Opinion
12-23-00294-CV
12-20-2024
WALMART STORES TEXAS, LLC, APPELLANT v. SCOTT A. LACY, APPELLEE
Appeal from the 114th District Court of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 21-2858-B)
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
James T. Worthen Chief Justice
Walmart Stores Texas, LLC (Walmart) appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Appellee, Scott A. Lacy, following a jury trial. In five issues, Walmart argues that (1) it had no duty to protect Lacy from a non-employee who criminally assaulted him, (2) no evidence supports the jury's finding that acts or omissions by Walmart proximately caused Lacy's injuries, (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding new and independent cause, (4) the evidence was insufficient to support the assessment of proportionate responsibility, and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support the damages awarded for lost earning capacity. We reverse and render a take-nothing judgment.
Background
On July 8, 2020, Lacy worked as a contractor for Dun Assembly. Lacy and Jessica Cogburn, another employee of Dun Assembly, were assembling patio equipment in the garden center of Walmart store number 1022 in Tyler, Texas. Walmart employee Loretta Brown began to chase a suspected shoplifter, Herbert Vanderkinter, who was running while pushing a shopping cart filled with merchandise. Lacy turned around and observed Brown running out of the store toward the exit gate of the lawn and garden center. While Brown chased Vanderkinter, she and another Walmart employee told Billy Wheat, a Walmart employee posted at the gate, to close the gate, but Wheat was unable to do so. Vanderkinter ran past Wheat and into the parking lot. Lacy saw Wheat at the exit gate "either jumping out of the way or g[etting] knocked out of the way[]" as Vanderkinter ran through the gate. Lacy testified that after hearing Brown yell, "Help. Stop him. He's stealing stuff. Somebody stop him[,]" he ran to assist her.
Brown testified that she was "trying to tell [Wheat] to close the gate[,]" and she explained that she "didn't tell [Lacy] to go out there."
Lacy exited the gate and chased Vanderkinter into the parking lot. Vanderkinter released the shopping cart. Lacy stopped Vanderkinter between two cars and knocked him to the ground. According to Cogburn, Lacy restrained Vanderkinter until a Walmart employee told Lacy to release him. Lacy was not injured during this altercation with Vanderkinter. According to Cogburn, Vanderkinter told Lacy, "You're a dead man[,]" got into his truck, and began to drive. Cogburn agreed that the altercation between Lacy and Vanderkinter had ended when Vanderkinter entered his truck. Lacy explained that after he released Vanderkinter, he believed that his involvement in the incident was over, and he began carrying merchandise toward the lawn and garden center. As Lacy was walking, he heard screams, which caused him to turn around. Cogburn heard tires squealing. Moments later, Vanderkinter's truck swerved in front of the gate at the lawn and garden center, aimed toward Lacy, and struck Lacy. The impact with Vanderkinter's truck caused Lacy to strike his head on a metal cone. Cogburn estimated that the truck was traveling approximately ten to fifteen miles per hour when it struck Lacy, and she testified that Vanderkinter "[a]bsolutely" attempted to kill Lacy by running over him. Lacy also agreed that Vanderkinter attempted to kill him by striking him with his truck. As a result of the collision, Lacy sustained significant injuries, including a severely fractured ankle which required surgery, fractured ribs, and injuries to his head, neck, and back.
As a result of the incident, Vanderkinter was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He pleaded "guilty" and was sentenced to forty years of imprisonment.
At the time of the incident, Walmart had adopted an internal policy pertaining to the investigation and detention of shoplifters that applies to all associates who work for Walmart or one of its subsidiaries. Said policy instructs employees to never pursue or restrain a fleeing suspect. Further, in several places, the policy prohibits employees from going beyond the facility's sidewalk to approach a suspect or to obtain additional information regarding a suspect (such as license plate number or direction of travel), even if law enforcement directs them to do so. The policy also states: "A suspect's vehicle may contain a weapon, may be a friend of the suspect, or it may begin moving." The policy reiterates, "DO NOT follow a suspect in the parking lot, even if directed by law enforcement[]" and "DO NOT leave Walmart property to collect merchandise a suspect may have dropped or abandoned."
