Opinion
01 Civ. 1326 (HB)
March 19, 2002
OPINION ORDER
Cheng Yong Wang and Xingqui Fum (collectively, "plaintiffs") asserted claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 and 2671, et seq. ("FTCA"), in connection with their 1998 arrests for allegedly conspiring to sell human organs of executed Chinese prisoners for transplantation into private medical clients. Defendant United States of America ("Government") previously moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In my prior decision, I granted the Government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim. However, I denied the Government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' false arrest claim on the ground that the factual record was not sufficiently clear for the Court to determine whether plaintiffs' statute of limitations for bringing a false arrest claim had run under Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999). See No. 01 Civ. 1326 (HB), 2001 WL 1297793 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2001). The Government now moves to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment of the remaining false arrest claim. For reasons detailed below, the Government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' false arrest claim is granted.
Because I am granting the Government's motion to dismiss, I do not need to decide the Government's alternative ground for dismissal, namely, summary judgment based on the fact that plaintiffs' arrest was supported by probable cause.
BACKGROUND
This Court provided a comprehensive and specific summary of the facts alleged in plaintiffs' Complaint in its prior opinion, Wang, 2001 WL 1297793, at *1-2, and familiarity with that opinion is presumed.DISCUSSION
In my prior decision, I dismissed the Government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' false arrest claim under the FTCA on the ground that I could not determine whether and how the rule set forth in Covington applied to the facts of the instant case based on the record that was before me at the time. I maintained that, under Covington, a court must determine the date on which a false arrest claim accrues by considering "whether the prosecution could have obtained a conviction without using the evidence tainted by the false arrest. If so, the claim accrues at the time of arrest. If not, the arrest accrues when the prosecution ends." Wang, 2001 WL 1297793, at *7, Given that the record before the Court at that time "[did] not disclose why the criminal case against Wang and Fu was dismissed, nor [did] it shed any light on what, if any, evidence was seized at the time of arrests or the importance of such evidence to the prosecution's case," I was unable to determine whether plaintiffs' false arrest claim accrued at the time of their arrest, February 20, 1998, or at the time that the Court signed an order of nolle prosequi and dismissed plaintiffs' indictment, November 2, 1999. If the former, then plaintiffs would have failed to satisfy the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) since they did not file their claim with an administrative agency within two years of their arrest. However, if the latter, then plaintiffs would have satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of that statute. Accordingly, I denied the Government's motion to dismiss and directed the parties to address the "Covington problem" with supplemental briefs. Wang, 2001 WL 1297793, at *7
The statute provides, in relevant part, that "[a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues. . . ."
Plaintiffs filed an administrative claim with the USAO for the Southern District of New York on March 1, 2000. (Compl. ¶ 5).
After considering the parties' supplemental briefs on the application of Covington to the facts of this case, the Government's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' false arrest claim is granted. I agree with the Government's argument that the "Second Circuit's decision in Covington does not change the jurisdictional requirement" under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b), namely, that "an administrative claim be filed within two years of a claim's accrual." (Government's Supplemental Memorandum at 13). Specifically, I find that Covington applies to only a "narrow set of circumstances" involving the accrual date for a false arrest claim brought under § 1983 rather than the accrual date for such a claim brought under the FTCA. (Id.). Plaintiffs have not convinced me otherwise.
For these reasons, I do not believe that Covington compels me to change the long-standing rule that the accrual date for claims brought under the FTCA is either the time of injury or the time at which plaintiff discovered or should have discovered her injury. Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that a claim brought under the FTCA accrues "either at the time of injury or when the plaintiff has, or with reasonable diligence should have, discovered the facts critical to his or her injury, whichever is earlier"). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that the statutory period for a claim of false arrest begins at the time of arrest, that is, the time at which plaintiff was conscious of the "injury" of confinement. Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 1980). In this case, plaintiffs were arrested on February 20, 1998 (Compl. ¶ 27); however, plaintiffs did not file their administrative complaint until March 1, 2000 (Pls. Memorandum at 4). Accordingly, because plaintiffs failed to file their administrative claim within two years after their claim accrued, they have failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b).
However, even if I were to find that the rule set forth in Covington applies to the facts of this case, plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b). As a preliminary matter, I agree with the Govermnent that plaintiffs must sustain the burden of proving that they have satisfied the jurisdictional requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b), that is, of proving that they filed their claim with an administrative agency within two years after their false arrest claim accrued. (Government's Supplemental Memorandum at 12). Having looked at their Declaration, I find that plaintiffs have failed to allege any facts whatsoever that would support an inference that the prosecution could not have obtained a conviction without using the evidence tainted by the false arrest, thereby failing to establish that their claim accrued at the time the prosecution ended. Indeed, plaintiffs have failed to elucidate in any way the "evidence seized at the time of arrests or the importance of such evidence to the prosecution's case" — information that would be necessary to determine the application of the rule set forth in Covington to the facts of this case. Wang, 2001 WL 1297793, at *7. Therefore, even if I did find that the rule set forth in Covington applied to the facts of this case, which I do not, I would still grant the Government's motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs have failed adequately to plead the jurisdictional requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Govermnent's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' false arrest claim is granted. The clerk of the court is ordered to remove this case from my docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.