Opinion
NO. 12-17-00312-CR
05-08-2018
WILLIAM WALLEY, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 217TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT ANGELINA COUNTY , TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
William Walley appeals from his convictions for aggravated sexual assault. In one issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The State charged Appellant with two counts of aggravated sexual assault against K.C. The indictment alleged that Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the penetration of (1) the sexual organ of K.C., a person who was then and there a disabled individual, by the defendant's sexual organ, without the consent of K.C., and (2) the mouth of K.C., a person who was then and there a disabled individual, by the defendant's sexual organ, without the consent of K.C. Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to both counts.
K.C. is a pseudonym. The indictment originally charged five counts, three of which the State abandoned, including a duplicate count.
At trial, K.C. testified that she was living with her grandmother and Appellant when the offenses occurred. The record indicates that Appellant was her grandmother's boyfriend, she was present during the sexual acts, and she was charged as a party to the offenses. K.C. explained that she suffers from seizures, for which she takes medication, struggles to "grasp" some things, and has some limitations, but is not "mentally retarded" or "dumb." When asked, she told the prosecutor that the purpose of sex was to "have babies." She explained that Appellant "put his thing in me" and put his "boy part" inside her "girl part." She testified that both she and Appellant were unclothed during these acts, Appellant took a pill beforehand, and Appellant put Vaseline on his "boy part." She also testified that Appellant put his "boy part" in her mouth and "white, yucky stuff came out." K.C. testified that she never participated in sexual acts before Appellant, that Appellant showed her how to do "some of the things," "it wasn't something good for me," and "I don't think that I want to do it ever again." She testified that Appellant "should not have had sex with me." However, K.C. also testified, "I wanted to try it, but I kind of changed my mind...I wasn't expecting it to be like that." During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:
Defense Counsel: Okay. You also said you wanted to have sex, but you really didn't like it?
K.C.: Yeah, I really didn't like it.
Defense Counsel: You really didn't like it, but you wanted to have sex during that time, didn't you?
K.C.: Yes.
Defense Counsel: So he did not force you into this, did he?
K.C.: No.
Defense Counsel: Okay. And you knew exactly what was going on, but you just did not know how it was going to feel?
K.C.: Yes.
...
Defense Counsel: Okay. All right. But nobody forced you to do this?
K.C.: No, nobody forced me. I just don't think I'll ever do that.
Madelyne Navarro, a forensic interviewer with Harold's House, testified that K.C. was twenty-four years old on the day of their interview. During the interview, K.C. stated that Appellant made her do things and touched her in inappropriate places. Specifically, Appellant "put it in her back side...he would also put it in her front side[]" and she had to "suck his front side and white, gooey stuff would come out." Navarro testified that K.C. demonstrated what occurred, which Navarro found unusual, but she felt that K.C. did not really know how to express what occurred and it was easier for her to demonstrate. Navarro testified that although K.C.'s interview revealed that sexual activity occurred, including oral sex, it left open whether that activity was vaginal or anal. Navarro explained that "K.C.'s functioning was a lot lower than a 24-year-old....[t]he questions that she was able to answer were more along the lines from like a 7 to 9-year-old." She did not believe that K.C. fully understood the acts engaged in.
Lisa King, a sexual assault nurse examiner, testified that she had to obtain a guardian's signature before examining K.C. because K.C. was "diagnosed with some mental deficits and was not truly capable of signing permission for herself." From reviewing K.C.'s medical records, King learned that K.C. suffered prolonged hypoxia as a child, meaning that she was deprived of oxygen, which is considered a brain injury or mental defect. King also testified that she had to change her method of communication because K.C.'s replies were "rather childlike." K.C. told King that Appellant put his "thing" in her "private," mouth, and butt. King testified that her exam revealed a healing abrasion through the posterior fourchette and a bruise on the cervix, but K.C. had no injuries to her hymen. King explained that the healing abrasion was consistent with someone who was inexperienced or an unwilling participant. She was unable to examine K.C.'s anus because it was "very, very painful." She testified that the results of the exam were consistent with the history of sexual activity relayed by K.C. Like Navarro, King did not believe that K.C. fully understood the nature of the acts engaged in.
