Opinion
C. A. 8:20-cv-03290-TMC-JDA
05-26-2021
Joseph Walker, Petitioner, v. Charles Williams, Jr., Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. [Doc. 28; 36.] Petitioner is a state prisoner who seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review post-trial petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Petitioner filed this Petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 8, 2020.[Doc. 1.] On February 22, 2021, Respondent filed a return and memorandum to the petition and a motion for summary judgment. [Docs. 27; 28.] On February 25, 2021, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Petitioner of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 30.] Petitioner's own motion for summary judgment was entered on the docket on April 30, 2021. [Doc. 36.] Respondent filed a reply on May 14, 2021. [Doc. 39.]
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on September 8, 2020. [Doc. 1-2 at 1 (envelope stamped received by prison mailroom on September 8, 2020).]
Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the Court recommends Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and Petitioner's motion for summary judgment be denied.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment of the Greenville County Clerk of Court. [Doc. 1 at 1.] In May 2012, Petitioner was indicted for one count of murder, one count of possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, two counts of distribution of cocaine base one-half mile from a school, park, or playground, and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base within the proximity of a school. [App. 210-21. On June 6, 2013, represented by C. Lance Sheek, Petitioner pled guilty under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and three counts of distribution of cocaine base within one-half mile of a school or park. [App. 1, 22-30.] He was sentenced to 30 years and 10 years respectively with credit for 541 days pursuant to the State's recommendation, with the sentences set to be served concurrently. [App. 34-35.]
The Appendix can be found at Docket Entry Numbers 27-2 and 27-3.
In Alford, the United States Supreme Court explained that a criminal defendant may simultaneously plead innocent and contest his innocence-that is, enter into a plea agreement without admitting guilt.
Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. [Doc. 1 at 2.]
PCR Proceedings
Petitioner filed a pro se application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) on June 17, 2014. [App. 37-44.] The PCR application, quoted substantially verbatim, alleged Petitioner was being held in custody unlawfully based on the following grounds and factual allegations:
(a) Applicant was denied the right to counsel Applicant was not represented by counsel a[t] guilty plea proceedings
(b) Ineffective assistance of counsel Applicant was not informed of right to appeal.[App. 39.] The State filed a return on August 22, 2014 [App. 45-47], and an amended return on January 7, 2015 [App. 60-64].
A hearing was held on December 11, 2017, and Petitioner was represented at the hearing by R. Mills Ariail, Jr. [App. 78-116.] The PCR judge subsequently issued an order denying the application and dismissing it with prejudice. [App. 201-09.]
Petitioner appealed. On December 10, 2018, Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter filed on Petitioner's behalf a Johnson petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of South Carolina. [Doc. 27-4.] The petition asserted the following as the sole issue presented: Whether “[t]he PCR judge erred in denying [P]etitioner's allegation that his pleas were given involuntarily because he was not aware of the rights he waived upon pleading guilty to the offenses charged against him.” [Id. at 3.] On January 22, 2019, Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se brief adding additional issues. [Doc. 27-5.] The appeal was transferred to the South Carolina Court of Appeals [Doc. 27-6], which denied the petition on August 13, 2020. [See Doc. 1 at 6.] Remittitur was issued on September 2, 2020, and filed on September 30, 2020. [Doc. 27-7.]
A Johnson petition is the PCR appeal analogue to an Anders brief, which effectively concedes the appeal lacks a meritorious claim. See Johnson v. State, 294 S.C. 310, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Although Petitioner and Respondent cite to exhibits that are purportedly included with their filings [Docs. 1 at 6; 27 at 4], the record before the Court does not appear to include the South Carolina Court of Appeals' decision denying the petition.
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
Petitioner filed this Petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 8, 2020. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner raises the following grounds and supporting facts, quoted substantially verbatim:
GROUND ONE: The PCR court erred in excepting Petitioner's plea under his continue denial of the charge was not intelligently giving.
Supporting facts: Petitioner was willing to take the plea on the drug charges, but was definitely clear he was willing and want[ed] to take the murder charge to trial because [he was] falsely accused. Plea counsel never advised Petitioner “plea options”. While Petitioner stood under “duress” by threat and pressure at the plea hearing; the state “sprang” a “plea suggestion” i.e., Alford plea right after the coercion of the plea court “compel conclusion” that everyone (in this courtroom) would be glad to take Petitioner up on going to trial on the murder charge. See Plea Record pg. 26 - 29..
GROUND TWO: Petitioner was denied to be fully inform to his notice of appeal or other procedural rights.
Supporting facts: Neither the Court or plea counsel had “advised
Petitioner at his plea hearing that he could file or confer a notice of appeal . . . because it was a plea that that if Petitioner disagree with the plea decision that he had an option to “withdrew” his plea or “reconsider the sentence is extraordinary circumstances, ” when Petitioner's continue denial of the murder, i.e., voluntary manslaughter conviction, even “after” the plea Court excepted his plea as free, voluntarily and with intelligence.[Doc. 1 at 5, 7.] The case is now ripe for review.
