Opinion
2023-KA-00860-COA
11-12-2024
GARRICK LORENZO WALKER A/K/A GARRICK L. WALKER A/K/A GARRICK WALKER APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON DISTRICT ATTORNEY: PATRICIA A. THOMAS BURCHELL
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/29/2023
FORREST COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. JON MARK WEATHERS TRIAL JUDGE:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: ALEXANDRA LEBRON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: PATRICIA A. THOMAS BURCHELL
BEFORE BARNES, C.J., SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ.
BARNES, C. J.
¶1. A jury convicted Garrick Walker of statutory rape. The trial court sentenced Walker to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with four years to serve and six years suspended, and four years of post-release supervision. Walker appealed, arguing the interrogation video containing his confession was improperly admitted because it was obtained after he requested counsel. Additionally, he argues that his confession was coerced, and the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶2. The victim, Amanda, was fifteen years old when she met Walker, who was then twenty-six years old. Amanda met Walker walking to a friend's house; they introduced themselves and struck up a friendly conversation. Amanda testified that during their first encounter, she told Walker her real age, but he told her that he was only seventeen years old. She testified that they decided to have sex, and the first place they had sex was in the woods. Afterward, they exchanged phone numbers and began a two-month relationship.
The victim's name has been changed to protect her identity.
Walker stated he knew Amanda's mother.
¶3. At the time, Amanda lived with her grandmother and was going to counseling at Restoration House in Hattiesburg, Mississippi. In May 2022, instead of going home with her grandmother from a counseling session one evening, Amanda ran away from the facility to meet Walker. Amanda testified that she and Walker sometimes stayed at two abandoned houses where she also kept a secret stash of clothes. Her grandmother was not aware of this rendezvous. That night, Walker and Amanda retrieved some of her clothes. Then, Walker's grandmother picked them up from a park and took them to her apartment in Hattiesburg.
¶4. Amanda testified that she and Walker stayed at his grandmother's small apartment for three or four days, having sex multiple times. Amanda did not inform her grandmother where she was or whom she was with. Amanda admitted she had lied about her age to Walker's grandmother, telling her she was seventeen years old. While Walker's grandmother was in the living room, Walker and Amanda stayed in a bedroom that had an air mattress and a television, watching movies and having sex behind a locked door. After several days, Amanda asked Walker's grandmother to take her home to her mother's house. When Amanda eventually returned to her grandmother's house, Amanda told her where she had been and what she had been doing. Amanda's grandmother then took Amanda to the hospital, precipitating an investigation.
¶5. At the hospital, Detective Lashunda Buckhalter of the Hattiesburg Police Department spoke with Amanda and later interviewed her at the police department. Amanda told Detective Buckhalter that she and Walker had sex at his grandmother's apartment and gave their respective ages of fifteen and twenty-six years old. Due to Amanda's allegations, Detective Buckhalter charged Walker with statutory rape, and on June 1, 2022, a warrant was issued for his arrest out of Hattiesburg.
¶6. On June 4, 2022, Walker was arrested by Petal, Mississippi law enforcement under the Hattiesburg warrant. The Petal police lodged new charges against Walker of misdemeanor resisting arrest, misdemeanor disorderly conduct, and felony escape, all of which occurred while taking Walker into custody. On June 6, 2022, Walker made an initial appearance in the Petal Municipal Court for the felony escape charge, and that day, an order was entered appointing him a public defender for that charge. On the same day, Walker also had an initial appearance in the Hattiesburg Municipal Court for the statutory rape charge. Bail was set at $500,000; however, the record does not indicate Walker had yet been appointed counsel for that charge.
