Opinion
13259/2006.
Decided August 14, 2008.
For Plaintiff: Fumoso, Kelly, DeVerna, Snyder, Swart Farrell, LLP, 110 Marcus Boulevard, Hauppauge, NY 11788, 631-232-0200, Appearances of Counsel.
Howard S. Shafer, Esq., of Shafer, Glazer, LLP, 90 John Street, 6th Floor, New York, NY 10038, For Defendant Movant Spectaguard/ Allied.
Wade, Clark, Mulcahy, 111 Broadway, New York, NY 10006, For Defendant Mercy College.
Nature of this Action
This is an action to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained by Plaintiff, CHRISTOPHER WALTON, who was allegedly assaulted by two teenaged males in his MERCY COLLEGE dormitory room, on April 9, 2003. Plaintiff alleges causes of action sounding in negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring. Nowhere does Defendant, SPECTAGUARD ACQUISITION, LLC, s/h/a ALLIED SECURITY, LLC, (referred to herein as SPECTAGUARD/ALLIED) explain its alleged role or relationship to the other parties.
Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED does not submit any affidavit made by a person with knowledge of the relevant facts; and it did not present any testimony at the Venue Hearing. In its Answer, it denied the general boilerplate allegations in the Complaint pertaining to it. ( See Complaint and Answer, at Movant's Exhibit "B" and "C").
Procedural History
Prior to exchanging any discovery, Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED moved to change the venue of this action, from the Bronx to the Westchester County Supreme Court, pursuant to CPLR 510(3), which provides that: "the court, upon motion, may change the place of trial of an action where: the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change."
In a conclusory fashion, SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED alleges that four Dobbs Ferry Police Officers who "were involved in the investigation of this incident" would be inconvenienced if the action were tried here in the Bronx instead of in Westchester County.
( See Defendant's Counsel Shafer's moving Affirmation, dated Jan. 2, 2007, at ¶ 7).
After conferencing this case with both Counsel on June 21, 2007, this Court wrote an Order, scheduling a Venue Hearing so that this Court could hear testimony regarding the issues presented, and giving the parties the opportunity to make their evidentiary showing by the submission of supplemental sworn affidavits. ( See Order, dated June 21, 2007). Pursuant to said Order, Counsel were required, prior to the Venue Hearing, to exchange and submit a list of witnesses, as well as documentary evidence in support of their position that they would seek to introduce at the Venue Hearing.
With respect to the testimony that the Court expected to hear, the Court explicitly stated that the Venue Hearing would encompass how the proposed testimony of each police officer was relevant, and material, to Movant's defense of this matter.
Most importantly, Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ALLIED was given the opportunity to submit supplemental affidavits, made by the police officers who would allegedly be inconvenienced by having to appear for trial in the Bronx, wherein they could set forth the following information: "their home residence addresses; whether they have residences in Bronx County; and whether the distance from their homes to the Bronx County Supreme Court is farther than the distance from their homes to the Westchester County Supreme Court"; together with some documentary proof of their residence addresses." The Court gave Defendant permission to redact therefrom any privileged information, provide the redacted copy to Plaintiff's Counsel, and submit the original for the Court's in camera confidential review. ( See this Court's Order, dated June 21, 2007).
See Montero v. Elrac, 300 AD2d 9 (1st Dept. 2002); Costanza v. Cornell, 175 AD2d 696 (1st Dept. 1991).
See Morales v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 268 AD2d 257 (1st Dept. 2000).
The Venue Hearing was held on Monday, August 6, 2007, at which time Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED produced no witnesses not even its own officer or employee. In addition, Defendant did not provide the Court with any supplemental affidavits, and did not request an extension of time.
Plaintiff WALTON provided his Supplemental Affidavit, dated July 18, 2007, stating that he resided in the Bronx for the past several years, together with documentary proof including his driver's license and bank statements. In this regard, it is noted that Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff resided in the Bronx at all relevant times.
Legal Standard
It is well-established that the party moving for a change of venue under CPLR 510(3) has the burden of proof; and is required to submit sufficient evidentiary proof in admissible form regarding the following four elements:
First, the affidavit in support of a motion under this section must contain the names, addresses and occupations of the prospectivewitnesses . . .[citations omitted]
Second, a party seeking a change of venue for the convenience ofwitnesses is also required to disclose the facts to which the proposed witnesses will testify at the trial, so that the court may judge whether the proposed evidence of the witnesses is necessary and material . . . [citations omitted]
Third, the moving party must show that the witnesses for whose convenience a change of venue is sought are in fact willing to testify . . . [citations omitted]
Fourth, there must be a showing as to how the witnesses in question would in fact be inconvenienced in the event a change of venue were not granted . . . [citations omitted] [emphasis added] O'Brien v. Vassar Bros. Hosp., 207 AD2d 169, 173 (2d Dept. 1995).
Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED fails to meet its burden, and fails to make a sufficient evidentiary showing regarding each of these factors despite having been given the additional opportunity to present witnesses and evidence at the Venue Hearing.
(1)Witnesses' Residence Addresses Not Disclosed
In the affidavits in support of its motion, Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED failed to include the residence addresses of the subject police officers; and Defendant's Counsel admitted in open court that he made his motion without having first even ascertained whether the police officers resided in the Bronx. Further, although the Court explicitly allowed Defendant to submit the aforesaid supplemental affidavits for in camera review, asking that Defendant be forthcoming about whether the subject police officers reside in the Bronx, and whether the distance from their homes to the Bronx County Supreme Court is farther than the distance from their homes to the Courthouse in the adjoining County of Westchester, Defendant failed to provide such pertinent information. Since the officers could be traveling to, and from, their homes to the Courthouse, such information should be revealed, in the interests of justice, so that the Court is not forced to blindly make its determination.
( See this Court's Order, dated June 21, 2007).
( See this Court's Order, dated June 21, 2007).
In a recent case with similarities to the case at bar, where movant alleged that " several officers from the Orange County Police Department were expected to testify, as was the Orange County Coroner, [but] . . . the police witnesses' residences were not identified, except by reference to the police station ", the First Department clearly held that the: "failure to provide the complete addresses of the proposed witnesses . . . results in a failure to carry the movant's burden (Heinemann v Grunfeld, 224 AD2d 204, 637 NYS2d 141). . . .the facial deficiency of the motion papers requires that the motion be denied", and that venue be retained in the Bronx. [emphasis added] Montero v. Elrac, Inc., 300 AD2d 9, 10 (1st Dept. 2002).
Similarly, in a case where there were "apparently no eyewitnesses to the accident other than the parties, and" the residence of "investigating police officer who is expected to be called as a witness at trial . . .was not established ", the First Department held that there was an "inadequate showing by defendant" to support the transfer of venue based upon the "convenience of material witnesses". [emphasis added] Costanza v. Cornell, 175 AD2d 696, 698 (1st Dept. 1991).
Defendant's Counsel's own Supplemental Affirmation wherein he alleges that a police dispatcher orally told him that (based upon unknown sources) the subject officers do not reside in a County in the City of New York, is unavailing, since such is rank hearsay, not evidentiary proof in admissible form, and, nonetheless, does not answer the question of whether the officers live in the adjoining county and/or closer to the Bronx Courthouse than to the Westchester Courthouse. "A hearsay assertion regarding what [a] technician [or someone] told the lawyer . . . is insufficient." Pittman v. Maher, 202 AD2d 172, 176 (1st Dept. 1994). Moreover, the suggestion that a witness would be inconvenienced by travel to an adjoining county is found to be " ludicrous on its face". [emphasis added] Cardona v. Aggressive Heating, Inc., 180 AD2d 572, 573 (1st Dept. 1992).
( See Defendant's Counsel Shafer's Supplemental Affirmation, dated July 18, 2007).
Where, as here, it is undisputed that venue is properly laid in the Bronx based upon the residence of a party in the Bronx, the First Department held that even a "Queens County police officer who responded to the accident would not be so inconvenienced by having to go to the Bronx as to warrant a change of venue to that county (see, Pittman v Maher, 202 AD2d 172, 177; . . .). Nor is such a change warranted by the Queens County residence of most of the parties (see, Dashman v Really Useful Theatre Co., 167 AD2d 325)." Morales v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 268 AD2d 257, 258 (1st Dept. 2000).
(2) Testimony Not On Necessary And Material Facts
In support of its motion, Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED utterly failed to set forth the facts about which it would call the subject police officers to testify at trial, and how their testimony would be necessary and material to its defense; and this militates against a change of venue.
Moreover, nowhere does Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED even state its role, and its relationship to the College or its students. This Court cannot assume, or speculate, as to how the officers' testimony is necessary to SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED's defense, when nothing was provided to shed light on the liability issues pertaining to it.