Judy Holleman, director of special services at Newton Independent School District, testified to a school report from December 2009 when K.C. was eighteen years old. The report identified a diagnosis of seizure disorder with hypoxia and classified the condition as moderate. K.C.'s full scale IQ was represented by a score of fifty-nine, her verbal IQ a score of sixty-two, and her performance IQ a score of sixty-three, which Holleman testified are all in the "extremely low range." Holleman explained that K.C.'s verbal and performance IQ scores place her in the lowest one percentile. She further testified that, based on the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test, K.C.'s reading skills and comprehension fell within an equivalency range of first grade, her "pseudo-word decoding" ability or "false words, using content clues around the word to understand what it means" was of a second grade level, her numerical operations were third grade level, and her math reasoning fell within a first grade level. K.C.'s independent behavior fell within the following ranges: (1) gross motor skills - five years, eight months, (2) fine motor skills - three years, ten months, (3) social interaction - eight years, eleven months, (4) language comprehension - four years, nine months, (5) language expression - eight years, seven months, (6) eating and meal preparation - seven years, five months, (7) toileting - five years, six months, (8) dressing - five years, eight months, (9) self-care - ten years, two months, (10) domestic skills - four years, three months, (11) time and punctuality - six years, ten months, (12) money and value - four years, four months, (13) work skills - four years, and (14) home and community skills - one year, nine months. Holleman testified that K.C. rated in the less than .01 percentile in the motor skills category, .02 percent in the social, interaction, and communication skills category, .09 percent in the personal living category, and less than .01 percent in the community living skills category. Her overall independence was rated at five years, ten months, and her broad independence category score was too low to register on the applicable graph.
Holleman testified that K.C. passed the state testing, then known as the TAKS test. According to the 2009 report, K.C. received individual help when needed, was on task, received positive attention, and could work independently. Her auditory and visual skills appeared normal, her gross and fine motor skills appeared slightly abnormal, she had good oral communication skills, her writing was legible, her reading skill was below grade level, and she cooperated with staff.
Holleman also testified that IQ does not change significantly over time, although tasks may be learned. Thus, she would not expect any significant difference were K.C. tested ten, twelve, or even twenty years after the 2009 test. She opined that a person with K.C.'s types of scores would be unable to protect oneself from harm or be independently able to provide food, shelter, or medical care. Nor did she believe that such a person was "capable of appraising and understanding the nature of engaging in sexual relations with another person[.]"
Officer Rodney Cheshire with the Diboll Police Department testified that K.C.'s father told him that K.C.'s mental capabilities are that of a three to five-year-old and that K.C.'s mother told Cheshire that K.C.'s capabilities are that of a nine-year-old. K.C.'s father testified that, as a child, K.C. was placed on a machine as a result of oxygen deprivation and currently suffers from grand mal seizures. He explained that K.C. developed a mild learning disorder, but graduated from high school despite her learning disability. He testified that she was at one time in special education, she receives social security for the seizure disorder, and the social security funds are deposited into her own bank account. He testified that K.C. is not "mentally retarded," but is smart and in control of her financial and medical decisions.
Annie Henderson, Appellant's mother and a nurse, testified that K.C. seemed "stable" and "interacted well." She did not sense that K.C. was disabled. According to Henderson, K.C. enjoyed books, understood what Henderson was doing while cooking, had no hygiene problems, showered and brushed her teeth, was well oriented regarding her surroundings, did not need help dressing or combing her hair, and was well behaved. Although there may have been some times when Henderson felt the need to alert K.C. not to do something because it was inappropriate, Henderson observed no evidence of a low IQ.
K.C.'s great-uncle testified that K.C. lived with him for several months before trial and is capable of doing anything she wants to do other than reading. He admitted that it is obvious that she has a mental disability. He testified that she is "slow," but washes his work clothes, helps with housework, cooks, works in the yard, buys groceries, calls in her prescriptions, and talks with her doctors. He believed K.C. handled her own money. He testified that she does not have to be told when to go to bed or wake up, and is able to care for and protect herself. He also believed her capable of learning, living on her own, and holding a job with the proper training. He did not feel uncomfortable leaving her alone except for the seizures. He testified that K.C. can defend herself and he did not believe that someone could get her to do something she did not want to do.
K.C.'s great-aunt testified that K.C.'s learning ability decreased as a result of her seizures. She disagreed that K.C. has the mind of a nine or ten-year-old. She testified that K.C. makes her own decisions, is not told what to do, and can operate on her own aside from the seizures. She explained that K.C. can protect herself and does not appreciate being told what to do. As an example, she described a physical altercation between herself and K.C. when she attempted to tell K.C. not to do something. She admitted that K.C. always depended on others for food, shelter, and medical care, but that she has been very sheltered. She testified that the fact K.C. had been sheltered and with someone her entire life is all that separated her from other people her age. She further testified that K.C. prepares her food, dresses, bathes, checks the clock, and takes her medication. She believed that K.C. dramatically improved since the 2009 testing.
