Ward v. Sears, Roebuck Co.

30 Citing cases

  1. Harper v. Cotton Logistics, Inc.

    DOCKET NO. 2:17-cv-1337 (W.D. La. Aug. 30, 2018)

    Publication of a defamatory statement "enjoys a qualified or conditional privilege if made (a) in good faith; (b) on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty; and, (c) to a person having a corresponding interest or duty." Clements v. Ryan, 382 So.2d 279, 282 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Ward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 339 So.2d 1255, 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1976)). Thus, "communications between appropriate persons within the employer's walls, concerning allegations of conduct by an employee that bears on the employer's interest, are subject to the qualified privilege if made in good faith."

  2. Fisk v. Warmack

    486 So. 2d 203 (La. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    Although the insurance company refused to pay the claimed loss because it ascertained that bookkeeping deficiencies or practices, rather than misappropriation, was the reason for the apparent, but nonexistent, shortage of funds, Mr. Warmack had a duty to his corporation to report "apparent shortages" to the fidelity insurer and the insurer had a corresponding duty or interest because it was contractually obligated to indemnify Central for any losses sustained through dishonesty of Central's employees. Appellees argue their good faith because "all the information Mr. Warmack possessed led to the inference that Ms. Fisk was indeed misappropriating the funds missing from his company's accounts." In Ward v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 339 So.2d 1255 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976), we observed that: Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So.2d 723 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1962), establishes the rule that a publication enjoys a qualified or conditional privilege if made (a) in good faith; (b) on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty; and, (c) to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. This privilege arises from the social necessity of permitting full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest or duty, without inhibiting free communication in such instances by the fear that the communicator will be held liable in damages if the good faith communication later proves to be untrue or inaccurate.

  3. Makofsky v. Cunningham

    576 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1978)   Cited 59 times
    In Makofsky v. Cunningham, 576 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1978), a proces verbal was defined as a formal statement of facts attested by or before a public officer such as a notary.

    There is qualified privilege to make statements with reasonable grounds for believing them to be true in reference to subjects in which the person communicating and the person to whom the statement is made have an interest or a duty, including a business interest. Madison v. Bolton, 1958, 234 La. 997, 102 So.2d 433; Ward v. Sears, Roebuck Co., La.App. 1976, 339 So.2d 1255, 1261, 28 La.L.Rev., supra, note 22, at 93; Comment, 6 La.L.Rev. 281 (1945). "With regard to proof of injury Louisiana has recognized that injury to reputation can result simply from the character of the defamatory words, though proof of pecuniary loss is impossible."

  4. Maggio v. Liztech Jewelry

    912 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. La. 1996)   Cited 7 times
    Noting that under Louisiana law, a statement is made in "good faith" when the person making it honestly and reasonably believes it to be correct

    The qualified privilege "arises from the social necessity of permitting full and unrestricted communication concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest or duty, without inhibiting free communication in such instances by the fear that the communicator will be held liable in damages if the good faith communication later proves to be untrue or inaccurate." Ward v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 339 So.2d 1255, 1261 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976) (citing Toomer, 146 So.2d at 725). "Good faith" refers to a statement made in the honest belief that it is a correct statement and with reasonable grounds for believing it to be true. Elmer v. Coplin, 485 So.2d 171, 177 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 489 So.2d 246 (La. 1986).

  5. Kennedy v. Sheriff of East Baton Rouge

    935 So. 2d 669 (La. 2006)   Cited 305 times
    Holding that "the standard of negligence . . . is to be applied in cases . . . involving a private individual allegedly injured by a defamatory falsehood in a matter of public concern," which is the same "negligence standard of liability in actions by private individuals involving matters of private concern"

    According to the courts, it is "[o]nly when lack of such reasonable grounds is found can it be said that the person uttering the statement is actuated by malice or ill will." Elmer, 485 So.2d at 177, citing Ward v. Sears Roebuck Company, 339 So.2d 1255 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1976). See also, Smith, 93-2512 at p. 17, 639 So.2d at 744-745, in which we reviewed Louisiana jurisprudence on the qualified or conditional privilege and noted that, in Louisiana, the most commonly cited ways in which the conditional privilege can be abused are when the defendant's remarks are made with malice or without good faith or for a purpose outside of the scope of the privilege.

