Opinion
No. 05-09-00780-CR
Opinion issued April 29, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F08-39170-NI.
Before Justices BRIDGES, FITZGERALD, and FILLMORE.
OPINION
Donte H. Walker appeals following his adjudication for robbery. In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to two years' imprisonment. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to the offense of robbery. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on two years' community supervision, and assessed a $1500 fine. The State later moved to adjudicate, alleging appellant violated the terms of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded true to all of the allegations in a hearing on the motion. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at two years' imprisonment. In his sole point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to prison because the sentence is not necessary to prevent the recurrence of his criminal behavior. Appellant asserts that because he had been recently diagnosed with schizophrenia and depression, was unable to obtain employment, and lacked the communication skills needed to explain how he was arrested for disorderly conduct or what substance caused him to be charged with public intoxication, the trial court should have considered rehabilitation rather than a prison term. The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for appellate review and, alternatively, the trial court exercised its discretion within the zone of reasonable disagreement when it sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in his motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion). After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentence, and his motion for new trial complained that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for our review. Even if appellant had preserved error, however, his argument still fails. As a general rule, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for the offense is not excessive or unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). In this case, the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 29.02(b) (Vernon 2003). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the two-year sentence. See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal). We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.