K.C.'s father explained that he felt "enraged" and reported Appellant to police after K.C. told him that Appellant "put his boy parts in her girl parts." However, when asked if he believed Appellant did anything wrong, K.C.'s father responded that K.C. consented and initially made up a story "thinking things were going to go a certain way, and they didn't go that way." On cross-examination, he told defense counsel that K.C. told him she consented, and he believed she has the ability to consent and is not defenseless. He testified K.C. is not disabled to the extent she could not give consent and that she is "pretty normal, other than being just spoiled rotten." Cheshire testified that there was never any evidence to prove that the sexual acts were forced.
According to K.C.'s great-uncle, she told him that she wanted to try sex but did not like it. He did not believe a crime had been committed, but believed K.C. capable of being able to appraise and resist. He further believed that she has the mental capacity to consent. K.C. told her great-aunt that she flirted with Appellant, wanted to have sex, had sex several times, and enjoyed it. Her great-aunt testified that K.C. did not appear pressured into it. She opined that K.C. has the ability to consent to sex, not consent to anything she does not want to do, and knows the consequences of sexual actions. She agreed that it would be a problem for an adult to have sex with a twenty-five-year-old who has the mind of an eight-year-old and there should be consequences. But, she did not believe Appellant did anything legally wrong.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of both counts of aggravated sexual assault and the trial court sentenced Appellant to sixty years on each count, to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions. Specifically, he maintains that the State failed to prove K.C.'s disability or that the sexual conduct at issue occurred without consent. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
In Texas, the Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson v . Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 316-17, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786-87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See id ., 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789. The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v . Florida , 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217-18, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.
Under this standard, we may not sit as a thirteenth juror and substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Dewberry v . State , 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899. Instead, we defer to the fact finder's resolution of conflicting evidence unless the resolution is not rational. See Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899-900. When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Clayton v. State , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime charged. See Williams v . State , 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v . State , 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.
As applicable to the present case, a person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual organ of another person by any means, without that person's consent; or causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by the sexual organ of the actor, without that person's consent, and the victim is a disabled individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (2)(C) (West Supp. 2017). A "disabled individual" is "a person older than 13 years of age who by reason of age or physical or mental disease, defect, or injury is substantially unable to protect the person's self from harm or to provide food, shelter, or medical care for the person's self." Id. § 22.021(b)(3). An aggravated sexual assault under Section 22.021 is without the consent of the other person if the aggravated sexual assault occurs under the same circumstances listed in Section 22.011(b). Id. § 22.021(c). Under Section 22.011(b)(4), a sexual assault is without a person's consent if the "actor knows that as a result of mental disease or defect the other person is at the time of the sexual assault incapable either of appraising the nature of the act or of resisting it[.]" Id. § 22.011(b)(4) (West Supp. 2017). Applicability of Texas Health and Safety Code
We first address Appellant's contention that K.C. is presumed competent to consent to sexual activity under the "Persons with an Intellectual Disability Act" (the Act). Appellant complains that the State failed to obtain a credible diagnostic test to determine K.C.'s intellectual disability, and contends that "the State's decision to use a skill set test nearly seven years old to make a prosecutorial determination that K.C. was 'disabled' due to mental defect violated K.C.'s right under Tex. Health & Safety Code § 592.021 to a 'presumption of competency.'" According to Appellant, K.C.'s consent was not coerced or the result of undue influence, and the "State's reliance on a high school test seven years' stale did not undermine K.C.'s presumption or Appellant's reasonable expectation of competency to consent."
Appellant correctly notes that the Act provides that "[e]ach person with an intellectual disability has the right to... [a] presumption of competency[.]" TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 592.021(1), 591.001 (short title) (West 2017). While Appellant is also correct that a person thought to have an intellectual disability has a "right promptly to receive a determination of an intellectual disability using diagnostic techniques that are adapted to that person's cultural background, language, and ethnic origin," such testing is expressly for the purposes of determining "if the person is in need of intellectual disability services as provided by Subchapter A, Chapter 593." Id. §§ 592.018 (determination of intellectual disability), 591.003(14) (West 2017) (defining "intellectual disability services") (emphasis added). Furthermore, although the Act defines when consent is legally adequate, which requires that consent be free from coercion or undue influence, that definition applies to issues encompassed by the Act, such as the provision of intellectual disability services by certain entities. Id. § 591.006(a), § 593.002 (consent required) (West 2017). The Act is expressly designed for the purpose of providing and assuring "a continuum of quality services to meet the needs of all persons with an intellectual disability in this state." Id. § 591.002(b) (West 2017).