¶7. On June 7, 2022, Detective Buckhalter interviewed Walker at the Forrest County jail on his statutory rape charge, where he ultimately confessed to the crime. Walker was without counsel but waived his Miranda rights and voluntarily spoke with Detective Burkhalter about the charge. The eighteen-minute interrogation was video recorded, introduced at trial, and played for the jury.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
¶8. The tone of the interview between Detective Buckhalter and Walter was cordial and familiar. Walker stated his willingness to talk to her; so Detective Buckhalter read Walker his Miranda rights, and he signed a form acknowledging them. Walker then raised concerns to her that he had not been taken to court that day on his Petal misdemeanor charges of resisting arrest and disorderly conduct, and he did not want it "held against" him if he "got out" on the other charges. Detective Buckhalter responded that they should be able to check on that for him. Walker acknowledged that the day before (June 6), he had gone to court "on the other charge" but stated "that's why I say I need a public defender." Walker did not specifically reference the charges for which he was needing counsel, but from the context of the conversation, he was raising concerns about going to court for the Petal misdemeanor charges; he was not requesting counsel for the interview. At the time, Walker was interested in having the Petal misdemeanor charges resolved because he had already made his initial appearances the day before on the two felony charges of statutory rape (in Hattiesburg) and felony escape (in Petal). Detective Buckhalter proceeded to have Walker read out-loud a waiver-of-Miranda-rights form he had signed. The conversation then turned to the Hattiesburg statutory rape charge.
¶9. Walker spoke freely and voluntarily with Detective Buckhalter about the statutory rape charge. Initially, he denied having sex with Amanda, claiming all they did was "text." Walker stated that he had known Amanda "not even a year," and she had lied about her age, telling him she was eighteen years old. Walker then contended that his brother had sex with Amanda, but he had not. Detective Buckhalter responded that she knew Walker and Amanda had sex not once but multiple times. Next, she said, "[I]f you [are] honest with me, I can talk to the D.A.-say hey, he was honest about the whole situation." Detective Buckhalter then asked Walker how many times he had sex with Amanda, and he responded, "one-time, basically . . . when I was at my Grandma's house." Walker continued that when they had sex, he thought she was eighteen years old. Walker claimed he quit seeing Amanda upon learning Amanda's real age from her mother, with whom he had "chilled." Detective Buckhalter said she would let the district attorney know that he was honest, but she could not make any promises. Walker asked if he could "get probation," but Detective Buckhalter responded that she could not make that determination. However, the detective affirmed that Walker would have a public defender. Walker asked the detective again to request probation, but twice more she responded that she could not make any promises. Walker then asked when "Petal" was coming to see him, and Detective Buckhalter responded that she did not know.
¶10. On November 28, 2022, Walker was indicted for statutory rape under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-65(1)(a) (Rev. 2020). Before trial, the defense filed a motion in limine to suppress the statement Walker made to Detective Buckhalter, claiming the statement was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. Walker argued that he invoked his right to counsel during the interview and that the right is not offense specific. Because he had been appointed counsel during his felony escape initial appearance, Walker claimed the appointment carried over to this interrogation on the unrelated statutory rape charge; therefore, his waiver of rights was involuntary.
¶11. A hearing was held on the motion in limine, where the trial judge heard the testimony of both Detective Buckhalter and Walker and, importantly, watched the video of the interrogation. Detective Buckhalter testified that when she interviewed Walker, she provided him his Miranda rights and had him read the rights on a form, and then Walker signed a waiver, agreeing to speak to her without an attorney present. As an officer of the Hattiesburg Police Department, Detective Buckhalter testified that she would have no authority to speak with Walker about the Petal charges. She did not recall Walker's asking for an attorney during the interrogation. Walker, to the contrary, testified that he requested an attorney, but Detective Buckhalter nonetheless continued to question him. He admitted to signing the Miranda waiver form but claimed he did not understand why he did not have counsel.
¶12. The trial court denied Walker's motion in limine to suppress his statement, finding the interview was "a straight-up custodial interrogation," and Walker voluntarily waived his right to the presence of counsel. During the interview, the trial court noted that Walker seemed more concerned about his Petal charges than the Hattiesburg charge. The trial court found that Walker knew that Officer Buckhalter was a Hattiesburg police officer, and he was being interviewed about the statutory rape charge. Indeed, Officer Buckhalter never asked about the Petal charges. The trial court determined that the video showed Walker was "not specifically invoking the right to counsel, . . . but instead was telling [Detective Buckhalter] he wanted to be appointed a public defender on the Petal charges so those would be resolved and he would be eligible for bond on the statutory rape charge." In denying his motion to limine, the trial court concluded:
Walker was given the Miranda rights warning prior to custodial interrogation and that under the "totality of the circumstances" he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, that he freely and voluntarily made the statements to Detective Buckhalter and that such statements were not the product of promises, threats, or inducements.