  6. Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp.

    639 So. 2d 730 (La. 1994)   Cited 1,340 times
    Holding that a de novo standard applies in reviewing a trial court's decision granting summary judgment

    "'Only when lack of such reasonable grounds is found can it be said that the person uttering the statement is actuated by malice or ill will.'" Clements v. Ryan, 382 So.2d 279, 282 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Ward v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 339 So.2d 1255, 1261 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976)). Courts in other jurisdictions similarly have held that the "malice" required to overcome the special-interest, conditional privilege is that required under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), that is, "knowledge that an allegation is false or with reckless disregard for whether the allegation is false."

  7. Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets

    390 So. 2d 196 (La. 1980)   Cited 208 times
    Holding that, in relevant part, the element of "malice, actual or implied," "must be shown" to "maintain a defamation action"

    To maintain an action in defamation, the following elements must be shown: (1) defamatory words; (2) publication; (3) falsity; (4) malice, actual or implied; and (5) resulting injury. HMC Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So.2d 700 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1979), writs denied, 378 So.2d 1384, 379 So.2d 11 (1980); Trahan v. Ritterman, 368 So.2d 181 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1979); Lees v. Smith, 363 So.2d 974 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1978); Perrilloux v. Batiste, 357 So.2d 841 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1978); Harper v. Jeans, 353 So.2d 1093 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 355 So.2d 264 (La. 1978); Ward v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 339 So.2d 1255 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976); Lake Charles Diesel Inc. v. Guthridge, 326 So.2d 613 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1976); Carter v. Catfish Cabin, 316 So.2d 517 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1975); Rogeau v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 274 So.2d 454 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1973). Accord, Makofsky v. Cunningham, 576 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1978).

  8. Thompson v. Bank One of La.

    134 So. 3d 653 (La. Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 12 times
    Finding that statements accusing the plaintiff of "embezzlement of Church funds," of being a "thief" and a "liar," and that the plaintiff's actions constituted fraud were defamatory per se as they accused the plaintiff of criminal conduct and tended to injure his professional reputation as a pastor

    In this context, “good faith” means having reasonable grounds for believing that the statement is true. Ward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 339 So.2d 1255, 1261 (La.App. 1st Cir.1976). The trial court noted that “even after it was shown that Bank One's error had caused the $50,000 CD to be credited to First Zion Baptist Church of New Orleans, defendants continued their efforts to oust Rev. Thompson from his position as pastor.”

  9. Thompson v. Bank One of La., NA

    NO. 2013-CA-1058 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2014)

    Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So.2d 723, 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). In this context, "good faith" means having reasonable grounds for believing that the statement is true. Ward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 339 So.2d 1255, 1261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976). The trial court noted that "even after it was shown that Bank One's error had caused the $50,000 CD to be credited to First Zion Baptist Church of New Orleans, defendants continued their efforts to oust Rev. Thompson from his position as pastor."

  10. Burton v. Collins

    997 So. 2d 904 (La. Ct. App. 2008)

    Even when a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of the essential elements of defamation, recovery may be precluded if the defendant shows either (1) the statement was true, or (2) the statement was protected by a privilege, absolute or qualified. Costello, supra; Cooksey, supra. A conditional or qualified privilege is applicable if the communication is made in good faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty to a person having a corresponding interest or duty. Aranyosi v. Delchamps, Inc., 98-1325 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/25/99), 739 So.2d 911, writ denied, 99-2199 (La. 11/5/99), 750 So.2d 187. Good faith is defined as a statement made with reasonable grounds for believing its truth. Only when lack of such reasonable grounds is found can it be said that the person uttering the statement is actuated by malice or ill will. Ward v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 339 So.2d 1255 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976); Aranyosi, supra.Chapman v. Ebeling, 41,710, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945 So.2d 222, 228.