In the present case, K.C.'s mental or physical disease or defect was at issue for purposes of determining Appellant's criminal liability, not whether she was entitled to a presumption of competency or diagnostic testing for purposes of intellectual disability services, or whether her consent was required under circumstances prescribed by the Act. As discussed previously, the penal code has its own set of provisions related to assaults on disabled individuals and when an assault is without consent. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.021(a)(2)(C), (b)(3), (c), 22.011(b)(4). It is the penal code, not the Act, that establishes a "system of prohibitions, penalties, and correctional measures to deal with conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens harm to those individual or public interests for which state protection is appropriate." Id. § 1.02 (West 2011). Accordingly, we decline to apply the Act's provisions to this case and, instead, we will apply the penal code's provisions that are specifically designed to address Appellant's criminal liability. Analysis
As previously discussed, K.C. admitted wanting to have sex, knowing what was happening, and not being forced to have sex. The jury also heard Officer Cheshire testify that there was no evidence of force, K.C.'s father testify that K.C. told him she consented, K.C.'s great-uncle testify that she told him she wanted to try sex, and K.C.'s great-aunt testify that K.C. told her she wanted to have sex. Accordingly, the questions Appellant raises are whether (1) K.C. qualifies as a "disabled individual," and (2) the sexual acts were without K.C.'s consent. Disabled Individual
The record demonstrates that K.C. suffers from a physical defect, i.e., seizures, and that the prolonged hypoxia she suffered as a child is considered a brain injury or mental defect. She has a vagus nerve stimulator implanted in her chest to stop an occurring seizure as long as someone is present to "swipe the magnet." K.C. admittedly has some "limitations," but the jury heard K.C. and other witnesses testify that she can bathe, dress, feed herself, and assist with various household duties. The record also contains evidence that K.C. communicates with her doctors, takes her medication, receives a disability check, and makes financial and medical decisions. K.C.'s great-aunt admitted that K.C. always depended on others for food, shelter, and medical care, but claimed this is a result of K.C. being sheltered. She and K.C.'s great-uncle believed that K.C. can protect herself and even live on her own. Her father believed she can do anything she wants to do, could survive on her own, and is capable of taking care of herself.
The record indicates that K.C.'s implant is stimulated by a magnet being swiped across the implant, which then causes the seizure to stop.
The record further contains evidence that K.C. attended special education classes before homeschooling, cannot drive, relies on others for transportation, does not go anywhere alone, a "grown up" must be present when she cooks, and her grandmother had been providing for her food, shelter, and medical care. K.C.'s great-uncle had concerns about leaving K.C. alone because of her seizures and her father testified that she cannot be left alone. K.C., twenty-five years old at the time of trial, admitted living with her grandmother almost her entire life. She testified that, without her grandmother, she could not get groceries or her prescriptions and could not get to her doctor's appointments. Nor did K.C. have a job. Additionally, Navarro testified that K.C.'s answers were more consistent with those given by a seven to nine-year-old, and King testified to changing her method of questioning because of K.C.'s childlike responses.
The jury also heard evidence that K.C.'s December 2009 testing characterized her condition as moderate and included a full scale IQ score of only fifty-nine, which Holleman described as "extremely low." Moreover, the testing placed K.C.'s independent behavior level no higher than that of a ten-year-old, including skill categories like eating and meal preparation, toileting, dressing, self-care, domestic ability, and work ability. Her overall independence skills rated at the level of a five-year old. Although the testing occurred several years before the offenses, the jury heard Holleman testify that IQ does not change significantly over time. She did not believe someone with K.C.'s IQ could provide food, shelter, or medical care for herself.
As factfinder, the jury bore the burden of determining the weight to give the 2009 test results and choosing which portions of the evidence to believe. See Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; see also McGregor v. State , 394 S.W.3d 90, 110 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref'd) ("A jury may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness's testimony."). Accordingly, the jury was entitled to credit evidence demonstrating that K.C. is, by reason of physical or mental disease, defect, or injury, substantially unable to protect herself from harm or provide food, shelter, or medical care for herself, and to disregard contrary evidence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(b)(3). In doing so, the jury could reasonably conclude that K.C. is a "disabled individual" as defined by the penal code. See id . Section 22 .011(b)(4)
Regarding K.C.'s capacity to appraise or resist, her testimony concerning actual consent or lack of actual consent is immaterial; rather, the issue is her capacity to consent. See Rider v . State , 735 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.). "The purpose of the effective consent provision of section 22.011(b) is to protect those whom the law deems incapable of consent." Id. If the law deems the complainant incapable of giving consent, she is likewise incapable of withholding consent. Id.