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Petition
Petitioner brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se petition is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the petitioner's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Habeas Corpus
Generally
Because Petitioner filed the Petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision, ” and “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101-02 (2011). Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Procedural Bar
Federal law establishes this Court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute permits relief when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” and requires that a petitioner present his claim to the state's highest court with authority to decide the issue before the federal court will consider the claim. Id. The separate but related theories of exhaustion and procedural bypass operate to require a habeas petitioner to first submit his claims for relief to the state courts. A habeas corpus petition filed in this Court before the petitioner has appropriately exhausted available state-court remedies or has otherwise bypassed seeking relief in the state courts will be dismissed absent unusual circumstances detailed below.
Exhaustion
Section 2254 contains the requirement of exhausting state-court remedies and provides as follows:
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (I) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.28 U.S.C. § 2254. The statute requires that, before seeking habeas corpus relief, the petitioner first must exhaust his state court remedies. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(A). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must fairly present his claim to the state's highest court.” Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011). Thus, a federal court may consider only those issues that have been properly presented to the highest state courts with jurisdiction to decide them.
In South Carolina, a person in custody has two primary means of attacking the validity of his conviction: (1) through a direct appeal, or (2) by filing an application for PCR. State law requires that all grounds for relief be stated in the direct appeal or PCR application. S.C. App. Ct. R. 203; S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-90; Blakeley v. Rabon, 221 S.E.2d 767, 770 (S.C. 1976). If the PCR court fails to address a claim as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-80, counsel for the applicant must make a motion to alter or amend the judgment. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Failure to do so will result in the application of a procedural bar to that claim by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Marlar v. State, 653 S.E.2d 266 (S.C. 2007). Further, strict time deadlines govern direct appeal and the filing of a PCR application in the South Carolina courts. For direct appeal, a notice of appeal must be filed and served on all respondents within ten days after the sentence is imposed or after receiving written notice of entry of the order or judgment. S.C. App. Ct. R. 203(b)(2), (d)(1)(B). A PCR application must be filed within one year of judgment, or if there is an appeal, within one year of the appellate court decision. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-45.
In Bostick v. Stevenson, 589 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2009), the Fourth Circuit found that, prior to the Supreme Court of South Carolina's November 5, 2007, decision in Marlar, South Carolina courts had not uniformly and strictly enforced the failure to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) as a procedural bar. 589 F.3d at 162-65. Accordingly, for matters in which there was a PCR ruling prior to November 5, 2007, the Court will not consider any failure to raise issues pursuant to Rule 59(e) to effect a procedural bar.
If any avenue of state relief is still available, the petitioner must proceed through the state courts before requesting a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. Richardson v. Turner, 716 F.2d 1059, 1062 (4th Cir. 1983); Patterson v. Leeke, 556 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1977). Therefore, in a federal petition for habeas relief, a petitioner may present only those issues that were presented to the Supreme Court of South Carolina through direct appeal or through an appeal from the denial of a PCR application, regardless of whether the Supreme Court actually reached the merits of the claim.
Procedural Bypass
Procedural bypass, sometimes referred to as procedural bar or procedural default, is the doctrine applied when a petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief based on an issue he failed to raise at the appropriate time in state court, removing any further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. In such a situation, the petitioner has bypassed his state remedies and, as such, is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal habeas petition. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has stated that the procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts. See id. Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings if a state has procedural rules that bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion. Id.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina will refuse to consider claims raised in a second appeal that could have been raised at an earlier time. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1727-90; Aice v. State, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (S.C. 1991). Further, if a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR application and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court. S.C. App. Ct. R. 203(d)(3), 243. If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); see also Kornahrens v. Evatt, 66 F.3d 1350, 1357 (4th Cir. 1995). As the United States Supreme Court explained:
. . . [State procedural rules promote] not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case.Reed, 468 U.S. at 10-11.
However, if a federal habeas petitioner can show both (1) “‘cause' for noncompliance with the state rule” and (2) “‘actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation[, ]'” the federal court may consider the claim. Smith, 477 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)). When a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedural requirements and cannot make the required showing of cause and prejudice, the federal courts generally decline to hear the claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Further, if the petitioner does not raise cause and prejudice, the court need not consider the defaulted claim. See Kornahrens, 66 F.3d at 1363.
If a federal habeas petitioner has failed to raise a claim in state court and is precluded by state rules from returning to state court to raise the issue, he has procedurally bypassed his opportunity for relief in the state courts and in federal court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). Absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice, a federal court is barred from considering the claim. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87. In such an instance, the exhaustion requirement is technically met, and the rules of procedural bar apply. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989); Matthews, 105 F.3d at 915.