¶13. At trial, Amanda and Detective Buckhalter testified for the State, while Walker's grandmother testified for the defense. Walker's grandmother testified that Amanda and Walker stayed at her apartment together on only one occasion. She picked them up from a park and took them to her apartment, where they stayed in a room with the door closed for one night and most of the following day. However, she denied that they had sex while there because she would have heard them. She also testified that Amanda told her she was seventeen years old.
¶14. The jury found Walker guilty of statutory rape. The trial court denied Walker's posttrial motions, and he now appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion in Limine to Suppress the Interrogation Video
¶15. Walker argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his interrogation video because his statement was obtained after he requested and was improperly denied counsel. Also, Walker claims the trial court erred in finding that he waived his Miranda right to counsel because Walker did not reinitiate questioning after requesting counsel, and Detective Buckhalter continued questioning him. Due to these alleged errors, Walker requests this Court reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial.
¶16. The appellate court "will only reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress 'if the ruling is manifest error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.'" Moore v. State, 287 So.3d 905, 911 (¶20) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Barnes v. State, 30 So.3d 313, 316 (¶8) (Miss. 2010)).
A. Request for Counsel
¶17. Walker argues his statement was improperly obtained after he requested counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Walker claims that he was requesting counsel for the statutory rape charge; thus, the trial court's finding that his request for counsel was related to the Petal charges was manifest error and against the weight of the evidence.
"The Sixth Amendment provides that 'in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defen[s]e.'" Neal v. State, 57 So.3d 1271, 1278 (¶19) (Miss. 2011) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (discussing the distinction between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel)). The right is offense-specific, and it attaches once prosecution has commenced. Id.
¶18. The rules governing the right to counsel are well established. When the accused invokes the right to have counsel present during a custodial interview or after criminal proceedings have begun, interrogation must cease until counsel is present. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981); McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. The "applicability of the '"rigid" prophylactic rule' of Edwards requires courts to first 'determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel,'" which is "an objective inquiry." Barnes, 30 So.3d at 317 (¶9) (emphasis in original) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1994)).
¶19. "The right to have an attorney present must be 'specifically invoked.' This may be accomplished 'in any manner and at any stage of the process.'" Armstrong v. State, 281 So.3d 962, 966 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 856 (Miss. 1991)). "A defendant is not required to use specific language such as 'I want a lawyer' to invoke the right to counsel." Id. (quoting Montoya v. Collins, 955 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1992)). "Instead, the right is asserted by 'some kind of positive statement or other action that informs a reasonable person of the defendant's desire to deal with the police only through counsel.'" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087, 1096 (Miss. 1997)). "Once a defendant expresses his 'unequivocal election of the right,' his subsequent agreement to waive his rights is invalid unless he initiated further discussion." Id. at 967 (¶13) (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 797 (2009)).
¶20. The trial court found that "Walker did not specifically invoke the right to counsel" but, instead, was asking Officer Buckhalter about obtaining a public defender on the "Petal charges" in order to resolve them so that he would be eligible for bail on the statutory rape charge and possibly be released from jail. After a careful review of the interrogation-interview video, we find no error with the trial court's findings. At the time of the interview, Walker was most concerned about getting released from the Forrest County jail but did not want his potential release "held against" him on other charges for which he had not yet appeared in court. He mentioned to Detective Buckhalter concern about going to court on his Petal misdemeanor charges and needing a public defender. Detective Buckhalter did not specifically respond to his remark because the Petal charges were neither a part of her jurisdiction as a Hattiesburg police officer nor the reason for her interview. After he confessed, she assured him he would still have a public defender for the Petal charges.
¶21. Walker argues that "[r]egardless of whether [his] request for counsel [was] explicit or equivocal, the court must give a broad interpretation to all such requests," citing Holland, 587 So.2d at 856. If his request was equivocal, Walker claims the "the interrogation may only continue within a narrow scope to clarify the meaning of the equivocal statement," citing Holland and Kuykendall v. State, 585 So.2d 773, 777 (Miss. 1991). Finally, Walker cites Barnes for the proposition that if "the request [was] plain, all questioning must stop."