The jury heard conflicting evidence regarding K.C.'s ability to appraise the nature of the act or resist it. K.C.'s father, great-uncle, and great-aunt believed that K.C. has the ability to consent. Her great-uncle believed her capable of both appraising and resisting, and he did not believe that anyone could get her to do something against her will. K.C.'s great-aunt opined that K.C. is capable of withholding consent and she described a physical altercation that resulted on an occasion when she attempted to tell K.C. what to do. Additionally, the jury heard K.C. testify that she knew that sex was for having babies and that Appellant took a pill because he had problems having sex.
The jury also heard Navarro testify that K.C. had difficulty communicating what occurred with Appellant. King testified that K.C. was not capable of giving permission for King's exam. King and Navarro both expressed the belief that K.C. did not fully understand the acts engaged in. Holloman testified that a person with K.C.'s IQ scores was not capable of appraising and understanding the nature of engaging in sexual acts with another person. Even K.C.'s father testified that when K.C. told him she might be pregnant, he believed she thought her prenatal vitamins caused her to become pregnant.
Most importantly, the jury heard the childlike language used by K.C., both at trial and during interviews with Navarro and King, to describe the sexual acts committed by Appellant. During her testimony, K.C. testified that she was not sure she had ever heard the word "condom," she "kind of" understood what was going on in the courtroom, and she did not know what the "white, yucky stuff" was that came out of Appellant's "boy part." She also testified that during one instance she trembled a "little bit because I did not know what...it was about[.]" Accordingly, the jury was able to personally assess K.C.'s disabilities, manner of speech, demeanor, and testimony when considering her ability to appraise or resist the sexual acts. See Meuret v . State , 500 S.W.3d 539, 550 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (jury could personally assess A.T.'s mental disabilities, manner of speech, demeanor, and testimony regarding ability to appraise sexual act); see also Green v . State , No. 14-06-00535-CR, 2007 WL 2265787, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (jurors saw complainant take the stand and could judge for themselves from his manner of speech, demeanor, and testimony whether he was capable of appraising the sexual act). Given the jury's role of resolving conflicting evidence and the jury's ability to observe K.C. in the courtroom, the jury could reasonably conclude that, as a result of mental disease or defect, K.C. was at the time of the sexual assaults incapable of appraising the nature of the act or resisting it. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(4); see also Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; McGregor , 394 S.W.3d at 110; Rodriguez v. State , No. 14-06-00108-CR, 2007 WL 1892302, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 3, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (jury was in better position to determine whether complainant was capable of appraising nature of act or of resisting it than appellate court, and jury's finding would not be disturbed when supported by record).
With respect to Appellant's knowledge that, as a result of mental disease or defect, K.C. was incapable of appraising or resisting the nature of the act, "proof of a culpable mental state almost invariably depends on circumstantial evidence." Tottenham v. State , 285 S.W.3d 19, 28 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd). In addition to observing K.C.'s demeanor for themselves, the jurors heard testimony indicating that K.C.'s disability is immediately apparent. Moreover, K.C. resided with her grandmother and Appellant. The record indicates that K.C.'s grandmother was not only K.C.'s caregiver, but Appellant's girlfriend. K.C.'s grandmother helped organize K.C.'s "medicine box" and the record contains evidence that K.C. relied on her grandmother for transportation, food, shelter, and other care. Because Appellant resided in the same home with K.C. and her grandmother, the jury could infer that Appellant had sufficient opportunity to interact with K.C. and observe her characteristics and skills as to make him aware that K.C. had a mental disease or defect that, at a minimum, made her incapable of appraising the nature of the act. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(4). Thus, the jury could reasonably conclude that the offenses were committed without K.C.'s consent. See id . Summary
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that the jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant (1) intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of K.C.'s sexual organ, without her consent, (2) intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of K.C.'s mouth by his sexual organ, without her consent, and (3) K.C. is a disabled individual. See Brooks , 323 S.W.3d at 899; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(b)(4), 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), (2)(C), (D)(3), (c). Because the evidence is legally sufficient to support Appellant's convictions, we overrule his sole issue.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant's only issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice Opinion delivered May 8, 2018.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
Appeal from the 217th District Court of Angelina County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 2016-0690)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.