Cause and Actual Prejudice
Because the requirement of exhaustion is not jurisdictional, this Court may consider claims that have not been presented to the Supreme Court of South Carolina in limited circumstances-where a petitioner shows sufficient cause for failure to raise the claim and actual prejudice resulting from the failure, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, or where a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” has occurred, Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96. A petitioner may prove cause if he can demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the default, show an external factor hindered compliance with the state procedural rule, or demonstrate the novelty of a particular claim, where the novelty of the constitutional claim is such that its legal basis is not reasonably available to the petitioner's counsel. Id. at 487-89; Reed, 468 U.S. at 16. Absent a showing of “cause, ” the court is not required to consider “actual prejudice.” Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 931 (4th Cir. 1995). However, if a petitioner demonstrates sufficient cause, he must also show actual prejudice to excuse a default. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492. To show actual prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate more than plain error. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134-35 (1982).
As an alternative to demonstrating cause for failing to raise the claim, the petitioner may show a miscarriage of justice. To demonstrate a miscarriage of justice, the petitioner must show he is actually innocent. See Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (holding a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs only in extraordinary cases, “where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent”). Actual innocence is defined as factual innocence, not legal innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). To demonstrate this actual innocence standard, the petitioner's case must be truly extraordinary. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496.
DISCUSSION
Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the underlying state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts before the court, id. § 2254(d)(2). The Supreme Court has held the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application of” clauses present two different avenues for relief. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. The Court stated there are two instances when a state court decision will be contrary to Supreme Court precedent:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.... A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.Id. at 405-06. Additionally, a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent when the decision “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case.” Id. at 407-08; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 102 (“Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.... It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.”). Finally, a decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent unless applicable Supreme Court precedent exists; without applicable Supreme Court precedent, there is no habeas relief for petitioners. Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 716 (7th Cir. 2008); see Bustos v. White, 521 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2008).
When evaluating a habeas petition based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, assuming the state court applied the correct legal standard-the Supreme Court's holdings in Strickland-“[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable. This is different from asking whether defense counsel's performance fell below Strickland's standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. “A state court must be granted a deference and latitude that are not in operation when the case involves review under the Strickland standard itself.” Id.; see also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003) (stating judicial review of counsel's performance is “doubly deferential when it is conducted through the lens of federal habeas”). Consequently, a “state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
In the specific context of a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, a prisoner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the prisoner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The Supreme Court further explained, In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court established that to challenge a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a prisoner must prove two elements: (1) his counsel was deficient in his representation and (2) he was prejudiced as a result. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the first prong, a prisoner must show that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. To satisfy the second prong, a prisoner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, ” and “[b]ecause of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689.
In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error “prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.... As we explained in Strickland v. Washington, supra, these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the “idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.”Hill, 474 U.S. at 59-60.
Thus, the habeas court must determine whether it is possible for fairminded jurists to disagree that the arguments or theories supporting the state court's decision are inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. Id.
Ground One
In Ground One, Petitioner contends that his pleas were involuntary due to him not receiving effective assistance of counsel. [Doc. 1 at 5.] This ground arguably covers two separate issues, both of which were considered by the PCR court-first, whether the pleas were involuntary and second, whether counsel was ineffective. Respondent submits that the PCR court properly considered and resolved these issues. [Doc. 27 at 13-23.]
Here, the PCR court addressed plea counsel's performance under the standards set forth in Strickland and Hill. [App. 204-06.] Specifically, after setting forth the Strickland and Hill standards, the PCR court stated,
Regarding Applicant's claim his guilty plea was induced by ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court finds Applicant has failed to meet his burden of proof. This Court finds Counsel provided effective assistance in this case and Applicant's decision to plead guilty was made freely and voluntarily. Counsel is a trial practitioner who had experience in the trial of criminal offenses. Counsel conferred with Applicant on multiple occasions, during which Counsel discussed the pending charges, the State's evidence, possible defenses and courses of action, and answered all of Applicant's questions.
This Court further finds the record reflects Applicant's plea was entered freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The plea judge explained the charges to Applicant, including the maximum penalties for each. The plea judge also went through Applicant's constitutional rights and questioned Applicant as to whether he understood those rights and wished to give them up to plead guilty. Applicant agreed that he did. Applicant admitted he was guilty of these offenses [and] told the plea judge that he was satisfied with his attorney. Applicant further told the plea judge no one had threatened him or made him any promises to get him to plead guilty, and he was doing so of his own accord. Additionally, Applicant told the plea judge he did not have any physical or mental issues which would prevent him from understanding the proceeding, and Applicant indicated he understood all of the plea judge's questions and had answered them honestly. This Court therefore finds that Applicant understood the terms of the plea and the possible sentences he could receive.