Tina Hutto, the manager of the Walmart store where the incident occurred, agreed that shoplifting probably occurs daily. She responded affirmatively when Lacy's counsel asked her whether, in enacting its internal policies and procedures, Walmart "foresaw the exact situation we had here with Mr. Lacy, where a suspect got into his car and that car ended up being a danger to other people at the store[.]" Hutto explained, "as a company . . ., we try to prevent those. But that criminal at that time made that his choice to do what he did." In addition, Hutto testified that, in her thirty-three years of employment with Walmart, she never saw or experienced anything like the incident that occurred in the instant case. Likewise, Wheat testified that he never saw an incident like the one involving Lacy in nineteen years of employment with Walmart, and Brown testified that in twenty-two years of employment with Walmart, she never saw such an incident until the occurrence involving Lacy.
Lacy filed a lawsuit against Walmart, in which he asserted claims for negligence; negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention; and premises liability. Lacy pleaded that Walmart owed him a duty of care to "provide a safe working environment; follow industry accepted policies and procedures for interacting with shoplifters; not [to] engage in activities that placed [him] in danger; and not place [him] in harm's way of foreseeable criminal conduct." Lacy asserted that his injuries directly and proximately resulted from Walmart's negligence and breach of its duty of care, and he sought damages for past and future medical expenses, past and future loss of earning capacity, lost wages, past and future physical pain and mental anguish, and loss of household services. In its answer, Walmart contended, among other things, that it had no legal duty to protect Lacy from Vanderkinter's criminal act because Vanderkinter's crime was so "random" and "extraordinary" that Walmart "should not be reasonably expected to have foreseen or prevented" it. Vanderkinter was not a party to Lacy's lawsuit, but the trial court granted Walmart's motion to designate Vanderkinter as a responsible third party whose percentage of responsibility, if any, would be determined by the jury.
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found in favor of Lacy under theories of both negligence/negligent activity and premises liability. Specifically, in response to question one, the jury found that Walmart's negligence proximately caused the occurrence, and in response to question two, the jury found that, with respect to a condition of its premises, Walmart was negligent because (1) the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, (2) Walmart knew or reasonably should have known of the danger, and (3) Walmart failed to exercise ordinary care to protect Lacy by both failing to warn him of the condition and failing to make the condition reasonably safe. After the jury assessed 80% responsibility to Walmart, 17% to Vanderkinter, and 3% to Lacy, the jury awarded Lacy compensatory damages totaling $4,233,532.02. The trial court signed a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict, in which it concluded that "Lacy is entitled to recover under his premises liability theory, and in [the] alternative under his negligent activity theory." Additionally, the trial court ordered that if Lacy's premises liability claim were "reversed, reformed, or overturned on appeal," the trial court "enters an alternate award" for Lacy against Walmart under Lacy's "remaining negligence theory as found by the jury." Walmart filed a motion for new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
Walmart also moved for a directed verdict after both sides rested, and the trial court denied the motion.
Legal Duty
In issue one, Walmart argues that it had no duty to protect Lacy from a criminal assault by a non-employee, and Lacy therefore cannot recover on his causes of action for premises liability and general negligence.
Applicable Law
The question of whether a legal duty exists is a threshold inquiry because a party who has no legal duty cannot be held liable for negligence. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006); Hyde v. Hoerauf, 337 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, no pet.). When the material facts are undisputed, the issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. 2017); QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin, 449 S.W.3d 665, 670 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2014, pet. denied). A plaintiff who was injured on another's property may have either a negligence claim or a premises claim against the property's owner. United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 537 S.W.3d 463, 471 (Tex. 2017); see Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. 1992). "Although premises liability is itself a branch of negligence law, it is a 'special form' with different elements that define a property owner or occupant's duty with respect to those who enter the property." Reyes v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 578 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2019, no pet.) (quoting W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005)). Negligence and premises liability claims require plaintiffs to prove different, but similar, elements to prevail. United Scaffolding, 537 S.W.3d 471. Likewise, negligence claims and premises liability claims "'involve closely related but distinct duty analyses.'" Id. (quoting Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550). Whereas a claim sounds in negligence if the injury resulted from a contemporaneous, negligent activity on the property, a claim sounds in premises liability if the injury resulted from the property's condition rather than an activity. Id.; Morrison v. Quarrington, No. 12-22-00302-CV, 2024 WL 2858838, at *10 (Tex. App.- Tyler May 15, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op. on reh'g).
