“That said, the discretion of the trial court is not without some limits, and when an appeal properly is taken from the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the appellant is entitled to meaningful appellate review, even if that review is only for an abuse of discretion.” Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568, 569–570(1), 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013) (footnote omitted). Also, “we will affirm the trial court's findings on disputed factual questions relating to venue if there is any evidence to support them.”

Without such a reasoning, we cannot ascertain whether that exercise was improper. See generally Wang v. Liu , 292 Ga. 568, 570 (1), 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013) ("Considering the number, variety, and nature of the statutory factors that necessarily must inform the discretion of the trial court, meaningful appellate review is possible only if the record reflects in some way the thinking that led the trial court to exercise its discretion as it did"); Lucado v. Coherd , 320 Ga. App. 241, 242-243, 739 S.E.2d 749 (2013) (holding that it is an abuse of discretion not to weigh factors where the statute requires that the factors be weighed). The detail required to adequately explain the essential reasoning of the trial court will depend upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, the closeness of the questions involved, and the ground upon which the court decides the motion.

Id. “The application of the statutory standard to the peculiar circumstances of a particular case is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568 , 569 (1) (740 SE2d 136 ) (2013). For the purpose of Signature’s motion to dismiss, the relevant facts are undisputed.

Regency Club v. Stuckey, 253 Ga. 583, 586 (3) (324 SE2d 166) (1984). See, e.g., Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568 (2) (740 SE2d 136) (2013) (vacating award of permanent injunction entered after interlocutory hearing due to lack of notice that permanent relief would be considered); Smith, 277 Ga. at 144-145 (vacating award of permanent injunction entered after initial hearing due to lack of notice such relief would be considered); Mosley v. HPSC, Inc., 267 Ga. 351 (2) (477 SE2d 837) (1996) (vacating denial of permanent injunction at interlocutory hearing where neither parties nor court mentioned consolidation). Here, while McHugh Fuller clearly had notice of the interlocutory hearing, it had no notice that the trial court intended at that hearing to consider the merits of permanent injunctive relief. The court's scheduling order made no reference to a final hearing on the merits.

]” Regency Club v. Stuckey, 253 Ga. 583, 586(3), 324 S.E.2d 166 (1984). See, e.g., Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568(2), 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013) (vacating award of permanent injunction entered after interlocutory hearing due to lack of notice that permanent relief would be considered); Smith, 277 Ga. at 144–145, 586 S.E.2d 623 (vacating award of permanent injunction entered after initial hearing due to lack of notice such relief would be considered); Mosley v. HPSC, Inc., 267 Ga. 351(2), 477 S.E.2d 837 (1996) (vacating denial of permanent injunction at interlocutory hearing where neither parties nor court mentioned consolidation). Here, while McHugh Fuller clearly had notice of the interlocutory hearing, it had no notice that the trial court intended at that hearing to consider the merits of permanent injunctive relief. The court's scheduling order made no reference to a final hearing on the merits.

We therefore conclude that the trial court must at a minimum set out the essential reasoning that forms the basis for its exercise of discretion. See In re Estate of Hanson , ––– Ga. App. –––– (1), 834 S.E.2d 615, 2019 WL 5257857 (Case No. A19A1494; decided October 17, 2019) (when determining whether state is a "significant-connection state" under OCGA § 29-11-10, "trial court must set out upon the record the essential reasoning that forms the basis for its exercise of discretion"); see also Wang v. Liu , 292 Ga. 568, 570-571 (1), 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013) (trial court considering motion to dismiss an action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not required to make specific findings on each of the seven enumerated statutory factors in every case, although that would be a better practice, but trial court must "set out upon the record the essential reasoning that forms the basis for its exercise of discretion"). Without such a statement of the essential reasoning of the trial court, we cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s decision was a reasoned and reasonable one in the light of the factors listed in OCGA § 29-11-15 (c).

“[W]hen an appeal properly is taken from the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the appellant is entitled to meaningful appellate review, even if that review is only for an abuse of discretion.” Wang v. Liu , 292 Ga. 568, 570, 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we will review this case for an abuse of discretion.

The trial court's application of the standard in OCGA § 9-10-31.1 (a) "to the peculiar circumstances of a particular case is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court," and our review is for an abuse of that discretion. Wang v. Liu , 292 Ga. 568, 569-570 (1), 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013). Kristine's argument that Jeffrey cannot move to dismiss for forum non conveniens because he chose to sell the marital property and move and because he admitted proper venue in his counterclaim fails.

La Fontaine , 342 Ga. App. at 458 (3), 803 S.E.2d 609. Overruled on other grounds by Wang v. Liu , 292 Ga. 568, 569 (1), 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013). Determining whether OCGA § 9-10-31.1 is applicable to this case is a matter of statutory construction which is a question of law subject to de novo review.

1 to dismiss the divorce portion of the case and we find nothing in the record showing that the trial court considered the factors enumerated in that statute. See Wang v. Liu, 292 Ga. 568(1), 740 S.E.2d 136 (2013) (to permit meaningful appellate review of grant or denial of motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, trial court must record the essential reasoning that forms the basis for its exercise of discretion). Because the trial court has not considered OCGA § 9–10–31.1 and wife has not argued its application in this appeal, we do not presently consider its application in this case.