Therefore, this Court finds Applicant has failed to prove the first prong of the Strickland test - that Counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms. Applicant failed to present compelling evidence that Counsel committed either errors or omissions in his representation of Applicant. This Court also finds Applicant has failed to prove the second prong of Strickland - that he was prejudiced by Counsel's performance. This Court also finds that the record fully supports the knowing and voluntary nature of Applicant's guilty plea. See Roddy v. State, 339 S.C. 29, 34, 528 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2000) (holding defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory or constitutional rights in a guilty plea “must be established by a complete record, and may be accomplished by colloquy between court and defendant, between court and defendant's counsel, or both”). In addition, Applicant has presented no evidence or valid reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements made at the plea. See Dalton [v. State], 376 S.C. [130, ] 137, 654 S.E.2d [870, ] 874 [(S.C. Ct. App. 2007) ](“[Admissions] made during a guilty plea should be considered conclusive unless [an applicant] presents valid reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements.”). This Court concludes Applicant has not met his burden of proving Counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance. The allegation is denied and dismissed.[App. 206-07.]
Because the PCR court applied the correct legal standard and the record fails to demonstrate the court confronted a set of facts that were materially indistinguishable from those considered in a decision of the Supreme Court but arrived at a result different from Supreme Court precedent, the Court concludes the state court's decision was not contrary to applicable Supreme Court precedent. Thus, this Court must analyze ?whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101.
This Court cannot find that the PCR court's application of Strickland was unreasonable. As set forth above, in analyzing Petitioner's claim, the PCR court cited state law cases, which notably reflect principles for reviewing guilty pleas enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. See e.g., Roddy, 528 S.E.2d at 421. In addition, Applicant has presented no evidence or valid reasons why he should be allowed to depart from the truth of his statements made at the plea. See Dalton, 654 S.E.2d at 874. Of note, in denying Petitioner's claim, the PCR court relied heavily upon Petitioner's own statements at the time he pled guilty. A defendant's statements during a plea colloquy “carry a strong presumption of verity” that poses “a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). The undersigned cannot find that the PCR court's decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of those precedents. For all of the above reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to the various claims raised in Ground One. The undersigned, therefore, recommends that summary judgment be granted as to this ground.
Ground Two
In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges that he was denied the right to be fully informed of his right to appeal as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Doc. 1 at 7.] As with Petitioner's claim in Count One, the PCR court addressed plea counsel's performance under the standards set forth in Strickland and Hill. [App. 204-06, 208.] Specifically, after setting forth the Strickland and Hill standards, the PCR court stated,
Though counsel is required to make certain that a defendant is made fully aware of his or her right to appeal after a trial, a different standard applies to a guilty plea:
Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as when there is reason to think a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal) or when the defendant reasonably demonstrated an interest in appealing, there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be informed of the right to a direct appeal from a guilty plea.
Turner v. State, 380 S.C. 223, 224-25, 670 S.E.2d 373, 374 (2008) (citations omitted).
The Court finds no deficiency on the part of plea counsel or prejudice therefrom. The Court relies upon the credibility findings already set forth above, and finds Applicant never asked for an appeal and no other reason existed for plea counsel to believe Applicant wanted or would want an appeal. Accordingly, Applicant's request for relief by way of this allegation is denied and dismissed.[App. 207.]
As with Ground One, because the PCR court applied the correct legal standard and the record fails to demonstrate the court confronted a set of facts that were materially indistinguishable from those considered in a decision of the Supreme Court but arrived at a result different from Supreme Court precedent, the Court concludes the state court's decision was not contrary to applicable Supreme Court precedent. Thus, this Court must analyze ?whether the state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101.
This Court cannot find that the PCR court's application of Strickland was unreasonable. As set forth above, in analyzing Petitioner's claim, the PCR court cited the state law Turner decision, which notably reflect principles for reviewing guilty pleas enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. See Turner, 670 S.E.2d at 374. In addition, Petitioner has presented no evidence that counsel had any reason to believe that Petitioner would want to appeal his plea. The undersigned cannot find that the PCR court's decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of those precedents.
Citing Kinard v. State, 795 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 2016) (per curiam), Petitioner appears to argue that plea counsel was required “to seek to appeal from a guilty plea.” [Doc. 36-1 at 13.] However, Kinard is of no assistance to Petitioner here. Kinard holds that “[a] lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable.” Id. at 16. There was no evidence before the PCR court that Petitioner instructed plea counsel to file an appeal notice.
For all of the above reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief as to the various claims raised in Ground Two. The undersigned, therefore, recommends that summary judgment be granted as to this ground.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Respondent's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 28] be GRANTED, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 36] be DENIED, and the Petition be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.