Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A.

24 Citing cases

  1. Struss v. Renault U.S.A., Inc.

    108 F.R.D. 691 (W.D. Pa. 1985)   Cited 4 times
    Interpreting Pennsylvania law

    (Complaint, Paragraphs 2, 7). " Rule 14 is predicated on the notion that there is joint liability between the original defendant and the third-party." Frazier v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 293, 295 (W.D.Pa. 1985), See alsoRobbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 98 F.R.D. 36, 37 (M.D.Pa.1983) ( " Yamaha may implead Galko only if the two are joint and several tortfeasors or if Yamaha has a right to indemnity or contribution from Galko if it is held liable." ).

  2. Pitcavage v. Mastercraft Boat Co.

    632 F. Supp. 842 (M.D. Pa. 1985)   Cited 31 times
    Striking “crossclaim” filed by third-party defendant against the original plaintiffs because plaintiffs were not “coparties” with the third-party defendant under Rule 13, and holding that third-party defendant's claims against plaintiff were more properly asserted as affirmative defenses

    In order to utilize the procedure of Rule 14, a third-party plaintiff must demonstrate some substantive basis for its claim. Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 98 F.R.D. 36 (M.D.Pa. 1983). Rule 14(a) is procedural and does not create any right to seek indemnification or contribution.

  3. Harries v. General Motors Corp.

    786 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Pa. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    After grappling with this issue for some time, research has revealed other decisions which concur with Judge Caldwell's view. See Struss by Struss v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 108 F.R.D. 691 (W.D.Pa. 1985); Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 98 F.R.D. 36 (M.D.Pa. 1983). In addition to Judge Caldwell's opinions, this court is particularly persuaded by the Honorable William J. Nealon's decision in Robbins, holding that the manufacturer of a motorcycle and the driver of an automobile were not joint tortfeasors in a crashworthiness case.

  4. Kutzler v. AMF Harley-Davidson

    194 Ill. App. 3d 273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 8 times

    Under the "crashworthy doctrine," which has been adopted in various contexts by most jurisdictions, the manufacturer's products liability may extend in motor vehicle cases to situations in which the defect did not cause the accident or initial impact, but rather increased the severity of the injury over that which would have occurred absent the defective design. ( E.g., Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck Co. (10th Cir. 1989), 884 F.2d 1330; Jackson, No. 84-857-Civ-5; Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp. (1983), 98 F.R.D. 36; Buehler v. Whalen (1977), 70 Ill.2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460; Larsen v. General Motors Corp. (8th Cir. 1968), 391 F.2d 495.) The doctrine recognizes that the foreseeable and intended use of a motor vehicle encompasses the inevitability of collisions and requires the manufacturer to design a vehicle reasonably safe for those foreseeable risks.

  5. Quirke v. JLG Indus.

    Civil No. 1:19-CV-01242 (M.D. Pa. May. 17, 2021)

    In a diversity action, the court applies state law to determine whether the third-party plaintiff has raised a proper substantive basis for its claim. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Transportation Coverage Specialists, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-705, 2012 WL 13008805, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2012) (citing Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 98 F.R.D. 36, 38 (M.D. Pa. 1983). The defendant must obtain the court's leave to file a third-party complaint more than 14 days after serving its original answer.

  6. A.B. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-5770 (E.D. Pa. Jul. 6, 2020)   Cited 7 times

    Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 98 F.R.D. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Unlike Robbins, Marriott seeks indemnity or contribution from the sex traffickers for liability premised on the same federal statute.

  7. Battle v. Wal-Mart Stores

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-cv-945 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    In a diversity action, the court must apply state law to determine if a third-party plaintiff has raised a proper substantive basis for its claim. Bernard, 2019 WL 144852, *2; see also Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 98 F.R.D. 36, 38 (M.D. Pa. 1983). If there is a proper substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint, the court must determine if it should permit the filing of third-party complaint.

  8. Bernard v. Air Vent, Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-2361 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Determining first whether the third-party complaint sufficiently pleaded a claim alleging that the third-party defendant was liable in tort

    Furthermore, in a diversity action, the court must apply state law to determine if a third-party plaintiff has raised a proper substantive basis for its claim. SeeRobbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 98 F.R.D. 36, 38 (M.D.Pa. 1983) (citing Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938))

  9. Gordet v. Chrysler Grp., LLC

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2070 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 28, 2018)

    Furthermore, in a diversity action, the court must apply state law in order to determine if a third-party plaintiff has raised a proper substantive basis for its claim. SeeRobbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 98 F.R.D. 36, 38 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (citing Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). If there is a proper substantive basis for the filing of a third-party complaint, the court must determine if it should permit the filing of the third-party complaint.

  10. Smerdon v. Geico Cas. Co.

    No. 4:16-CV-02122 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 9, 2017)   Cited 3 times

    "Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 98 F.R.D. 36, 37 (M.D. Pa. 1983). Pitcavage v. Mastercraft Boat Co., 632 F. Supp. 842, 845 (M.D. Pa. 1985).