To recover under a general common law negligence theory, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that the defendant owed him a legal duty. Elephant Ins. Co. v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. 2022); Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550; Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex. 1990). Claims of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention all constitute general common law negligence causes of action. Douglas v. Hardy, 600 S.W.3d 358, 366 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2019, no pet.) (citing Dangerfield v. Ormsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 912 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.)). A person generally has no legal duty to control another person's conduct or to prevent harm to others. Pagayon, 536 S.W.3d at 504; Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 837 (Tex. 2000); Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 756 (Tex. 1998); Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996); Douglas, 600 S.W.3d at 367. Exceptions to this general no-duty rule in common law negligence cases include, among other things, certain special relationships between the parties, such as parentchild and employer-employee. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525.
In a premises liability case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the premises owner failed to remedy an unreasonable risk of harm due to a condition of its premises about which it knew or should have known. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753; see United Scaffolding, 537 S.W.3d at 472; M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. 2004). A premises owner is not an insurer of visitors' safety. Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 769 (Tex. 2010). A premises owner's duty to the plaintiff depends upon the plaintiff's status when the incident occurred, i.e., whether the plaintiff was an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550; Dukes v. Philip Johnson/Alan Ritchie Architects, P.C., 252 S.W.3d 586, 592 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied). While premises liability claims involve nonfeasance "based on the owner's failure to take measures to make the property safe[,]" negligence claims involve malfeasance. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 776. A complaint that a landowner failed to protect the plaintiff from a third person's criminal conduct ordinarily sounds as a premises liability claim. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753.
Although a person has no legal duty to protect another from a third person's criminal acts, a premises owner has a duty to use ordinary care to protect an invitee from criminal acts of third parties if the owner knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee. Id. at 756; see Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 12 (Tex. 2008). In other words, "[a] duty exists only when the risk of criminal conduct is so great that it is both unreasonable and foreseeable." Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756. The foreseeability requirement protects premises owners "'from liability for crimes that are so random, extraordinary, or otherwise disconnected from them that they could not reasonably be expected to foresee or prevent the crimes.'" QuikTrip Corp., 449 S.W.3d at 671 (quoting Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d at 17).
An invitee is a person who enters another's property with the owner's knowledge and for the parties' mutual benefit. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 202 (Tex. 2015).
In premises liability cases, foreseeability is the beginning, not the end, of the analysis in determining the extent of the landowner's duty to protect against criminal acts of third parties. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756. "'Foreseeability requires only that the general danger, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable.'" Id. (quoting Walker, 924 S.W.2d at 377). "When the 'general danger' is the risk of injury from criminal activity, the evidence must reveal 'specific previous crimes on or near the premises' . . . to establish foreseeability." Id. (quoting Walker, 924 S.W.2d at 377). Courts must determine whether the risk of criminal conduct was foreseeable not in hindsight, but "in light of what the premises owner knew or should have known before the criminal act occurred." Id. at 757.
When analyzing foreseeability, "courts should consider whether any criminal conduct previously occurred on or near the property, how recently it occurred, how often it occurred, how similar the conduct was to the conduct on the property, and what publicity was given the occurrences to indicate that the landowner knew or should have known about them." Id. (footnote omitted). The Texas Supreme Court succinctly describes the five Timberwalk factors as proximity, recency, frequency, similarity, and publicity. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d at 15; Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 759. In explaining each of the Timberwalk factors, the Court "focused doggedly on foreseeability." UDR Tex. Props., L.P. v. Petrie, 517 S.W.3d 98, 101 (Tex. 2017). The requirement that a risk be both unforeseeable and unreasonable "is not peculiar to premisesliability cases; [rather,] it is essential to the determination of duty in all of tort law." Id. (citing Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525) (identifying foreseeability as factor to consider in determining whether duty exists in common law negligence cases).
Analysis
It is undisputed that Lacy was an invitee on Walmart's premises. To recover on his premises liability and negligence claims, Lacy bore the burden of proving that Walmart had a duty to protect him from Vanderkinter's criminal conduct. See Kenyon, 664 S.W.3d at 144; Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550; Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756; Douglas, 600 S.W.3d at 366-67. In his pleadings and at trial, Lacy's counsel emphasized Walmart's employees' violations of Walmart's internal policy by approaching Vanderkinter, pursuing him, and following him into the parking lot.