Regarding the materiality of the purported testimony, Defendant's Counsel merely makes a general statement that: "Police Officer Sean Horsfield responded to [sic] reported incident and the remainder of the police personnel investigated the incident."
( See Defendant's Counsel Shafer's moving Affirmation, dated Jan. 2, 2007, at ¶ 8).
In his Affidavit, Officer Horsfield merely states that he: "responded to a report of a robbery involving Christopher Walton, [and] . . . prepared a report of the incident." Using nearly identical language, the other police officers, Guarnieri, Sullivan, and Bailey, merely state that they: "investigated a robbery involving Christopher Walton [and] . . . prepared reports of [their] investigation."
( See subject police officers' identical Affidavits, at Defendant's Exhibits "D", "E", "F", and "G").
Defendant does not refer to any specific part of the Dobbs Ferry Police Department's Records to support its position, but merely attaches the Records. ( See Exhibit "H" to Defendant's moving papers).
Said Police Records do not mention any entity that is identified as SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED. Furthermore although Defendant failed to identify any part of the Police Records that might be relevant the following information can be gleaned therefrom, none of which shows how any of the four police officers' testimony would be necessary and material to the defense of SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED:
The first page of the Police Records is an Incident Report which indicates that the only police activity which occurred on April 9, 2003, the date of the alleged incident, was the dispatch of one police officer to the College "to investigate a possible past robbery".
[emphasis added] ( See Police Records, p. 1-2, at Defendant's Exhibit "H").
The police officer was not dispatched to the College until the incident was reported at about 4:30 P.M., which was about three hours after it allegedly occurred at about 1:40 P.M. The unidentified police officer who prepared the Incident Report had interviewed the Plaintiff, who allegedly told him that two males had appeared in his dormitory room and took his earrings, phone, and ring. Thus, no police officer witnessed the alleged incident, or performed any duties while it was happening or immediately thereafter. It was in the days and weeks that followed, to accomplish their task of identifying and arresting the perpetrators, that Detective Bailey, Lt. Guarnieri, and other officers, conducted interviews; and developed information regarding jewelry pawned by suspect James. Detective Sullivan's role involved showing Plaintiff a photo array, from which Plaintiff identified suspect Bethune; and taking a statement from suspect James after giving him his Miranda warnings. As shown by the arrest reports prepared by Detective Sullivan, the alleged perpetrators, Abdullahi James (age 19), and Andrew Bethane (age 17), were arrested and charged with offenses of burglary and robbery.
Defendant presumes that the officer who prepared the Incident Report was Officer Horsfield although his signature is not clear and his name is not printed on the form.
( See Police Records, p. 1-2, at Defendant's Exhibit "H").
( See Supplemental Reports in Police Records, at Defendant's Exhibit "H"). It appears that the police's canvassing did not begin until the next day, on April 10, 2003.
( See Police Records, at Defendant's Exhibit "H").
In a case with similarities herein, a movant sought to transfer venue out of the Bronx to "where the accident occurred", for the convenience of the possible witness of the "Dutchess County Police Sergeant Corbett, who made out the accident report." The Court held that movant's showing:
does not withstand close scrutiny" (Wecht v Glen Distribs. Co., 112 AD2d 891, 892 [1st Dept 1985]), since our review of the record indicates that the defendant has not convincingly set forth "[the] materiality of [these] witnesses' testimony" (Farra v Hesseltine, 134 AD2d 788, 789 [1987]). . . . We further note that defendant fails to set forth any of the testimony of his witnesses, as required (Stavredes v United States, 87 AD2d 502 [1st Dept 1982]). Schneeweiss v. Pelkey, 138 AD2d 271, 272-273 (1st Dep't. 1988).
. . .
Movants further fail to provide any information concerning the nature of the anticipated testimony that will be provided by the non-party witnesses and how this testimony would be material to the issues raised before the Court. An affidavit in support of a motion for change of venue based on the convenience of non-party witnesses must provide some sort of detail of their testimony so that the court can discern whether or not the witness and their testimony is material to the movant's case. Francis v. Jenks, 28 AD2d 1007, 1007, 283 NYS2d 955 (2d Dept 1967); Thorner-Sidney Press, Inc. v. Merling Marx Seidman, Inc., 115 AD2d 328, 328-329, 495 NYS2d 868 (4th Dept 1985). The submitted affidavit merely states that the drivers and police trooper will testify as to the issues of liability while the physicians will testify as to damages. This is insufficient to determine materiality of the witnesses and their testimony. As such, movants fail to set forth sufficient evidence. [emphasis added]
Roopnarine v. Zelena , 4 Misc 3d 1006 A (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2004).