¶22. Walker's argument is misplaced. First, Walker did not invoke his right to counsel for the interview itself but for future representation for the Petal charges. Walker takes his remark out of the context in which it was made. Second, Mississippi has adopted the United States Supreme Court holding in Davis that an invocation of counsel "must be unambiguous," and even "an ambiguous mention of possibly speaking with one's attorney is insufficient to trigger the right to counsel." Grayson v. State, 806 So.2d 241, 247 (¶11) (Miss. 2001) (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). In Barnes, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained the current law on what constitutes a request for counsel during custodial interrogations:
A defendant must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis reiterated that there is no requirement that police clarify whether or not a defendant actually wants an attorney when the defendant makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement. The Court said that, although clarifying questions are good police practice, "we decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him."Barnes, 30 So.3d at 317 (¶9) (citations omitted). Taking Walker's statement within "the context in which it was made does not indicate an explicit request for an attorney." See id. at 318 (¶13) (reaffirming Davis that when the defendant fails to make an unambiguous, unequivocal request for an attorney, the investigator has no obligation to cease questioning). Further, even if we were to consider his remark a request for counsel, it was not unambiguous. Walker's remark was made within the context of concern about his Petal charges, not the statutory rape charge which was the reason for Detective Buckhalter's interview. Since the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "'offense' specific," it "attaches once the government has initiated charges 'with respect to a particular alleged crime.'" Howell v. State, 163 So.3d 240, 253 (¶33) (Miss. 2014) (quoting Weeks v. State, 804 So.2d 980, 995 (¶55) (Miss. 2001)). While charges had been initiated for both the Petal and Hattiesburg crimes, Detective Buckhalter was not interviewing Walker about the Petal charges, and Walker admitted as much in the interview. The trial court properly found, "As the right to counsel is offense-specific, asking about a public defender on another charge was not an unequivocal election of the right to counsel."
¶23. The trial court did not err in finding that Walker did not actually invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and that his remark was related to the Petal charges. Walker asserted no positive statement or action to Detective Buckhalter that he "desire[d] to deal with the police only through counsel" regarding the statutory rape charge. Because Walker did not invoke counsel, there was no violation of Walker's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
B. Waiver of Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
¶24. Walker argues the trial court erred in finding he waived his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. Walker contends that his Miranda waiver was invalid because once he invoked his right to counsel, Detective Buckhalter was prohibited from having Walker sign the Miranda waiver. Further, Walker claims that he did not initiate further discussion with Detective Burkhalter after he requested counsel; therefore, Detective Buckhalter improperly continued the interview to obtain his confession.
¶25. "[I]nterrogation may commence or resume in the absence of an attorney if the defendant (1) initiates further discussions with the police and (2) knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right invoked." Armstrong, 281 So.3d at 966 (¶12) (citing Holland, 587 So.2d at 855). Whether a suspect has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily "waived his or her Miranda rights is a factual question that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances." Franklin v. State, 170 So.3d 481, 490 (¶33) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984)).
¶26. The trial court found Walker was properly given his Miranda warnings prior to the custodial interrogation, and he "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" waived them. Walker then "freely and voluntarily" gave his statement to Detective Buckhalter. We find no error in this regard.
¶27. First, as stated above, Detective Buckhalter was under no obligation to cease questioning because Walker did not invoke his right to counsel during the interview. Second, our review of the interrogation video clearly shows Walker initiated discussion with Detective Buckhalter about the statutory rape charge. The interview began with Detective Buckhalter's asking Walker, "You wanna talk to me?" and his responding affirmatively. Detective Buckhalter read Walker his Miranda rights, and he signed the form, indicating he understood them. Then, Walker stated he had a question about going to court that day on the Petal misdemeanor charges, and that is why he needed a public defender. Detective Buckhalter said she would check on the court date. Next, she had Walker read aloud the waiver-of-rights form, and he signed it while the two were laughing and joking. Then the following exchange occurred:
Walker: I've just been coolin' back, layin' back, waitin' for HPD [Hattiesburg Police Department].
Detective: You knew it was comin'.
Walker: I ain't lyin'.
Detective: I know. I want you to be honest with me now .... I'm givin' you the benefit of the doubt to be honest now. Alright. So, I came to talk to you about this (inaudible). Tell me about it. Come on.
Walker: Like I said . . . (Pause) What did they say had happened?
Detective: Y'all had a relationship.
Walker: Who? (Incredulously).
Detective: I know you've been over to her house-all that.
Walker then proceeded to freely and voluntarily discuss with Detective Buckhalter the Hattiesburg statutory rape charge without counsel, at first denying the charge but ultimately confessing to the sexual encounter. At no time during the interview did Walker invoke his right to remain silent or request counsel. Walker made an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and responded to Detective Buckhalter, who was under no obligation to cease questioning. This issue is without merit.
