, so I been praying and asking Jesus to guide me in this right here and guide you in your mind. That's all I can do. I'm going to trust Him, and I feel like my life is in danger.
The court explained that if Mr. Ware failed to elect to have the jury assess punishment upon his conviction, the court would instead assess that punishment, just as it had two weeks earlier at a pretrial hearing. Mr. Ware responded that he had previously asked for probation and relief under section 12.44(a) of the penal code, but everything he asked for "was shot down." He complained that the State took 287 days to build its case, that he was not given the right to an examining trial, and that "all [his] rights have been broken."
The above exchange suggests Mr. Ware was frustrated with his case and relied on his faith in a higher being. It does not suggest, however, that Mr. Ware could not rationally consult with his counsel or that he did not understand the nature of the proceedings against him. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to sua sponte conduct an informal competency inquiry based on this evidence.
We affirm.
/Cory L. Carlyle/
CORY L. CARLYLE
JUSTICE Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
190365F.U05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F18-76179-R.
Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle. Justices Whitehill and Osborne participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Judgment entered this 5th day of August, 2020.