Lacy pleaded theories of both general negligence and premises liability, and the trial court's judgment found in his favor as to his premises liability claim. In premises liability cases, foreseeability is established through evidence of specific previous crimes on or near the premises. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d at 12; Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756-57. Specifically, in determining whether the risk of criminal conduct is foreseeable, we must weigh any evidence of prior crimes using the Timberwalk factors of proximity, recency, frequency, similarity, and publicity. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756-57. As Lacy correctly notes, only the general danger must be foreseeable, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm. Id. at 756. When, as here, the general danger is the risk of injury resulting from the criminal activity of third parties, the evidence must show that specific previous crimes occurred on or near the premises to establish foreseeability. Id.
As previously mentioned, the trial court found in favor of Lacy under his premises liability theory, but also ordered that if said claim were reversed on appeal, it entered "an alternate award" in favor of Lacy under his general negligence/negligent activity theory.
In his briefing to this Court and during oral argument, Lacy's counsel conceded that the evidence does not satisfy the Timberwalk factors. The only evidence adduced at trial regarding past criminal conduct on or near the premises was Hutto's testimony that shoplifting probably occurs daily at Walmart store number 1022. There was no testimony that shoplifting led to violent crimes at or near the Walmart where the incident at issue occurred or any other Walmart store. See id. at 757, 759. It is undisputed that Vanderkinter struck Lacy with his truck after he relinquished the shopping cart and Lacy released him; that is, the property crime of shoplifting did not injure Lacy, and Lacy was not injured when he chased and tackled Vanderkinter in the parking lot. Rather, Vanderkinter's violent crime after a thwarted attempt to shoplift, namely aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, injured Lacy.
Additionally, it is undisputed that Walmart's employees violated Walmart's internal policy regarding pursuing and detaining shoplifters; however, a company's internal policies or procedures do not create a common law duty where such a duty does not otherwise exist. Macon v. Braum's, Inc., No. 12-23-00083-CV, 2023 WL 8659244, at *8 (Tex. App.-Tyler Dec. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.); Quiktrip Corp., 449 S.W.3d at 676; Mata v. Argos USA LLC, No. 06-21-00089-CV, 2022 WL 1193671, at *8 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Apr. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Cleveland Reg'l Med. Ctr., L.P. v. Celtic Props., L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322, 351-52 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2010, pet. denied). "'The mere act of taking preventative measures . . . is not the same as foreseeing . . . criminal activity....To hold otherwise would virtually eliminate the foreseeability requirement for a negligence claim against a person who installs a security system or takes other preventative measures to guard against crime.'" Quiktrip Corp., 449 S.W.3d at 677 (quoting Allen v. Connolly, 158 S.W.3d 61, 67 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)).
As mentioned above, only the general danger must be foreseeable, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756. Walmart certainly was aware that confronting and detaining shoplifters posed some risk to the safety of its employees, customers, and others on its premises. However, we conclude that, as a matter of law, Vanderkinter's violent crime against Lacy, which occurred after Vanderkinter was confronted, detained, and released, was not foreseeable to Walmart. See id. at 757, 759 (concluding that sexual assault of tenant at apartment complex was not foreseeable); see also Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d at 13 (noting that although repeated occurrences of theft, vandalism, and simple assaults signal that future property crimes are possible, "they do not suggest the likelihood of murder."); Allen, 158 S.W.3d at 66-67 (noting that evidence of shoplifting at gas station located on same block as insurance agency where plaintiff was robbed and sexually assaulted did not establish foreseeability). Specifically, we conclude that Vanderkinter's crime against Lacy was so random, extraordinary, or otherwise disconnected from Walmart that Walmart could not reasonably be expected to foresee or to prevent it. See QuikTrip Corp., 449 S.W.3d at 671. Accordingly, because Vanderkinter's crime against Lacy was unforeseeable, Lacy failed to establish that Walmart had a legal duty. Accordingly, Lacy cannot recover against Walmart under a premises liability theory. See Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d at 144; Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550; Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756.
Presumably due to the dearth of Timberwalk evidence, Lacy argues on appeal that his claim is a general negligence claim rather than a premises liability claim. A complaint that a landowner failed to protect the plaintiff from a third person's criminal conduct ordinarily sounds as a premises liability claim. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753. But we need not determine the appropriate characterization of Lacy's claim because regardless of whether his claim sounds as a premises liability claim or a negligence claim, he bore the burden of demonstrating that Walmart had a duty to protect him from Vanderkinter's criminal conduct. See Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d at 144; Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 550; Douglas, 600 S.W.3d at 366 (concluding that claims of negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention are general common law negligence causes of action). The requirement that a risk be both unforeseeable and unreasonable "is essential to the determination of duty in all of tort law." UDR Tex. Props., 517 S.W.3d at 101; see Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525. As explained above, Vanderkinter's aggravated assault of Lacy with a deadly weapon after the thwarted shoplifting attempt was unforeseeable. Because said risk was unforeseeable to Walmart, Lacy failed to establish that Walmart owed a duty to protect him from it. See UDR Tex. Props., 517 S.W.3d at 101. Moreover, Lacy failed to establish an applicable exception to the general rule that a property owner has no legal duty to protect another from a third person's criminal act. See Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d at 837; Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756; Walker, 924 S.W.2d at 377; Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525.