The mere allegation that the police who responded to the scene was a member of the Nassau County Police was "facially insufficient", and not grounds for the transfer of venue based upon the officer's convenience, where movant did not "indicate the nature of [the officer's] proposed testimony." Iassinski v. Vassiliev, 220 AD2d 372, 373 (1st Dept. 1995).
In a case where it was alleged that the: " "[police] officers witnessed the condition of the roadway where the accident occurred, the condition of the plaintiff and the vehicle involved in the accident"", but Defendants had "neither elaborate[d] as to what the conditions alluded to were, nor otherwise indicate[d] how they may be material or relevant to the lawsuit", such "unspecified testimony" did not "provide a ground for this relief." Moghazeh v. Valdes-Rodriguez, 151 AD2d 428, 429 (1st Dept. 1989).
A change of venue was properly denied by the motion court "as unwarranted by [mere] virtue of the fact that the individuals for whose convenience [movant Defendant ] Ford expresses concern, mainly public servants, had an opportunity to observe the condition of the vehicle and passengers after the accident", since "none of the witnesses could provide competent and material testimony on whether the van was defective, the only liability issue confronting Ford (cf., Moghazeh v Valdes-Rodriguez, 151 AD2d 428; Wecht v Glen Distribs. Co., 112 AD2d 891, 893), and much of their testimony would be cumulative (see, Johnson v Cherry Grove Is. Mgt., 190 AD2d 598)." Velasquez v. C.F.T., Inc., 240 AD2d 178, 178-179 (1st Dep't 1997).
Likewise, in the case at bar, Movant presented no Affidavit, or testimony, identifying the liability issue confronting SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED; and this Court should not be left to speculate about how each of the subject police officers could provide competent, material, and non-cumulative testimony. Moreover, there is no allegation that any of the parties, or the witnesses who actually had first-hand knowledge of any relevant facts, would not be available or willing to testify.
Even the whereabouts of the perpetrators, who confessed to their crime, are known, since there are incarcerated. ( See Transcripts of criminal proceedings, at Defendant's Exhibits "J" and "K". See Aff of Plaintiff's Counsel, Christesen, dated Jan. 26, 2007, at ¶ 26).
In this respect, this case is distinguishable from Kennedy v. C.F. Galleria at White Plains v. City of White Plains and the City of White Plains Parking Authority , 2 AD3d 222 (1st Dept. 2003), invoked by Defendant. In Kennedy, "the police reports show that the testimony of [the] officers would be material, since they were among the first officers to respond, secure the scene, and interview witnesses. Their testimony presumably would also be highly relevant to the allegation . . . that third-party defendants did not properly secure the vestibule area, in accordance with the agreement between the third-party litigants." [emphasis added] Kennedy v. C.F. Galleria at White Plains, L.P., 2 AD3d 222, 223 (1st Dept. 2003). In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no evidence that the subject police officers secured the scene in any manner; or that they even came to WALTON's dormitory room on the date of the incident. By the time the police (presumably only Officer Horsfield) arrived at a College office in the late afternoon of April 9, 2003, the perpetrators had been long gone because Plaintiff WALTON had not reported the incident until about three hours after it happened, (which was subsequent to his return to the College after he had gone home to tell his father about what had happened). Moreover, no evidence was presented that the liability issue pertaining to Defendant concerns any security agreement, or anything about which any of the subject police officers would have first-hand knowledge that was favorable to the Defendant's position.
In the Incident Report, the reporting officer states that he arrived at the College's Security Office, not at the dormitory room. ( See Police Records, p. 1-2, at Defendant's Exhibit "H").
( See WALTON's statement, printed on 4/12/03, in Police Records, at Defendant's moving papers, Exhibit "H").
Furthermore, it is noted that, in the case at bar, this decision is being made after a Venue Hearing, when Movant failed to present any testimony, despite the direction it was given by this Court's June 21, 2007 Order; whereas, in Kennedy, there was no Venue Hearing.
Even more distinguishable is the case of Hoogland v. Transport Expressway, Inc ., 24 AD3d 191 (1st Dept. 2005), cited by Defendant. In Hoogland, an Orange County State Trooper, Fire Chief, and two paramedics, had responded to the scene of a multi-car accident, and performed "actions at the scene"; and their testimony on their own actions and observations would bear on liability and damages. In addition, "they would be inconvenienced by having to take a day off from their public service jobs to travel [ from Orange County] to New York County to testify"; and so it was proper for the court to consider their convenience. Hoogland, supra .