II. Walker's Confession
¶28. Walker contends for the first time on appeal that his confession was coerced and thus involuntary, in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Walker suggests that if we find this argument procedurally barred, we should review it for plain error. Alternatively, Walker argues his counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue to the trial court.
¶29. Walker's motion in limine to suppress the video statement was based on his alleged invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda, but Walker never made any argument before the trial court that his confession was coerced and thus involuntary. "Asserting grounds for an objection on appeal that differ[] from the ground given for the objection at the trial level does not properly preserve the objection for appellate review." Roberts v. State, 234 So.3d 1251, 1262 (¶29) (Miss. 2017) (quoting Woodham v. State, 779 So.2d 158, 161 (¶12) (Miss. 2001)).
¶30. A similar situation arose in Roberts. There, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statement he gave to law enforcement admitting to the crimes of kidnapping and statutory rape because the confession was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. Id. at 1258 (¶13). Specifically, he claimed that he had previously invoked his right to counsel and his right to remain silent and refused to sign the waiver of rights form before his confession. Id. The trial court denied his motion, finding the confession admissible. Id. at 1259 (¶19). For the first time on appeal, the defendant argued that any waiver of rights was involuntary because he was induced to confess by promises made by law enforcement. Id. at 1260 (¶21). However, the defendant never made this argument before the trial court, where his arguments "were limited wholly to Miranda." Id. at 1262 (¶28). The Mississippi Supreme Court explained, "It is important to recognize that 'a clear distinction exists between the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda and the voluntariness of a confession itself under both the federal Due Process Clause and Mississippi law.'" Id. at 1261 (¶28) (quoting Keller v. State, 138 So.3d 817, 850 (¶74) (Miss. 2014)). The supreme court held that although the trial court found Roberts's confession voluntary, his failure to argue before the trial court that it was the product of "coercive promises" procedurally barred the issue on appeal. Id. at 1262 (¶29).
¶31. The same holds true here. The trial court made a finding that Walker's confession was voluntary and "not the product of promises, threats, or inducements" without further analysis. Walker now argues his confession was involuntarily coerced, never having made this argument before the trial court; thus, it is procedurally barred on appeal.
¶32. Even if the argument were preserved for appeal, it is without merit. "A defendant's confession may be allowed into evidence over objection only where the trial judge finds the confession was intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made, rather than bargained for with promises, threats, or inducements by law enforcement officers." Johnson v. State, 129 So.3d 148, 150 (¶10) (Miss. 2013) (citing Wilson v. State, 936 So.2d 357, 361 (¶8) (Miss. 2006); Manix v. State, 895 So.2d 167, 180 (¶39) (Miss. 2005)). Whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which "will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Franklin, 170 So.3d at 485 (¶14). "Once a trial judge determines admissibility, the defendant[] faces a heavy burden in trying to reverse on appeal." Ruffin v. State, 992 So.2d 1165, 1169 (¶8) (Miss. 2008) (citing Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 826 (¶26) (Miss. 1998)).
¶33. Walker argues that his confession was coerced because Detective Buckhalter promised Walker she would talk to the district attorney if Walker were "honest." This comment occurred about half-way through the interview after Walker denied several times that he had had sex with Amanda. Following the comment, Walker confessed that he had sex with Amanda "one time, basically, when I was at my Grandma's house." At the end of the interview, Detective Buckhalter said she would talk to the district attorney's office and let the office know he was honest with her. She also told Walker no less than three times that she could not make any promises when he asked her to request probation.
¶34. "If a confession is the result of threat, inducements or promises-however slight-it is not voluntary." Moffett v. State, 354 So.3d 929, 942 (¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Burford v. State, 320 So.3d 502, 511 (¶17) (Miss. 2021)). "The test in such cases is whether the inducement is of a nature calculated under the circumstances to induce a confession irrespective of its truth or falsity...." Id. (quoting Robinson v. State, 247 Miss. 609, 612-13, 157 So.2d 49, 51 (1963)). However, "[t]he Mississippi Supreme Court has held that 'a mere exhortation to tell the truth is not an improper inducement that will result in an inadmissible confession.'" Id. (quoting Harden v. State, 59 So.3d 594, 605 (¶26) (Miss. 2011)); see Moore v. State, 493 So.2d 1301, 1302-03 (Miss. 1986) (The supreme court held that statement by interrogating officer to defendant that "he should go ahead and tell the truth" was not an implied promise of leniency, but if officer had said "it would be easier on him if he told the truth," it would have been "over the line.").
