Opinion
No. 05-02-01519-CR.
Opinion issued June 4, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 219-80088-02. AFFIRMED.
Before Justices JAMES, FRANCIS, and LANG.
OPINION
Jamie Michael Walker appeals his conviction for sexual assault of a child. Appellant waived a jury trial and entered an open guilty plea. The trial court sentenced appellant to eight years' confinement. In two points of error, appellant contends he did not receive effective assistance of counsel and the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In his first point of error, appellant argues counsel failed to provide him with sufficient information to make an intelligent and voluntary plea. Appellant argues counsel failed to spend any meaningful amount of time with him preparing a defense, and counsel lacked knowledge of the merits of the case. Appellant argues he was harmed by counsel's failures and he would have gone to trial rather than plead guilty had counsel sufficiently informed him of the consequences of his plea. The State responds that appellant has not shown counsel was ineffective because the record is silent as to counsel's motivation for proceeding at trial as he did. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Bone v.State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). When facing a silent record as to defense counsel's strategy, the court will not speculate about defense counsel's tactics or guess what the reasons might be for taking or not taking certain actions. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Without evidence of the strategy and methods involved concerning counsel's actions at trial, the court will presume sound trial strategy. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. At the plea hearing held on May 21, 2002, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment, the punishment range for the offense, and the admonishments and the sex offender registration requirements. Appellant testified he was freely pleading guilty because he was guilty and for no other reason. The trial judge asked appellant if he was satisfied with the advice and counsel of his attorney. Appellant replied, "Yes, sir." Other than his bare statements, appellant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective or that the results of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's first point of error. In his second point of error, appellant contends the verdict is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction because it shows the complainant told him she was eighteen years of age before they began having sexual intercourse. The State responds the evidence is sufficient to show appellant's guilt. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State must introduce sufficient evidence into the record to support the plea and show the defendant is guilty, and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the basis for its judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15 (Vernon Supp. 2003); see also Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988). The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant, in writing, waives the appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses and consents to the introduction of documentary evidence in support of the judgment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15. When a defendant voluntarily enters a plea of guilty, we do not apply the Jackson "rationality" test in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. Ex parte Martin, 747 S.W.2d at 791 ( citing Ex Parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986)). Rather, we affirm the trial court's judgment if the evidence introduced embraces every essential element of the offense charged and is sufficient to establish a defendant's guilt. Stone v. State, 919 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of the female sexual organ of a child by any means. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). The record contains appellant's signed judicial confession that tracks the language in the indictment. At the sentencing hearing held on August 14, 2002, the State offered the judicial confession into evidence without objection by appellant. A judicial confession admitted into evidence and contained in the clerk's record is sufficient to prove appellant's guilt. Pitts v. State, 916 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Dinnery v. State, 592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980) (op. on reh'g). At the sentencing hearing, appellant testified he met S.H. at a job fair, they dated for about six months, and they began having sexual intercourse about one month after they began dating. Appellant testified that S.H. told him she was eighteen years old, but he later found out she was sixteen years old and still attending high school. Even after learning S.H.'s true age, appellant continued to have sexual intercourse with her about three to four times a week. Appellant further testified he was on felony probation from Chicago, Illinois at the time he was having sexual intercourse with S.H. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court complied with the provisions of article 1.15. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.