Opinion
2:04-cv-0448-GEB-GGH.
September 23, 2005
ORDER RE ATTORNEY'S FEES
This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).
Defendants Sutter County and David McFarland (collectively the "Defendants") move for an $86,589.50 attorney's fees award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, based on their prevailing-party status, since summary judgment was granted against Plaintiff Barbara Ward ("Ward"). Defendants contend that an award of attorney's fees is proper because Ward's claim was "groundless from the start" and she "continued to litigate" even after being informed by Defendants that her claims lacked "legal and factual bases." (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. 4.) For the reasons stated below Defendants' motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Ward's Second Amended Complaint (the "Complaint") alleged that Defendants were liable for invasion of privacy, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. State claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence were also included in the Complaint. The claims all stemmed from Ward's assertion that Defendant David McFarland arrested her without probable cause. Defendants' summary judgment motion was granted on Ward's federal claims and her state law claims were dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
DISCUSSION
A defendant may recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 if "`the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.'" Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quotingChristiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). This is intended to be a "stringent standard." Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit repeatedly "has recognized [that] `[attorney's] fees in civil rights cases should only be awarded to a defendant in exceptional circumstances.'" Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 1990)). And the Supreme Court has cautioned that in determining whether a plaintiff's case was frivolous or unreasonable, district courts must "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation."Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421; see also Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
Defendants contend that attorneys fees should be awarded because Ward's claims were "unreasonable and groundless from the start." (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. at 4.) In support of this claim, Defendants argue that "[t]he order on defendants' motion for summary judgment confirms the lack of merit and the settled state of law, as applied to the facts, on all the section 1983 issues." (Id.) But the issue is whether Ward's claims were "groundless at the outset," not whether Defendants prevailed on summary judgment. Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Plaintiff's "inability to present evidence to defeat summary judgment does not mean that her claims were groundless at the outset"); and see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) ("The fact that the plaintiff may ultimately lose his case is not in itself a sufficient justification for the assessment of [attorney's] fees.")
Ward's lawsuit was not so factually or legally groundless from the outset to constitute a frivolous lawsuit. When Ward filed suit, she had been arrested by Defendant McFarland for multiple theft felonies. Ward alleged that the only piece of evidence Defendant McFarland reviewed prior to arresting her, was a video surveillance tape from which "even Sheriff Denney . . . could not form an opinion as to whether or not a theft had occurred. . . ." (Pl.'s Mem. Opp'n Mot. at 4.) "These circumstances furnish some basis, albeit somewhat tenuous, for [Ward] to theorize" that Defendant David McFarland willfully deprived her of her Fourth Amendment rights by arresting her without probable cause.
Defendants also argue that because "the lack of merit of the claims was clearly pointed out to the plaintiff on May 17, 2004, and again on June 21, 2004 . . . but [plaintiff] continued to litigate," an award of attorney's fees is proper. (Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. at 4.) Attorney's fees may be proper where a plaintiff continues to litigate after it becomes clear the action lacks foundation. Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d. 636, 645 (9th Cir. 1999). However, awarding a defendant attorney's fees simply because a § 1983 plaintiff was apprised by her adversary in a letter that her claims lacked merit would have a "chilling effect upon civil rights plaintiffs [and be] disproportionate to any protection defendants might receive against the prosecution of meritless claims." Mitchell v. Office of the Los Angeles Superintendent of Sch., 805 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1986); and see EEOC v. Bruno's Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that a district court must exercise caution in awarding fees to a prevailing defendant in order to avoid discouraging legitimate suits that may not be "airtight").
For the stated reasons, Ward's § 1983 claim for false arrest was not "groundless, without foundation, frivolous, or unreasonable." Karam, 352 F.3d at 1195 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, since Defendants "made no effort to allocate the hours claimed between [false arrest and Ward's various other] claims," the merits of the remainder of Ward's claims need not be reached.Pontarelli v. Stone, 781 F.Supp. 114, 127 (D.R.I. 1992). Therefore, the motion for attorney's fees is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.