Opinion
A-13614
10-05-2022
FRANCINE YVETTE WANNQUIST-CHISUM, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Ariel J. Toft, Assistant Public Advocate, and James Stinson, Public Advocate, Anchorage (opening brief); Ariel J. Toft, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage (reply brief), for the Appellant. Alex Engeriser, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Seward, Trial Court No. 3SW-19-00015 CR George Peck, Magistrate Judge.
Ariel J. Toft, Assistant Public Advocate, and James Stinson, Public Advocate, Anchorage (opening brief); Ariel J. Toft, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage (reply brief), for the Appellant.
Alex Engeriser, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Francine Yvette Warrnquist-Chisum was convicted, following a jury trial, of driving under the influence, refusal to submit to a chemical test, and fourth-degree assault. She now appeals, raising three claims of error. 1
AS 28.35.030(a)(1), AS 25.35.032(a), and AS 11.41.230(a)(3), respectively.
First, she argues that the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. The facts underlying the motion are as follows: In February 2019, an intoxicated woman knocked on James Gudobba's door in Seward and told him that she had just driven her car into a ditch. The woman then left and entered a nearby residence. Gudobba called the police and described the woman as around fifty years old, about five feet tall, blonde, and wearing a baseball cap. When the trooper arrived, Gudobba directed him to the residence that the woman had entered. The trooper went to the residence and was invited in by a man seated at the kitchen table. The trooper told the man that he needed to speak with "the driver from that car." The man left and went into the bedroom and two women came out.
One of the women, Wannquist-Chisum, was heavily intoxicated and fit the description of the woman who had knocked on Gudobba's door. When the trooper asked her about the car stuck in the snowbank outside, she pulled out a car key from her wallet and made statements indicating that it was the only available key to the car. She also stated that she had test driven the car that night and that she had been drinking earlier in the evening, although she denied driving under the influence. At one point, Wannquist-Chisum became agitated and told the trooper to leave the residence. But the trooper did not leave the residence. Instead, he conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test, and observed six out of six clues of intoxication. The trooper attempted to conduct further field sobriety tests, but Wannquist-Chisum declined to comply, and the trooper then arrested her for driving under the influence.
Prior to trial, Wannquist-Chisum filed a motion to suppress, seeking suppression of "all evidence" obtained after Wannquist-Chisum told the trooper to leave. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the trooper was entitled to remain and conduct further field sobriety tests because he had probable cause to arrest Wannquist-Chisum. Wannquist-Chisum now appeals that ruling. 2
Although we question the district court's conclusion that the trooper was entitled to remain and conduct a HGN test after being told to leave, we agree with the district court that the trooper had probable cause to arrest and could have immediately arrested Wannquist-Chisum without conducting the HGN test. In other words, there was nothing unlawful about the arrest, and therefore no grounds to suppress evidence obtained after the arrest. We further conclude that any error in failing to suppress the HGN test, which occurred before the arrest, was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of Wannquist-Chisum's intoxication at trial.
Second, Wannquist-Chisum argues that the evidence was insufficient to conclude that she had been driving the car. When we review a claim of insufficiency on appeal, we are required to view the evidence - and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence - in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict. We then determine whether, viewing the evidence in this manner, a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.
Iyapana v. State, 284 P.3d 841, 848-49 (Alaska App. 2012).
Id.
Here, Wannquist-Chisum concedes that the evidence was sufficient to prove her intoxication, but she argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she was the driver of the car in the snowbank. Wannquist-Chisum bases this claim on the fact that, at trial, Gudobba was hesitant to identify her and provided a slightly different description of the woman who knocked on his door in his testimony than he had initially provided to the police. (He testified that she was 5'6" or 5'8" whereas he had initially reported that she was about 5' 1".) Wannquist-Chisum asserts that the other woman who exited the bedroom looked like her and the State therefore failed to prove that she was the driver rather than the other woman. 3
But the other woman was much taller than Wannquist-Chisum, and Wannquist-Chisum fit Gudobba's initial description of the driver as 5' 1". The State also introduced photographs showing that the driver's seat of the car was "positioned close to the steering wheel as though a person of small stature had been driving," such that the trooper did not believe the other, taller woman could have driven the car with the seat in that position. Finally, Wannquist-Chisum made incriminating statements about having the only key to the car and test driving the car when she was speaking to the trooper. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, we conclude that a reasonable juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Wannquist-Chisum was guilty of driving under the influence.
Lastly, Wannquist-Chisum argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support her conviction for fourth-degree assault. Wannquist-Chisum was convicted of fourth-degree assault (recklessly placing another person in fear of imminent physical injury) based on evidence that she attempted to headbutt the trooper during her arrest. The trooper testified that Wannquist-Chisum "swung her head back" at him as he was behind her. He further testified that he moved so that he "wouldn't get hit in the face with her head," which is "unpleasant" and "hurts." Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the jury's verdict, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Wannquist-Chisum recklessly placed the trooper in fear of imminent physical injury when she tried to headbutt him in the face.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 4