See detailed Affidavits made in the Hoogland case, annexed to Defendant's Reply, at Exhibit "M".
In contrast, in the case at bar, no special "actions" or observations are identified as having been performed by the subject officers, or by the one police officer who was dispatched several hours after the incident was all over. Moreover, there is no basis for the conclusory allegation herein that the police officers would have to take a day off work to testify in the Bronx. Rather, as discussed infra, the commute to the Bronx Supreme Court would only be seven (7) minutes longer than the commute to the Westchester Supreme Court, even if they were departing from the Dobbs Ferry Police Department.
In a recent case where affiants, as they did herein, used general " identical language " that they "had "personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances" concerning the motor vehicle accident," but "failed to disclose the nature of their anticipated testimony. In other words, the affidavits did not contain the basic detail necessary to ascertain whether the affiants would be material witnesses", the defendants' motion papers were deemed "not sufficient to justify a discretionary change in venue. . . . The defendants . . . must establish . . . the nature of their anticipated testimony." [emphasis added] Walsh v. Mystic Tank Lines Corp. , 51 AD3d 908 (2d Dept. 2008).
Even though a moving defendant had "identified as potential witnesses the officer of the New Castle police department who investigated the scene after the accident", defendant had not met his burden, having failed to state "what the substance and materiality" of the officer's testimony might be. Culhane v. Jensen, 179 AD2d 582 (1st Dept. 1992).
Likewise, Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED failed to meet its burden to show how the subject officers' testimony was relevant and material to their defense. Although the Court issued a detailed Order scheduling a Venue Hearing, and advising that Movant should be prepared to make a showing regarding the relevancy of the proposed testimony, and so gave Defendant every opportunity to meet its burden, Defendant felt no need to call any witnesses for the hearing; and did not even present the testimony of its own employee having knowledge of the material facts.
(3) Are Four Police Actually Testifying For Movant?
A close scrutiny of the subject officers' identical Affidavits show that none of them actually state that they would be "available and willing to testify". Roopnarine v. Zelena , 4 Misc 3d 1006 A (App. Term, 1st Dept. 2004). The officers do not mention Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED, or that they were contacted by its Counsel or anyone else on its behalf, or acknowledge that they could testify about any facts that would be helpful to its defense. See Carrozza v. Galleria Mall at White Plains, 292 AD2d 279 (1st Dept. 2002).
A movant failed to meet its burden where Counsel failed to establish that he had made the requisite personal contact with the witnesses prior to the making of his motion. Montero v. Elrac, supra, 300 AD2d 9 (1st Dept. 2002).
Given that Defendant could not meet its burden to show how the subject police officers' testimony could possibly be relevant to its defense, it is not surprising that Defendant's Counsel, also, is unable to even assert that he would be calling all four officers to testify at trial, or that he would even be seeking their depositions.
In his Supplemental Affirmation, Defendant's Counsel readily admits: "certainly it could not be stated that all of the [police] witnesses would be called at this juncture, however, it is anticipated that a number of witnesses would be called at trial. No decision has yet been made with regard to [taking] depositions." ( See Defendant's Counsel Shafer's Supp Affirmation, dated July 18, 2007, at ¶ 4). It is also noted that the Police Records show that, aside from the parties, there were student witnesses who had first-hand knowledge about the facts that the police marshaled for the purpose of apprehending the perpetrators, and that the police had no first-hand knowledge.
Nonetheless, Counsel presented no reason why all four police officers would be needed to testify at trial, as such would be cumulative. In a case where a movant "identified only one witness — the Westchester police officer responding to the accident at the commercial premises — who might be inconvenienced by having to travel to a neighboring county for trial," the motion to transfer venue from the Bronx to Westchester was properly denied. Rosenthal v. Bologna, 211 AD2d 436, 437-438 (1st Dept. 1995).
(4) Not Inconvenienced
Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED also fails to meet its burden to show how the subject police officers would, in fact, be inconvenienced. In a conclusory fashion, the officers all sign identical statements mimicking each other by vaguely alleging that they would be inconvenienced, and alleging that the Westchester Courthouse is "a short distance from the Dobbs Ferry Police Department Headquarters".