¶35. Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237 (Miss. 1989), is also instructive. There, the supreme court found that, although troubling, the defendant's confession was not coerced when the interrogating officer told the defendant that "if he were to be cooperative with the investigation, the district attorney would be informed of this fact." Id. at 239. The supreme court, citing over a dozen cases from other jurisdictions, held that when law enforcement makes such promises to relate the defendant's cooperation to the district attorney, but the promises are "accompanied by no other coercive psychological tactics," they do not "constitute an implied promise of leniency or advantage." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, in Greer v. State, 818 So.2d 352, 356-57 (¶¶12, 14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), which cites Layne as analogous, the interrogating officer promised to inform the district attorney that the defendant had cooperated but did not attach any promise of leniency. This Court affirmed that the statement was voluntary. Id. at 358 (¶16).
¶36. As in Layne and Greer, here there was no reward attached to Detective Buckhalter's promise to tell the district attorney of Walker's truthfulness. While her encouragement to "be honest" did lead Walker to admit he had sex with Amanda, the detective specifically told Walker she could not make any promises of leniency or requesting probation. Procedural bar notwithstanding, the trial court did not err in finding from the totality of the circumstances and beyond a reasonable doubt that Walker's confession was voluntary and not a product of promises, threats, or inducements.
¶37. In the alternative, Walker argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the issue of a coerced, involuntary confession before the trial court. As we find no merit to his involuntary-confession argument, his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument is without merit.
III. Weight of the Evidence
¶38. Lastly, Walker argues that the jury's verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. He claims his confession had no evidentiary value because it was improperly admitted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his Fifth Amendment right against involuntary self-incrimination. Further, he contends that Amanda's testimony was inconsistent and uncorroborated.
¶39. The trial court's grant or denial of a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Little v. State, 233 So.3d 288, 292 (¶21) (Miss. 2017). The evidence will be weighed "in the light most favorable to the verdict." Id. The verdict will only be disturbed "when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice." Id. (quoting Lindsey v. State, 212 So.3d 44, 45 (¶4) (Miss. 2017)). The reviewing court cannot "reweigh the evidence or make witness-credibility determinations." Id. at (¶20). "Instead, 'when the evidence is conflicting, the jury will be the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony.'" Id. (quoting Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss. 1980)).
¶40. In challenging the weight of the evidence, Walker points out inconsistencies in Amanda's version of the events. For example, Amanda never told Detective Buckhalter about having sex with Walker in the woods or in abandoned houses, facts she testified to at trial. Further, when Amanda went with Walker to stay at his grandmother's apartment, she first testified she brought clothes from home but later testified she had retrieved clothing hidden in two abandoned houses. Walker also points out that his grandmother's testimony conflicted with Amanda's testimony. While Amanda testified she stayed three or four days at the apartment, Walker's grandmother claimed that Amanda stayed only one day and that there was no indication of sexual activity between Walker and Amanda. Walker also attempts to challenge Amanda's credibility because she ran away from home and was disobedient to her mother and grandmother.
¶41. First, as discussed above, the admission of Walker's confession was not in violation of either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment and was properly admitted. His confession served to corroborate much of Amanda's testimony. Although there were discrepancies between Amanda's and Walker's version of events, they were minor. Both admitted they had sex, at least once, at the apartment of Walker's grandmother. Amanda consistently maintained this fact during her interview with Detective Buckhalter and at trial. While Walker's grandmother claimed Walker and Amanda did not have sex, she admitted the couple stayed in a different room with the door closed. Even though Walker argues that Amanda was not a credible witness because she was a disobedient runaway, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony. The jury apparently believed Amanda's testimony over that of Walker's grandmother.
¶42. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Walker's motion for a new trial. The verdict was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that allowing it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.
CONCLUSION
¶43. The trial court did not err in denying Walker's motion to suppress his interrogation video. Walker's confession was not improperly obtained. Further, the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm Walker's conviction and sentence.
¶44. AFFIRMED.
CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, SMITH, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR.
McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.