In May 1999, petitioner recruited Gary Lee Griffin to help him “rob and kill a rich white man” and “take the money, take the jewels.” Pet. for Cert. 5 (internal quotation marks omitted); 282 Ga. 774, 774–775, 653 S.E.2d 439, 443, (2007). Petitioner and Griffin packed two bicycles in a borrowed *482 car, dressed in black, and took a knife and stun gun to Gresham's house.
See also OCGA § 17-10-1.2. As we explained in Walker v. State , 282 Ga. 774, 777 (5), 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), disapproved on other grounds by Ledford v. State , 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (2011), ‘‘background information about the victim that is not relevant to the issues in the guilt/innocence phase, particularly the sort of background information likely to engender the jury's sympathies, should not be presented to the jury during that phase.’’ Id. at 777 (5), 653 S.E.2d 439.
We have held that testimony regarding the emotional impact on the victim's family and the community must be controlled within the trial court's discretion but is not categorically improper. See Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 779-780 (11), 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007), disapproved on other grounds by Ledford v. State , 289 Ga. 70, 85 (14), 709 S.E.2d 239 (2011), disapproved on other grounds by Willis , 304 Ga. at 706 (11) (a) n.3, 820 S.E.2d 640. We have held that victim impact testimony should not encourage the jury to base its sentencing decision on factors such as "class or wealth."
We have held that testimony regarding the emotional impact on the victim's family and the community must be controlled within the trial court's discretion but is not categorically improper. See Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 779-780 (11) (653 S.E.2d 439) (2007), disapproved on other grounds by Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 85 (14) (709 S.E.2d 239) (2011), disapproved on other grounds by Willis, 304 Ga. at 706 (11) (a) n.3. We have held that victim impact testimony should not encourage the jury to base its sentencing decision on factors such as "class or wealth."
Accordingly, while it would have been preferable for the trial court to have admitted the photograph of the victim alone, without extraneous material that was unnecessary to aid in identifying him, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the document. The cases on which Keita relies, Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774 ( 653 SE2d 439) (2007), and Lucas v. State, 274 Ga. 640 ( 555 SE2d 440) (2001), are distinguishable. In Walker, the trial court permitted the victim's wife, over objection, to testify in "the guilt/innocence phase about the victim's church membership and his being a deacon."
Martin forfeited this issue for ordinary appellate review by failing to obtain a ruling on his motion. See Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 775(1), 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007) (addressing the waiver arising from the failure to obtain a ruling in the trial court), overruled on other grounds by Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 85(14), 709 S.E.2d 239 (2011). See also Division 6(d) below.
Indeed, of the nine reported noncapital cases in Georgia in which mental retardation was at issue, the defendant was able to successfully establish his mental retardation in five of them. The majority also notes that in Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439, 447 (2007), the co-defendant Griffin had been “adjudicated mentally retarded.” However, Griffin entered a plea of “guilty but mentally retarded,” rather than receiving that verdict at trial.
On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007). Then, in 2009, Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
APPENDIX Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335 (687 SE2d 438) (2009); Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774 (653 SE2d 439) (2007), disapproved on other grounds by Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 85 (709 SE2d 239) (2011); Tollette v. State, 280 Ga. 100 (621 SE2d 742) (2005); Perkinson v. State, 279 Ga. 232 (610 SE2d 533) (2005); Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47 (572 SE2d 583) (2002); Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34 (572 SE2d 595) (2002); Arevalo v. State, 275 Ga. 392 (567 SE2d 303) (2002); Butts v. State, 273 Ga. 760 (546 SE2d 472) (2001); King v. State, 273 Ga. 258 (539 SE2d 783) (2000); Jones v. State, 273 Ga. 231 (539 SE2d 154) (2000); Wilson v. State, 271 Ga. 811 (525 SE2d 339) (1999), overruled on other grounds by O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 768 (3) (670 SE2d 388) (2008); Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780 (514 SE2d 205) (1999); Whatley v. State, 270 Ga. 296 (509 SE2d 45) (1998); Bishop v. State, 268 Ga. 286 (486 SE2d 887) (1997); Jones v. State, 267 Ga. 592 (481 SE2d 821) (1997); McClain v. State,267 Ga. 378 (477 SE2d 814) (1996).
To the extent that Whitner or any other cases suggest otherwise, they are disapproved. In addition to Whitner, such cases arguably include Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 777 (4) ( 653 SE2d 439) (2007), Pittman v. State, 273 Ga. 849, 851, fn. 2 ( 546 SE2d 277) (2001), and Paul v. State, supra at 849 (3). Although Ledford's claim that the trial court's comments violated OCGA § 17-8-57 is reviewable as possible plain error, the claim must fail because the trial court's statement was not improper.