In arguing that Walmart owed him a duty, Lacy cites Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, in which the Texas Supreme Court recognized an exception to the general no-duty rule when criminal conduct is foreseeable because of immediately preceding conduct. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 769. In Del Lago, verbal and physical hostilities occurred between a wedding party and fraternity members at a bar for approximately ninety minutes. Id. The bar continued to serve the "drunk rivals who were engaged in repeated and aggressive confrontations." Id. When bar staff attempted to close the bar and force the hostile parties to leave, a brawl ensued. Id. at 766. The Texas Supreme Court held that the bar owner had a legal duty to protect invitees from the criminal activity that resulted because the owner "had actual and direct knowledge that a violent brawl was imminent between drunk, belligerent patrons and had ample time and means to defuse the situation." Id. at 769. Although prior criminal acts are relevant under the Timberwalk factors, only "immediately preceding conduct" is relevant under the standard articulated in Del Lago. Id. at 769. Unlike the facts presented in Del Lago, in the instant case, the record does not contain evidence demonstrating that Walmart had either sufficient time to defuse the situation or the means to do so. See id. Moreover, the record in the instant case does not demonstrate that a violent crime immediately preceded the violent crime that resulted in Lacy's injury. See id. We therefore conclude that Del Lago is inapposite.
Lacy further argues that the Texas Supreme Court's adoption of "comment e to Section 302B of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS" in Golden Spread Council, Inc. No. 562 of the Boy Scouts of America v. Akins supports concluding that Walmart had a legal duty. See Golden Spread Council, Inc. No. 562 of Boy Scouts of Am. v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex. 1996). Paragraph D of comment e states that liability may exist "'[w]here the actor has brought into contact or association with the other a person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a particular opportunity or temptation for such misconduct.'" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B, cmt. e, para. D.)). In Golden Spread, the mother of a child who was molested by his scoutmaster sued Boy Scouts of America (BSA) and Golden Spread Council of the Boy Scouts of America (GSC) for negligent screening, training, and supervision. Id. at 288-89. The Texas Supreme Court balanced the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant, noted that public policy strongly favors protecting children from abuse, and concluded that "[o]n balance, all of these factors favor the imposition of a duty[.]" Id. at 290-91. Importantly, the Court concluded that GSC owed a duty to the minor and to his parents because it brought the minor into contact with a person that it knew or should have known was peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances that afforded a peculiar opportunity or temptation for such misconduct. Id. at 29193.
Unlike the facts presented in Golden Spread, Lacy is not a member of a vulnerable group, and the circumstances that existed at the Walmart store where he was injured did not afford a peculiar opportunity or temptation for misconduct such as Vanderkinter's aggravated assault of Lacy with a deadly weapon. See id. We therefore conclude that Golden Spread is inapposite. Because Lacy failed to establish that Walmart owed him a duty, he cannot recover on his claim for general common law negligence/negligent activity. See Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d at 144; Phillips, 801 S.W.2d at 525.
For all these reasons, we sustain issue one. Because Walmart's remaining issues would not result in greater relief, we need not address them. See TEX. R. APP. 47.1.
Disposition
Having sustained issue one after concluding that Walmart did not have a legal duty to protect Lacy from Vanderkinter's unforeseeable criminal conduct, we reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Lacy on his claims for premises liability and negligent activity and render judgment that Lacy take nothing from Walmart.
JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the oral arguments, appellate record, and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that there was error in the judgment entered by the court below and that same should be reversed and judgment rendered.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED by this Court that the judgment of the trial court in favor of Appellee, SCOTT A. LACY, is reversed and judgment is rendered that Appellee, SCOTT A. LACY, take nothing. All costs of this appeal are adjudged against Appellee, SCOTT A. LACY, for which let execution issue; and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.