However, they fail to express any awareness regarding the actual distances or addresses involved. As Plaintiff points out, the estimated travel distance from the Dobbs Ferry Police Department to the Westchester Supreme Court is 9.54 miles, and the estimated travel time is 17 minutes; whereas the estimated distance from the Dobbs Ferry Police Department to the Bronx Supreme Court is 16.54 miles, (a difference of 7 miles) and the estimated travel time is 24 minutes (a difference of merely seven (7) minutes ). Under the circumstances, this situation is distinguishable from the matter of Kennedy, supra, relied upon by Defendant, where one of the factors that the Court considered in transferring venue from the Bronx to Westchester was that the White Plains Police Headquarters was within walking distance only 300 feet from the Westchester Supreme Court. A short walk is a much easier and different type of commute than any drive. ( See Affidavit of Police Officer Lawlor, in the Kennedy case, in Defendant Counsel's Supp Affirmation, at Exhibit "L").
(See Mapquest printout, at Plaintiff's Exhibit "4").
The Kennedy case, supra, is also distinguishable from the case at bar, because it involved a City, and public authority in Westchester County, as third-party defendants. See CPLR 504, 505.
In a very recent case where the "Yonkers Police Department investigated the incident and the Westchester County Medical Examiner's Office conducted the autopsy," the First Department reiterated what it has repeatedly held: "mere general statements as to witness inconvenience are not enough (Hartigan v Kurian, 224 AD2d 299, 638 NYS2d 33). We have rejected a change of venue in similar cases where witnesses predominantly resided or maintained offices in Yonkers and failed to explain how they would be inconvenienced by a trial in the Bronx as opposed to Westchester, particularly given that the distance from Yonkers to the courts in the two counties is roughly the same." [emphasis added] Timan v. Sayegh , 49 AD3d 274 (1st Dept. 2008).
In Timan, "venue was properly laid in the Bronx on the basis of a [party's] residence there (CPLR 503[a])," and the Court denied the motion to "change venue to Westchester for the convenience of material witnesses (CPLR 510), [since] defendants failed to meet their burden of showing, inter alia, . . . how [such witnesses] would [be] inconvenienced by having to attend a trial in the Bronx (see Heinemann v Grunfeld, 224 AD2d 204, 637 NYS2d 141)." Timan v. Sayegh , 49 AD3d 274 (1st Dept. 2008).
" In light of the short distance involved, it cannot be presumed that the witnesses would be subjected to great inconvenience or hardship." Heinemann v. Grunfeld, 224 AD2d 204 (1st Dept. 1996).
"Even where the application concerns the convenience of public officers, which is a consideration entitled to great weight, the courts have declined to find that any particular inconvenience will result from conducting trial in an adjacent county (Losicco v Gardner's Village, 97 AD2d 535, 468 NYS2d 40)." Pittman v. Maher, 202 AD2d 172, 177 (1st Dept. 1994). The Pittman Court further held that: "a presumption that a witness will be inconvenienced merely because the courthouse is located in a different county is unwarranted (see, Kurnitz v New Rochelle Hosp. Medical Center, 166 AD2d 390, 561 NYS2d 193; Scott v Ecker Mfg. Corp., 161 AD2d 347, 554 NYS2d 922)." Pittman, supra .
"While the convenience of public officers is entitled to great weight in ascertaining whether a change of venue is warranted (see Powers v East Hudson Parkway Auth., 75 AD2d 776), we cannot say that Nassau County or its officers will be so prejudiced by having to go to trial in adjacent Queens County that we should interfere with Special Term's exercise of discretion." Losicco v. Gardner's Village, Inc., 97 AD2d 535 (2d Dept. 1983).
"Under these circumstances, to grant a venue change from the Bronx to [an adjoining county would] . . . constitute an improvident exercise of discretion. Viewed realistically, this motion is nothing more than 'forum shopping.' " Geraldino v. Coca-Cola Bottling of NY, Inc., 300 AD2d 56 (1st Dept. 2002). There is no doubt that Defendant engaged in this motion practice to obtain a favorable venue, which many litigants desperately seek in the Bronx, without regard to judicial resources wasted on this type of unsubstantiated motion practice.
"The paramount concern of this Court is the preservation of the integrity of the judicial process. It does not advance that end to permit a party to obtain . . . an advantageous forum" where, as here, it is unwarranted under these circumstances. Koschak v. Gates Constr. Corp., 225 AD2d 315, 316 (1st Dept. 1996).
Accordingly, Defendant SPECTAGUARD/ ALLIED's Motion is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of this Court.