Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1395-N.
November 8, 2004
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Plaintiff, Levi Ward, ("Ward") was, at all relevant times, a prisoner in the custody of the Dallas County Sheriff's Department at the Dallas County Jail in Dallas, Texas.
2. The Defendant, Souvka Wallace, ("Wallace") was, at all relevant times, a duly appointed officer of the Dallas County Sheriff's Department working at the Dallas County Jail in Dallas, Texas.
3. James Randle ("Randle") was, at all relevant times, a prisoner in the custody of the Dallas County Sheriff's Department at the Dallas County Jail in Dallas, Texas.
4. On April 18, 2001, Ward and Randle were housed in Tank 3W10 of the Dallas County Jail.
5. Wallace was on duty as a detention officer at the Dallas County Jail on April 18, 2001.
6. On the morning of April 18, 2001, Wallace was involved in feeding breakfast to the inmates housed in Tank 3W10.
7. On April 18, 2001, Ward did not receive a breakfast tray and told Wallace of that fact. Wallace declined to provide Ward with a breakfast tray.
8. On April 18, 2001, Ward approached Randle and asked him whether he had gotten an extra breakfast tray. Subsequently, Ward and Randle were involved in an altercation which resulted in Ward's jaw being broken.
9. Ward failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the harm Ward complains of was a reasonably foreseeable result of Wallace's failure to provide Ward a breakfast tray.
10. Ward claims that Randle struck him from behind and broke his jaw in view of Wallace; Wallace denies this. Even by Ward's account, however, the assault took place too quickly for Wallace to have prevented it. Thus, Ward failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wallace was aware of a substantial risk of harm to Ward.
11. Ward claims that when he reported that he did not have a tray, Wallace told him to go fight for his food; Wallace denies making that statement. The actual injury to Ward is sufficiently removed in time from this alleged statement, that if he made it, it was not a cause in fact or a reasonably foreseeable cause of Ward's injuries. Ward's injuries were a direct and proximate result of Ward and Randle's choice to engage in a physical altercation. That deliberate choice broke any causal chain between any alleged statement by Wallace and the injury to Ward. Thus, Ward failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that any statement Wallace made to Ward actually caused the harm of which Ward complains.
12. The sole and exclusive proximate cause of Ward's injuries was the choice of Ward and Randle to engage in a physical altercation.
13. If any of the foregoing Findings of Fact may be more properly deemed Conclusions of Law, they are hereby incorporated by reference into the Conclusions of Law.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the instant case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this case presents a federal question.
2. This Court has general personal jurisdiction over Wallace because Wallace has appeared generally and defended the case on the merits without challenging personal jurisdiction.
3. Venue in the Northern District of Texas is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the case occurred in the Northern District of Texas.
4. Ward waived his right to a jury trial in the instant case by failing to demand a jury.
5. To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an officer's failure to protect a prisoner, the Plaintiff must prove that (a) the officer subjectively knew of a substantial risk of harm to the Plaintiff, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Downey v. Denton County, 119 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1997); (b) the officer responded with deliberate indifference to the risk, Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 650 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); and (c) the officer's indifference actually and proximately caused harm to Plaintiff. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1988).
6. Ward has three theories of recovery against Wallace arising out of three aspects of the events in question: (1) failure to provide Ward with a breakfast tray when Ward told Wallace he had not received a breakfast tray; (2) failure to warn Ward immediately before Randle allegedly struck him from behind in view of Wallace; and (3) allegedly instructing Ward to fight for his food.
7. Ward alleged that Wallace's failure to provide him with a breakfast tray resulted in harm to Ward. By virtue of the foregoing findings of fact, this act was not a proximate cause of Ward's injuries. Accordingly, Ward is not entitled to recover on that theory.
8. Ward alleged that Wallace knew Randle was about to strike Ward and that Wallace was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm to Ward by failing to warn him or prevent the assault. By virtue of the foregoing findings of fact, Ward failed to prove that Wallace knew of the impending risk of harm to Ward in time to act to prevent it, assuming arguendo that the assault took place in front of Wallace. Accordingly, Ward is not entitled to recover on that theory.
9. Ward alleged that Wallace told Ward to "go fight for your breakfast tray." By virtue of the foregoing findings of fact, Ward fails to prove that this statement actually caused the altercation between Randle and Ward. Accordingly, Ward is not entitled to recover on this theory.
10. Accordingly, Ward takes nothing on his claims and they are dismissed with prejudice.
11. If any of the foregoing Conclusions of Law may be more properly deemed Findings of Fact, they are hereby incorporated by reference into the Findings of Fact.