Ward v. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co.

11 Citing cases

  1. Rochester Poster Advertising Co., v. Smithers

    130 Misc. 676 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1927)   Cited 1 times

    "Easements capable of physical examination are embraced within the Recording Act and necessarily subject to the same law of notice as conveyances of a fee." ( Ward v. Metropolitan Elev. R.R. Co., 82 Hun, 545; affd., 152 N.Y. 39.) This contract is a valid agreement between the parties and constitutes an effective grant of an easement upon the premises in question.

  2. Shaw v. New York El. R.R. Co.

    79 N.E. 984 (N.Y. 1907)   Cited 9 times
    In Shaw v. New York El. R.R. Co. (187 N.Y. 186) the question was considered whether the evidence of a witness in an action against the lessor was admissible in another action against the subsequent lessee, the witness being dead, and at page 193 the court say: It is unnecessary to spend time in considering whether the lessee as a privy came within the definition of section 830 of the Code as a "legal representative," as it would clearly be covered by the common law.

    There was no such open, visible and notorious occupation by the defendants of the street under the consent, assuming it to have been one, as would operate as a notice to the plaintiffs of defendants' rights. ( Ward v. Met. Elev. Ry. Co., 152 N.Y. 39. ) Second.

  3. Conabeer v. N.Y. Central H.R.R.R. Co.

    156 N.Y. 474 (N.Y. 1898)   Cited 31 times
    In Conabeer v. N.Y.C. H.R.R.R. Co. (156 N.Y. 474) the opinion of the court reads: "Where a right is obtained by prescription the measure of the right is controlled by the extent of the use.

    There is no proof of any such loss. That the plaintiff's remote grantor, Mrs. McGown, surrendered the easements in Fourth avenue appurtenant to her abutting property, so far as the same were affected by the erection and operation of this railroad, there is no doubt, and the plaintiff could acquire no greater rights than were possessed by her. This court has several times held that a release or abandonment of the easements of light, air and access which are appurtenant to property abutting upon a public street may be established by any evidence which clearly indicates an intention upon the part of an abutting owner to abandon the right, at least where it has been acted upon by the other party. That the deed from Mrs. McGown to the defendant effected such a release and abandonment is obvious. ( White v. M.R. Co., 139 N.Y. 19; Foote v. M.E.R. Co., 147 N.Y. 367; Ward v. M.E.R. Co., 152 N.Y. 39.) Although, under the statute of 1807, the commissioners appointed made a map which included Fourth avenue, still, until the street was opened and the damages to the owners of the land paid, the title remained in the latter.

  4. Miles v. De Sapio

    96 A.D.2d 970 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)   Cited 20 times

    Plaintiffs admit they did not inquire of defendants as to defendants' possible rights or title in the disputed property, and there is no indication in the record that if such an inquiry had been made, defendants' interest would not have been disclosed. An easement is clearly a conveyance of real property subject to the recording act and related case law, which expressly conditions the superiority of the rights of the subsequent grantee on his having purchased "in good faith" (Real Property Law, § 291; Ward v Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 152 N.Y. 39; Pallone v New York Tel. Co., 34 A.D.2d 1091, affd 30 N.Y.2d 865). Accordingly, plaintiffs had sufficient facts in their possession to be on inquiry notice to defendants' interest in the disputed parcel.

  5. Goggin v. Manhattan Railway Co.

    124 App. Div. 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908)   Cited 3 times

    The title of a tenant in common is not joint but several, although of an undivided part; and I see no reason why prescriptive title may not be gained as against his interest in the land, even though no complete easement is acquired. An abutting owner by his acts may abandon his easement of light, air and access if he sees fit ( Ward v. Met. Elev. R. Co., 152 N.Y. 39) and lack of prosecution within the prescribed time would seem to be one method of doing so. If the statute was not suspended by the infancy of the one cotenant, there is no question that the full twenty years had run against the appellants when the action was begun, and that if prescriptive title could be gained at all it had conclusively ripened as adverse user for the full period of time necessary. Notwithstanding the dower of the mother had been admeasured and she occupied the property they, as remaindermen, had an immediate right of action.

  6. Child v. New York Elevated R.R. Co.

    89 App. Div. 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904)

    They were in open, visible and notorious possession of all the rights acquired by or released to them, and their possession was inconsistent with the title in the plaintiff's lessor to a full right to the easements of light, air and access afforded by the street, and, therefore, it operated as a notice to the plaintiff of the defendants' right therein. ( Ward v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 152 N.Y. 39.) Third. Plaintiff was not entitled to recover, under his complaint, damages sustained under the five years lease.

  7. Shaw v. New York Elevated R.R. Co.

    78 App. Div. 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903)

    Snell v. Levitt ( 110 N.Y. 595). In Ward v. Metropolitan Elevated R. Co. ( 152 N.Y. 39) it appeared that the plaintiff's grantor, in consideration of $3,300 paid to her by the defendants, released to them the easements or rights belonging to the premises which had been taken and were affected by the maintenance and operation of their road, and all causes of action therefor, past and future, and consented to a perpetual maintenance and operation of such road in front of the premises. It was held that this instrument was sufficient within the White case, based upon a valuable consideration, to convey the easement in the street; and although this instrument was not recorded, as the railroad was in actual possession of the easements, that possession was notice to all persons purchasing the abutting property as to the rights that the railroad actually had.

  8. Peloke v. Scheid

    135 Misc. 2d 606 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1987)   Cited 4 times

    Simply stated, this court holds and determines that defendants in 1979 were not "bona fide purchasers" of the 10-foot-wide strip of land in question. The recording act and related case law expressly condition the superiority of the rights of the subsequent grantee upon his having purchased "in good faith" (Real Property Law § 291; Ward v Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 152 N.Y. 39; Pallone v New York Tel. Co., 34 A.D.2d 1091 [4th Dept 1970], affd 30 N.Y.2d 865).

  9. Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Pollack

    160 N.Y.S.2d 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957)   Cited 1 times

    Such possession is notice to all the world of the existence of any right which the person in possession is able to establish. Phelan v. Brady, 119 N.Y. 587, 23 N.E. 1109, 8 L.R.A. 211; Ward v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co., 152 N.Y. 39, 43, 46 N.E. 319, 320; Gilbert v. Van Kleeck, 284 App. Div. 611, 615, 132 N.Y.S.2d 580, 583. The third party complaint is legally insufficient for it does not set forth facts of possible liability for indemnification to the third party plaintiff.

  10. Maybeck v. New York Municipal R. Corp.

    104 Misc. 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1918)

    Upon the authorities the question does not seem to have been fully determined. In Ward v. Metropolitan El. R. Co., 152 N.Y. 39, the Court of Appeals expressly refrained from deciding it, holding that "as the defendants [when plaintiff acquired title] were in open, visible and notorious possession of all the rights acquired by or released to them and their possession was inconsistent with the title in plaintiff's grantor to a full right to the easements of light, air and access afforded by the street, it operated as a notice to the plaintiff of the defendants' rights therein." In the subsequent case of Shaw v. New York El. R.R. Co., 187 N.Y. 186, where the plaintiff had acquired the property without notice of an unrecorded consent, and there was at that time no occupation of the street by the defendants, it was held that the plaintiff "took her title unaffected and unimpaired by the act of her husband independent of any other consideration."